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particular, its levels of success and sustainability are still not adequately known (Mbaiwa, 2004). 7.3.1 Background to Community Based Natural Resource Management The driving force behind the introduction of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in East and Southern Africa from the 1980s was a result of factors such as: the threat of species extinction due to the over-utilisation of resources, especially wildlife through poaching; the inability of the state to protect its declining wildlife resources; land use conflicts between rural communities living in resource areas and resource managers, especially wildlife managers; and the need to link conservation and development (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995). These factors led to the adoption of CBNRM as an alternative strategy of natural resource management. According to Mbanefo and de Boerr (1993), local involvement in natural resource use and management has been successfully implemented in Zimbabwe since 1986 through the Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). According to Ashley (1995), local involvement in natural resource management was implemented through the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) programme in Namibia. In Mozambique, it has been accomplished successfully through Tchuma Tchato 'Our Wealth', and in Kenya through the Conservation of Biodiversity Resource Areas Programme (COBRA), and in Tanzania through the Ujirani Mwena 'Good Neighbourliness' (Cruz, 1995; Masika, 1995). In Botswana, the involvement of communities in resource management is carried out through the Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programme (Mbaiwa, 2004). The CBNRM approach combines rural development and natural resource conservation (Rozemeijer and van der Jagt, 2000). It is a reform of the conventional 'protectionist conservation philosophy' and 'top down' approaches to development, and it is based on common property theory which discourages open access resource management, and promotes resource use rights of the local communities (Rihoy, 1995). As an attempt to find alternative solutions to the failure of top-down approaches to development and conservation, CBNRM is based on the recognition that local people must have the power to decide over their natural resources in order to encourage sustainable development (Rozemeijer and van der Jagt, 2000). 318

CBNRM aims at alleviating poverty and advancing conservation through the strengthening of rural economies and empowering local communities to manage resources for their long-term social, economic and ecological benefits (Rozemeijer and van der Jagt, 2000). The adoption of CBNRM programmes is based on the assumption that local populations have a greater interest in the sustainable use of natural resources around them, more than centralised or distant government or private management institutions (Tsing et ai, 1999; Twyman, 2000). CBNRM credits the local inhabitants with having a greater understanding of, as well as vested interest in, their local environment. Hence, they may be seen as being more able to effectively manage natural resources through local or traditional practices (Leach et ai, 1999; Tsing et ai, 1999; Twyman, 2000). CBNRM assumes that once rural communities participate in natural resource utilisation and derive economic benefits, this will encourage the spirit of ownership and will ultimately lead to the sustainable use of the natural resources located in their area (Mbaiwa, 2004). Even though CBNRM is generally accepted as an alternative model of fostering the sustainable use of natural resources through community development, critics of the model note the following weaknesses with it: the lack of a clear criteria by which to judge whether CBNRM projects are sustainable and successful in meeting conservation and development targets (Western et ai, 1994; Boggs, 2002); marginalisation of minority groups (Taylor, 2000, 2001); inaccurate assumptions about communities and poorly conceived focus on community level organisation (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999); and inappropriate management strategies (Fortman et ai, 2001). Critics also note that there is a tendency by 'policy receivers' (local communities) who are the intended beneficiaries to be treated passively by the 'policy initiators' (Twyman, 1998, 2000); and that CBNRM projects rely heavily on expatriate expertise (Pimbert and Pretty, 1995; Twyman, 2000). Much of the literature on CBNRM is unrealistically optimistic and the high expectations have not been met. Consequently, Southern African communities are not benefiting as much as they should from CBNRM. The devolution of rights to communities is noted by Lawry (1994) as being insufficient without equal attention to how rights are distributed. The issue of the devolution of rights is related to the lack of understanding of institutional arrangements impeding CBNRM (Leach et ai, 1999). 319

CBNRM aims at alleviat<strong>in</strong>g poverty and advanc<strong>in</strong>g conservation through <strong>the</strong><br />

streng<strong>the</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> rural economies and empower<strong>in</strong>g local communities to manage<br />

<strong>resource</strong>s for <strong>the</strong>ir long-term social, economic and ecological benefits (Rozemeijer<br />

and van der Jagt, 2000).<br />

The adoption <strong>of</strong> CBNRM programmes is based on <strong>the</strong> assumption that local<br />

populations have a greater <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able use <strong>of</strong> <strong>natural</strong> <strong>resource</strong>s<br />

around <strong>the</strong>m, more than centralised or distant government or private <strong>management</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>stitutions (Ts<strong>in</strong>g et ai, 1999; Twyman, 2000). CBNRM credits <strong>the</strong> local <strong>in</strong>habitants<br />

with hav<strong>in</strong>g a greater understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>, as well as vested <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>ir local<br />

environment. Hence, <strong>the</strong>y may be seen as be<strong>in</strong>g more able to effectively manage<br />

<strong>natural</strong> <strong>resource</strong>s through local or traditional practices (Leach et ai, 1999; Ts<strong>in</strong>g et<br />

ai, 1999; Twyman, 2000). CBNRM assumes that once rural communities participate<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>natural</strong> <strong>resource</strong> utilisation and derive economic benefits, this will encourage <strong>the</strong><br />

spirit <strong>of</strong> ownership and will ultimately lead to <strong>the</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>natural</strong><br />

<strong>resource</strong>s located <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir area (Mbaiwa, 2004).<br />

Even though CBNRM is generally accepted as an alternative model <strong>of</strong> foster<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />

susta<strong>in</strong>able use <strong>of</strong> <strong>natural</strong> <strong>resource</strong>s through community development, critics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

model note <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g weaknesses with it: <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> a clear criteria by which to<br />

judge whe<strong>the</strong>r CBNRM projects are susta<strong>in</strong>able and successful <strong>in</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g<br />

conservation and development targets (Western et ai, 1994; Boggs, 2002);<br />

marg<strong>in</strong>alisation <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority groups (Taylor, 2000, 2001); <strong>in</strong>accurate assumptions<br />

about communities and poorly conceived focus on community level organisation<br />

(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999); and <strong>in</strong>appropriate <strong>management</strong> strategies (Fortman et<br />

ai, 2001). Critics also note that <strong>the</strong>re is a tendency by 'policy receivers' (local<br />

communities) who are <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tended beneficiaries to be treated passively by <strong>the</strong><br />

'policy <strong>in</strong>itiators' (Twyman, 1998, 2000); and that CBNRM projects rely heavily on<br />

expatriate expertise (Pimbert and Pretty, 1995; Twyman, 2000). Much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

literature on CBNRM is unrealistically optimistic and <strong>the</strong> high expectations have not<br />

been met. Consequently, Sou<strong>the</strong>rn African communities are not benefit<strong>in</strong>g as much<br />

as <strong>the</strong>y should from CBNRM. The devolution <strong>of</strong> rights to communities is noted by<br />

Lawry (1994) as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sufficient without equal attention to how rights are<br />

distributed. The issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> devolution <strong>of</strong> rights is related to <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong><br />

understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional arrangements imped<strong>in</strong>g CBNRM (Leach et ai, 1999).<br />

319

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