2008 edition - Fort Sam Houston - U.S. Army

(i) That the accused burned or set on fire a
certain structure;
(ii) That the act was willful and malicious;
(iii) That there was a human being in the
structure at the time;
(iv) That the accused knew that there was a
human being in the structure at the time; and
(v) That this structure belonged to a certain
person and was of a certain value.
(2) Simple arson.
(a) That the accused burned or set fire to certain
property of another;
(b) That the property was of a certain value;
and
(c) That the act was willful and malicious.
c. Explanation.
(1) In general. In aggravated arson, danger to human
life is the essential element; in simple arson, it
is injury to the property of another. In either case, it
is immaterial that no one is, in fact, injured. It must
be shown that the accused set the fire willfully and
maliciously, that is, not merely by negligence or
accident.
(2) Aggravated arson.
(a) Inhabited dwelling. An inhabited dwelling
includes the outbuildings that form part of the cluster
of buildings used as a residence. A shop or store
is not an inhabited dwelling unless occupied as such,
n o r i s a h o u s e t h a t h a s n e v e r b e e n o c c u p i e d o r
which has been temporarily abandoned. A person
may be guilty of aggravated arson of the person’s
dwelling, whether as owner or tenant.
(b) Structure. Aggravated arson may also be
committed by burning or setting on fire any other
structure, movable or immovable, such as a theater,
church, boat, trailer, tent, auditorium, or any other
sort of shelter or edifice, whether public or private,
when the offender knows that there is a human being
inside at the time. It may be that the offender
had this knowledge when the nature of the structure—as
a department store or theater during hours
of business, or other circumstances—are shown to
have been such that a reasonable person would have
known that a human being was inside at the time.
(c) Damage to property. It is not necessary that
the dwelling or structure be consumed or materially
injured; it is enough if fire is actually communicated
to any part thereof. Any actual burning or charring
52.f.(1)(b)
is sufficient, but a mere scorching or discoloration
by heat is not.
(d) Value and ownership of property. For the
offense of aggravated arson, the value and ownership
of the dwelling or other structure are immaterial,
but should ordinarily be alleged and proved to
permit the finding in an appropriate case of the included
offense of simple arson.
(3) Simple arson. “Simple arson” is the willful
and malicious burning or setting fire to the property
of another under circumstances not amounting to
aggravated arson. The offense includes burning or
setting fire to real or personal property of someone
o t h e r t h a n t h e o f f e n d e r . S e e a l s o p a r a g r a p h 6 7
(Burning with intent to defraud).
d. Lesser included offenses.
(1) Aggravated arson.
(a) Article 126—simple arson
(b) Article 80—attempts
(2) Simple arson. Article 80—attempts
e. Maximum punishment.
( 1 ) A g g r a v a t e d a r s o n . D i s h o n o r a b l e d i s c h a r g e ,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement
for 20 years.
(2) Simple arson, where the property is—
(a) Of a value of $500.00 or less. Dishonorable
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
confinement for 1 year.
(b) Of a value of more than $500.00. Dishonorable
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
and confinement for 5 years.
f. Sample specifications.
(1) Aggravated arson.
(a) Inhabited dwelling.
In that (personal jurisdiction data), did,
(at/on board—location) (subject-matter jurisdiction
data, if required), on or about 20 ,
willfully and maliciously (burn) (set on fire) an inh
a b i t e d d w e l l i n g , t o w i t : ( t h e r e s i d e n c e
o f ) ( ) , ( t h e p r o p e r t y
o f ) o f a v a l u e o f ( a b o u t )
$ .
(b) Structure.
In that (personal jurisdiction data), did,
(at/on board—location) (subject-matter jurisdiction
data, if required), on or 20 , willfully
and maliciously (burn) (set on fire), knowing
that a human being was therein at the time, (the Post
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