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Psychosocial Notebook, Volume 2, October 2001
ultimately became independent from Ottoman rule anyway, this myth was
regenerated and revitalized. It “retained its vigour because it carries its
promise that Serbia would resurrect as a mighty empire, instead of remaining
a small, landlocked country” (Anzulovic, 1999: 5). Thus:
The myths dealing with the loss of the medieval empire served to create
a nationalist frenzy at the moment when the anticipated breakdown of the
post-war order imposed by the communists and the Serbian domination
of communist Yugoslavia’s armed forces… seemed to provide a unique
opportunity for the realisation of the central promise of Serbia mythology
– the creation of a Second Serbian Empire (Anzulovic, 1999: 2).
From this brief description of Anzulovic’s argument, and keeping in mind
the fact that Serb culture emerged historically out of a sociocultural
environment of hardship and repression, it is important to underline how,
in Serbia, a collectivist identity sustained by a narcissist libidinal economy
was hegemonic, and was articulated by narratives of self-victimization,
moral superiority and omnipotence. These narratives were consistent with
a hyper-moralized and authoritarian moral world and with a mode of subjectivation
in which dynamics of authoritarian repression of individual
impulsions and desires were widely hegemonic, as this was instrumental
in guaranteeing the survival of a collectivist identity. This mode of subjectivation
should be seen as an element of continuity in the process of
historical development of Serbian culture and society, beyond the specific
ideological narratives through which it was articulated in different forms.
From this perspective, pre-Communist Serbo-centric nationalism,
Communist Yugoslavism and post-Communist nationalism should be seen
as different cultural and political strategies, which are in turn shaped by the
same authoritarian and narcissistic model of subjectivation throughout history.
This brought Serbia to be the principal promoter and main locus for
the articulation of different versions of Yugoslav identity as a cultural strategy
to assert hegemony over neighbouring countries.
Following this idea, one might turn to Andrew Wachtel and his analysis of
the three main phases of Yugoslavian nationalism, from its first emergence
in the early nineteenth century to its current expression. In the words of
Wachtel, these phases could be “differentiated on the issue of how a
national culture should be created and on what it should be based”
(Wachtel, 1998: 5). According to the first version of Yugoslavian nationalism
promoted by Slovenes, Croats and Serbs sometime between 1830 and
1840, “the South Slavs would, for all intents and purposes, have adopted a
slightly modified form of Serbian culture”, as the Serbs were the largest
southern Slavic group as well as the first to throw off external rule and
create an autonomous state in modern times (Wachtel, 1998: 5). Around
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