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2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

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App. 21, R.C.M. 201(f) APPENDIX 21<br />

cle 18. This subsection is substantially the same as paragraph 14<br />

of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), although it has been reorganized for clarity.<br />

Several statements in MCM, 1969 (Rev.) concerning punishm<br />

e n t s b y g e n e r a l c o u r t s - m a r t i a l h a v e b e e n p l a c e d i n t h e<br />

discussion. As to the second sentence in subsection (1)(A)(i), see<br />

also Wickham v. Hall, 12 M.J. 145 (C.M.A. 1983); Wickham v.<br />

Hall, 706 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1983).<br />

The source for subsection (2) is Article 19. Subsection (2) is<br />

based on paragraph 15 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), although it has<br />

been reorganized for clarity. Note that under subsection (2)(C)(ii)<br />

a general court-martial convening authority may permit a subordinate<br />

convening authority to refer a capital offense to a special<br />

court-martial. This is a modification of paragraph 15 a(1) of<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which said a general court-martial convening<br />

authority could “cause” a capital offense to be referred to a<br />

special court-martial without specifying whether the convening<br />

a u t h o r i t y h a d t o m a k e t h e r e f e r r a l p e r s o n a l l y . S u b s e c t i o n<br />

(2)(C)(iii) permits the Secretary concerned to authorize special<br />

court-martial convening authorities to refer capital offense to special<br />

courts-martial without first getting authorization from a gene<br />

r a l c o u r t - m a r t i a l c o n v e n i n g a u t h o r i t y . S e v e r a l s t a t e m e n t s i n<br />

MCM, 1969 (Rev.) have been placed in the discussion.<br />

2002 Amendment: Subsections (f)(2)(B)(i) and (f)(2)(B)(ii)<br />

were amended to remove previous limitations and thereby implement<br />

the amendment to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 819 (Article 19, UCMJ)<br />

contained in section 577 of the National Defense Authorization<br />

Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999).<br />

Subject to limitations prescribed by the President, the amendment<br />

i n c r e a s e d t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l m a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t a t s p e c i a l<br />

courts-martial to confinement for one year and forfeitures not<br />

exceeding two-thirds pay per month for one year, vice the previous<br />

six-month jurisdictional limitation.<br />

A s t o s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) s u m m a r y c o u r t s - m a r t i a l a r e t r e a t e d<br />

separately in R.C.M. 1301–1306.<br />

(g) Concurrent jurisdiction of other military tribunals. This subsection<br />

is based on the last paragraph in paragraph 12 of MCM,<br />

1969 (Rev.).<br />

Rule 202 Persons subject to the jurisdiction of<br />

courts-martial<br />

(a) In general. This subsection incorporates by reference the provisions<br />

of the code (see Articles 2,3,4, and 73) which provide<br />

jurisdiction over the person. See also Articles 83, 104, 106. The<br />

discussion under this subsection briefly described some of the<br />

more important requirements for court-martial jurisdiction over<br />

persons. Standards governing active duty servicemembers (Article<br />

2(a)(1)) are emphasized, although subsection (4) brings attention<br />

to limitations on jurisdiction over civilians established by judicial<br />

decisions.<br />

Subsection (2)(A) of the discussion dealing with inception of<br />

jurisdiction over commissioned officers, cadets, midshipmen, warrant<br />

officers, and enlisted persons is divided into three parts. The<br />

first part, enlistment, summarizes the area of the law in the wake<br />

of the amendment of Article 2 in 1979. Act of November 9, 1979,<br />

Pub.L. No. 96–107, § 801(a), 93 Stat. 810–11. In essence, the<br />

amendment eliminated recruiter misconduct as a factor of legal<br />

significance in matters involving jurisdiction, and reestablished<br />

and clarified the “constructive enlistment” doctrine. The statutory<br />

enlistment standards concerning capacity under 10 U.S.C. §§ 504<br />

A21-10<br />

and 505 thus become critical, along with the issue of voluntariness.<br />

As to whether an enlistment is compelled or voluntary,<br />

compare United States v. Catlow, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 142, 48 C.M.R.<br />

758 (1974)with United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 (C.M.A.<br />

1978) and United States v. Lightfoot, 4 M.J. 262 (C.M.A. 1978).<br />

See also United States v. McDonagh, 14 M.J. 415 (C.M.A. 1983).<br />

The second paragraph under (i) Enlistment is based on United<br />

S t a t e s v . B e a n , 1 3 U . S . C . M . A . 2 0 3 , 3 2 C . M . R . 2 0 3 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ;<br />

United States v. Overton, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 684, 26 C.M.R. 464<br />

(1958); and 10 U.S.C. § 1170. The last sentence is based on<br />

Article 2(c) which provides that in case of constructive enlistment,<br />

jurisdiction continues until “terminated in accordance with<br />

law or regulations promulgated by the Secretary concerned.”<br />

The last paragraph restates Article 2(c). The last sentence of<br />

that paragraph takes account of the legislative history of Article<br />

2(c). See S.Rep. No. 197, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1979), which<br />

i n d i c a t e s t h a t U n i t e d S t a t e s v . K i n g , 1 1 U . S . C . M . A . 1 9 , 2 8<br />

C.M.R. 243 (1959) is overruled by the statute. This is also reflected<br />

in the first paragraph under (ii) Induction.<br />

The first paragraph of (ii) Induction is (with the exception of<br />

the application of the constructive enlistment doctrine,see the<br />

immediately preceding paragraph) based on United States v. Hall,<br />

17 C.M.A. 88, 37 C.M.R. 352 (1967); United States v. Rodriguez,<br />

2 U.S.C.M.A. 101, 6 C.M.R. 101 (1952); United States v. Ornelas,<br />

2 U.S.C.M.A. 96 C.M.R. 96 (1952). See also Billings v.<br />

Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944); Mayborn v. Heflebower, 145<br />

F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 854 (1945).<br />

The second paragraph under (ii) Induction is based on United<br />

S t a t e s v . S c h e u n e m a n n , 1 4 U . S . C . M . A . 4 7 9 , 3 4 C . M . R . 2 5 9<br />

( 1 9 6 4 ) . S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . W i l s o n , 4 4 C . M . R . 8 9 1<br />

(A.C.M.R. 1971). Although no military case has so held, dicta<br />

and Scheunemann supports the second sentence.<br />

As to (iii) Call to active duty, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 672, 673 and<br />

673(a), See also United States v. Peel, 4 M.J. 28 (C.M.A. 1977).<br />

The second paragraph of this section reflects decisions in United<br />

States v. Barraza, 5 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v.<br />

Kilbreth, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 390, 47 C.M.R. 327 (1973).<br />

1986 Amendment: Paragraph (2)(A)(iii) of the Discussion was<br />

amended and paragraph (5) was added to reflect amendments to<br />

Articles 2 and 3 of the UCMJ contained in the “Military Justice<br />

Amendment of 1986,” tit. VIII, § 804, National Defense Authorization<br />

Act for fiscal year 1987, Pub.L. No. 99–661, 100 Stat.<br />

3905 (1986), which, among other things, preserves the exercise of<br />

jurisdiction over reservists for offenses committee in a duty status,<br />

notwithstanding their release from duty status, if they have<br />

time remaining on their military obligation. The legislation also<br />

provides express statutory authority to order reservists, including<br />

members of the National Guard of the United States and the Air<br />

National Guard of the United States who commit offenses while<br />

serving on duty under Title 10 of the United States Code, to<br />

active duty for disciplinary action, including the service of any<br />

punishment imposed.<br />

The first paragraph under (B)Termination of jurisdiction over<br />

active duty personnel restates the basic rule. See United States v.<br />

Brown, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 693, 31 C.M.R. 297 (1962); United States<br />

v. Scott, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 29 C.M.R. 462 (1960). See also<br />

United States v. Griffin, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 213, 32 C.M.R. 213<br />

(1962).<br />

Subsection (B)(i) is based on United States v. Wheeley, 6 M.J.

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