2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army 2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

samhouston.army.mil
from samhouston.army.mil More from this publisher
18.08.2013 Views

App. 21, R.C.M. 307(b) APPENDIX 21 Fed.R.Crim. P. 4(b). (c) How to allege offenses. Subsection (1) is based on paragraph 24a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The nomenclature of charge and s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s i m b e d d e d i n t h e c o d e . C o m p a r e A r t i c l e s 3 0 , 34(b), 43(b), 45(b), 54(a), 61, and 62 with Fed.R.Crim. P. 7(c)(1). Taking both the charge and specifications together, the practice is entirely consistent with Fed.R.Crim. P.7. There is no need in military practice for the differentiating nomenclature for indictments and informations (Fed.R.Crim P.7(a)); in military practice the same charges progress through the pretrial system without any change in nomenclature, regardless of the level of court-martial by which they are ultimately disposed. See U.S. Const, amend. V. That further permits military practice to disregard waiver of indictment (Fed.R.Crim. P.7(b)) insofar as the pleadings are conc e r n e d . F i n a l l y , m i l i t a r y p r a c t i c e d o e s n o t i n v o l v e c r i m i n a l forfeitures in the same sense as federal civilian practice. Cf. Fed.R.Crim. P.7(c)(2). Subsection (2) is based on paragraph 24a and appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The definition is consistent with that part of Fed.R.Crim. P.7(c)(1) which requires that “The indictment or information shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated.” The first paragraph of the accompanying discussion is based on paragraph 27 and appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The sources of the lettered subsections of the discussion are: (A) Numbering charges —paragraph 24, and paragraph 3 of appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (B) Additional charges —id. (C) Preemption —Article 134; (D) Charges under the law of war —paragraph 12 of appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (3) restates Fed.R.Crim. P.7(c)(1) in military terms. That definition is consistent with paragraph 24 a and Chapter VI of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The test of sufficiency of a specification follows United States v. Sell, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 202, 11 C.M.R. 202 (1953); paragraph 87 a(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Paragraph 29d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) is deleted as unnecessary. A specific format for specifications is not prescribed. See also Introductory Discussion, Part IV. 2004 Amendment: The Rule was amended by modifying language in the Discussion at (H)(ix), and moving it in to the text of the Rule, to emphasize that facts that increase maximum authorized punishments must be alleged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Prior convictions are not required to be alleged in a specification because Apprendi and Jones exempt prior convictions from those aggravating factors that must be included in charging documents and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. R.C.M. 1004 already establishes capital sentencing procedures that satisfy an accused’s constitutional rights in this area. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The sources of the lettered subsection of the accompanying discussion are: (A) Sample specifications —paragraph 26 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (B) Numbering specifications —paragraph 3 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); A21-22 (C) Name and description of the accused; (i) Name —paragraphs 4 and 5 of appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (ii) Military association —paragraph 4 of appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (iii) Social Security or service number —paragraphs 4 and 6 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (note that the social security or service number ordinarily is entered in the data at the top of the charge sheet; see Appendix 4); and (iv) Basics of personal jurisdiction —United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414 (C.M.A. 1977). See also Analysis, subsection (e)(3) Discussion (F) (Subject-matter jurisdiction) of this rule. (D) Date and time of offense —paragraph 7 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). As to “on or about,” see United States v. Heard, 443 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1971); (E) Place of offense —paragraph 7 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (F) Subject-matter jurisdiction —United States v. Alef, supra. A s t o s u b s e c t i o n ( i i i ) , U n i t e d S t a t e s v . T r o t t i e r , 9 M . J . 3 3 7 (C.M.A. 1980) (jurisdiction over drug offenses). As to subsection (iv), United States v. Newvine, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 208, 48 C.M.R. 9 6 0 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . K e a t o n , 1 9 U . S . C . M . R . 6 4 , 4 1 C.M.R. 64 (1969). The guidance here is not prescriptive, just as the inclusion of subject-matter jurisdiction in the sample specifications (Part IV) is always parenthetical, a reminder and not as a requirement. The Working Group does not consider any particular format for such pleadings required by Alef. Questions of jurisdiction are interlocutory questions to be decided by the military judge applying a preponderance standard. See R.C.M. 905(c); 907(b)(1)(A), and United States v. Ruiz, 4 M . J . 8 5 ( C . M . A . 1 9 7 7 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . K u r i g e r , 4 M . J . 8 4 ( C . M . A . 1 9 7 7 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . C h e r r y , 4 M . J . 8 3 ( C . M . A . 1977); United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 28n.1 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Jessie, 5 M.J. 573 (A.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 5 M.J. 300 (1978). See also United States v. Laws, 11 M.J. 475 (C.M.A. 1981). Ordinarily this finding will not be disturbed by findings by exceptions and substitutions on the general issue of guilt because of the higher standard of proof involved in such d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . S e e g e n e r a l l y J a m e s , P l e a d i n g s a n d P r a c t i c e under United States v. Alef, 20 A.F.L. Rev. 22 (1978). 1995 Amendment: The discussion was amended in conformance with a concurrent change to R.C.M. 203, in light of Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). O’Callahan v. Parker , 395 U.S. 258 (1969), held that an offense under the code could not be tried by court-martial unless the offense was “service connected.” Solorio overruled O’Callahan. (G) Description of offense. —The sources of the section are: (i) Elements —paragraph 28 a(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (ii) Words indicating criminality — id.; (iii) Specificity —paragraphs 28 a, 69 b, and 87 a(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (iv) Duplicity —paragraph 28 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); accord, Fed.R.Crim. P.7,8. ( H ) O t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n d r a f t i n g s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . — T h e sources of the sections are:

( i ) P r i n c i p a l s — p a r a g r a p h 9 o f a p p e n d i x 6 a o f M C M , 1969(Rev.); (ii) Victim —paragraph 10 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (iii) Property —paragraph 13 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (iv) Value —paragraph 11 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (v) Documents —paragraph 28 c, and paragraph 14 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (vi) Orders —(a), (b)- id.; (c) Negating exceptions- United States v. Cuffee, 10 M.J. 381 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Gohagen, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 175, 7 C.M.R. 51 (1953); ( v i i ) O r a l S t a t e m e n t s — p a r a g r a p h 2 8 c o f M C M , 1 9 6 9 (Rev.); (viii) Joint offenses —paragraph 26 d and paragraph 8 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); (ix) Matters in aggravation —paragraph 127 c (Table of Maximum Punishments) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Venerable, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 174, 41 C.M.R. 174 (1970). Subsection (4) is less restrictive than the former and traditional military practice reflected at paragraphs 25, 26 b and c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) which favored trial of all known offenses at a single trial, but complicated that policy with policies against joining major and minor offenses and accumulating charges. The confusion is eliminated by leaving to the discretion of the convening a u t h o r i t y w h i c h c h a r g e s a n d s p e c i f i c a t i o n s w i l l b e t r i e d . S e e R.C.M. 601(d) and accompanying discussion. The rule in this subsection does not follow Fed.R.Crim. P.8(a), because that rule is entirely too unwieldy for a military criminal system, particularly in combat or deployment. Subsection (5) follows Fed.R.Crim. P.8(b). The civilian rule is consistent with the former approach of paragraph 26 d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The present rule goes even further by making it possible to allege related offenses against co-actors on a single charge sheet, but the rule does not require that approach. The rule is also consistent with the provision for common trials of paragraph 33 1 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). (d) Harmless error in citation. The subsection restates in military nomenclature Fed.R.Crim. P.7(c)(3). The subsection is consistent with paragraphs 27 and 28 c, and paragraph 12 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It is not intended to provide a comprehensive rule on harmless error in drafting specifications. Rule 308 Notification to accused of charges ( a ) I m m e d i a t e c o m m a n d e r . T h i s s u b s e c t i o n p a r a p h r a s e s p a r a - graphs 32 f(1) and 33 c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Article 30. This subsection deletes the requirement for a report of the circumstances that make compliance impossible. The use of a certificate of notification is encouraged in the discussion. The identification of known accusers, including persons who ordered charges to be preferred, is new and protects the accused against unauthorized acts by such persons. See Article 1(9). The certificate requirement is abandoned only as a requirement, and use of such certificates remains advisable, since they give evidence of compliance with Article 10. However, to require a ANALYSIS App. 21, R.C.M. 401(d) certificate might risk an excessive remedy for a mere administrative failure to complete the certificate properly. There is no precisely analogous rule in the federal civilian rules, though the federal civilian rules do reach the same end—to notify an accused of the pendency of the allegations. Fed.R.Crim. P.4 (arrest or summons upon complaint), 5 (initial appearance), 5.1 (preliminary examination), 6 (grand jury), 7 (indictment, information), and 9 (warrant or summons upon indictment or inform a t i o n ) a l l p r o v i d e a c i v i l i a n d e f e n d a n t w i t h n o t i c e o f t h e impending prosecution. The purpose of the subsection is to permit the accused to begin preparing a defense. United States v. Stebbins, 33 C.M.R. 677 (C.G.B.R. 1963). The subsection originates in Articles 10 and 30 and is one of the fundamental rights of an accused. United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951). It gains additional importance in this respect since the right of both the United States and the accused to take depositions arises upon preferral. Article 49(a). (b) Commanders at higher echelons. This subsection reflects the same continuing duty to give notice of the preferred charges that appeared at paragraph 33 c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). (c) Remedy. This subsection is new and is based on the approach taken in United States v. Stebbins, supra, and consistent with paragraph 58 (continuances and postponements) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). CHAPTER IV. FORWARDING AND DISPOSITION OF CHARGES Rule 401 Forwarding and disposition of charges in general (a) Who may dispose of charges. This subsection is based on paragraphs 5, 32, 33, 35, and 128 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Articles 15, 22-24. The second sentence is based on United States v. Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956); United States v. Rembert, 47 C.M.R. 755 (A.C.M.R. 1973), pet. denied, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 598 (1974). See also United States v. Hardy, 4 M.J. 20 (C.M.A. 1977). A superior authority who withholds from a subordinate the authority to dispose of offenses (see R.C.M. 306) or charges may later modify or rescind such withholding. Even if such modification or rescission is denominated a “delegation,” it would be a rescission of the earlier withholding. (b) Prompt determination. This subsection is based on Article 30(b) and the first sentence of paragraph 30 i of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion is also based on paragraphs 30 f, 32 b, c, f(1), 33 a, d, m, and 35 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). (c) How charges may be disposed of. This subsection is based on paragraphs 32 and 33 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Most matters in those paragraphs, including the mechanics of forwarding charges, have been placed in the discussion as the practices of the services vary because of differing command structures. Specific requirem e n t s a n d a d d i t i o n a l d e t a i l s m a y b e p r o v i d e d b y s e r v i c e regulations. (d) National security matters. This subsection is based on the first sentence in the second paragraph of paragraph 33 f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also R.C.M. 407(b) and Article 43(e). A21-23

( i ) P r i n c i p a l s — p a r a g r a p h 9 o f a p p e n d i x 6 a o f M C M ,<br />

1969(Rev.);<br />

(ii) Victim —paragraph 10 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969<br />

(Rev.);<br />

(iii) Property —paragraph 13 of appendix 6 a of MCM,<br />

1969 (Rev.);<br />

(iv) Value —paragraph 11 of appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969<br />

(Rev.);<br />

(v) Documents —paragraph 28 c, and paragraph 14 of appendix<br />

6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.);<br />

(vi) Orders —(a), (b)- id.; (c) Negating exceptions- United<br />

States v. Cuffee, 10 M.J. 381 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v.<br />

Gohagen, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 175, 7 C.M.R. 51 (1953);<br />

( v i i ) O r a l S t a t e m e n t s — p a r a g r a p h 2 8 c o f M C M , 1 9 6 9<br />

(Rev.);<br />

(viii) Joint offenses —paragraph 26 d and paragraph 8 of<br />

appendix 6 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.);<br />

(ix) Matters in aggravation —paragraph 127 c (Table of<br />

Maximum Punishments) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v.<br />

Venerable, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 174, 41 C.M.R. 174 (1970).<br />

Subsection (4) is less restrictive than the former and traditional<br />

military practice reflected at paragraphs 25, 26 b and c of MCM,<br />

1969 (Rev.) which favored trial of all known offenses at a single<br />

trial, but complicated that policy with policies against joining<br />

major and minor offenses and accumulating charges. The confusion<br />

is eliminated by leaving to the discretion of the convening<br />

a u t h o r i t y w h i c h c h a r g e s a n d s p e c i f i c a t i o n s w i l l b e t r i e d . S e e<br />

R.C.M. 601(d) and accompanying discussion. The rule in this<br />

subsection does not follow Fed.R.Crim. P.8(a), because that rule<br />

is entirely too unwieldy for a military criminal system, particularly<br />

in combat or deployment.<br />

Subsection (5) follows Fed.R.Crim. P.8(b). The civilian rule is<br />

consistent with the former approach of paragraph 26 d of MCM,<br />

1969 (Rev.). The present rule goes even further by making it<br />

possible to allege related offenses against co-actors on a single<br />

charge sheet, but the rule does not require that approach. The rule<br />

is also consistent with the provision for common trials of paragraph<br />

33 1 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />

(d) Harmless error in citation. The subsection restates in military<br />

nomenclature Fed.R.Crim. P.7(c)(3). The subsection is consistent<br />

with paragraphs 27 and 28 c, and paragraph 12 of appendix 6 a of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It is not intended to provide a comprehensive<br />

rule on harmless error in drafting specifications.<br />

Rule 308 Notification to accused of charges<br />

( a ) I m m e d i a t e c o m m a n d e r . T h i s s u b s e c t i o n p a r a p h r a s e s p a r a -<br />

graphs 32 f(1) and 33 c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Article 30.<br />

This subsection deletes the requirement for a report of the circumstances<br />

that make compliance impossible. The use of a certificate<br />

of notification is encouraged in the discussion. The identification<br />

of known accusers, including persons who ordered charges to be<br />

preferred, is new and protects the accused against unauthorized<br />

acts by such persons. See Article 1(9).<br />

The certificate requirement is abandoned only as a requirement,<br />

and use of such certificates remains advisable, since they give<br />

evidence of compliance with Article 10. However, to require a<br />

ANALYSIS<br />

App. 21, R.C.M. 401(d)<br />

certificate might risk an excessive remedy for a mere administrative<br />

failure to complete the certificate properly.<br />

There is no precisely analogous rule in the federal civilian<br />

rules, though the federal civilian rules do reach the same end—to<br />

notify an accused of the pendency of the allegations. Fed.R.Crim.<br />

P.4 (arrest or summons upon complaint), 5 (initial appearance),<br />

5.1 (preliminary examination), 6 (grand jury), 7 (indictment, information),<br />

and 9 (warrant or summons upon indictment or inform<br />

a t i o n ) a l l p r o v i d e a c i v i l i a n d e f e n d a n t w i t h n o t i c e o f t h e<br />

impending prosecution.<br />

The purpose of the subsection is to permit the accused to begin<br />

preparing a defense. United States v. Stebbins, 33 C.M.R. 677<br />

(C.G.B.R. 1963). The subsection originates in Articles 10 and 30<br />

and is one of the fundamental rights of an accused. United States<br />

v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951). It gains additional<br />

importance in this respect since the right of both the United States<br />

and the accused to take depositions arises upon preferral. Article<br />

49(a).<br />

(b) Commanders at higher echelons. This subsection reflects the<br />

same continuing duty to give notice of the preferred charges that<br />

appeared at paragraph 33 c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />

(c) Remedy. This subsection is new and is based on the approach<br />

taken in United States v. Stebbins, supra, and consistent with<br />

paragraph 58 (continuances and postponements) of MCM, 1969<br />

(Rev.).<br />

CHAPTER IV. FORWARDING AND DISPOSITION<br />

OF CHARGES<br />

Rule 401 Forwarding and disposition of charges<br />

in general<br />

(a) Who may dispose of charges. This subsection is based on<br />

paragraphs 5, 32, 33, 35, and 128 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See<br />

Articles 15, 22-24. The second sentence is based on United States<br />

v. Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956); United<br />

States v. Rembert, 47 C.M.R. 755 (A.C.M.R. 1973), pet. denied,<br />

23 U.S.C.M.A. 598 (1974). See also United States v. Hardy, 4<br />

M.J. 20 (C.M.A. 1977). A superior authority who withholds from<br />

a subordinate the authority to dispose of offenses (see R.C.M.<br />

306) or charges may later modify or rescind such withholding.<br />

Even if such modification or rescission is denominated a “delegation,”<br />

it would be a rescission of the earlier withholding.<br />

(b) Prompt determination. This subsection is based on Article<br />

30(b) and the first sentence of paragraph 30 i of MCM, 1969<br />

(Rev.). The discussion is also based on paragraphs 30 f, 32 b, c,<br />

f(1), 33 a, d, m, and 35 a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).<br />

(c) How charges may be disposed of. This subsection is based on<br />

paragraphs 32 and 33 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Most matters in<br />

those paragraphs, including the mechanics of forwarding charges,<br />

have been placed in the discussion as the practices of the services<br />

vary because of differing command structures. Specific requirem<br />

e n t s a n d a d d i t i o n a l d e t a i l s m a y b e p r o v i d e d b y s e r v i c e<br />

regulations.<br />

(d) National security matters. This subsection is based on the<br />

first sentence in the second paragraph of paragraph 33 f of MCM,<br />

1969 (Rev.). See also R.C.M. 407(b) and Article 43(e).<br />

A21-23

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!