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Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission

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punish you, in reality we are not concerned about whether it will be efficacious, or<br />

not, because your conduct was not that bad”.<br />

(d) The reasons for rejecting option 3: a public policy bar in all cases<br />

1.257 Option 3 would, in its practical impact, be most closely consistent with what may<br />

be the existing judicial approach to insurance against criminal punishment. 806<br />

The<br />

policy which might be thought to justify option 3 was well expressed by Denning J<br />

in Askey v Golden Wine Co Ltd:<br />

It is, I think, a principle of our law that the punishment inflicted by a<br />

criminal court is personal to the offender, <strong>and</strong> that the civil courts will<br />

not entertain an action by the offender to recover an indemnity against<br />

the consequences of that punishment. In every criminal court the<br />

punishment is fixed having regard to the personal responsibility of the<br />

offender in respect of the offence, to the necessity for deterring him<br />

<strong>and</strong> others from doing the same thing against, to reform him ... All<br />

these objections would be nullified if the offender could recover the<br />

amount of the fine <strong>and</strong> costs from another by process of the civil<br />

courts. 807<br />

1.258 We anticipate that any conduct satisfying the test of a ‘deliberate <strong>and</strong> outrageous<br />

disregard of the defendant’s rights’ would be conduct which is sufficiently serious<br />

to merit a bar within the criminal law, if such conduct were to constitute a criminal<br />

offence. Nevertheless, despite this analogy, <strong>and</strong> the force of the arguments which<br />

underlie it, we believe that a more powerful set of counter-arguments (namely, the<br />

five reasons set out above for favouring option 1) 808<br />

entail that a different approach<br />

can <strong>and</strong> must be adopted in relation to punitive damages awarded in civil actions,<br />

than is applied to crimes.<br />

(e) Some alternative proposals suggested by consultees<br />

1.259 Several consultees made some interesting proposals for dealing with insurance<br />

against punitive damages in ways which differed from options 1-3. We think it<br />

useful <strong>and</strong> necessary to describe them, <strong>and</strong> to give some reasons why we ultimately<br />

reject them.<br />

(i) Insurance is permitted only to the extent that there is a shortfall caused by a<br />

wrongdoer’s inability to meet his or her liability<br />

1.260 One suggestion 809<br />

was (in effect) that any insurance cover for punitive damages<br />

should be limited to such sums as are necessary to meet a shortfall arising due to<br />

806 See para 4.108 above. The approach to contracts of indemnity is also applicable to other<br />

forms of indemnity (eg by way of a tort action for damages) in respect of fines paid by way<br />

of punishment, <strong>and</strong> even against the adverse financial implications of conviction (eg loss of<br />

business profits).<br />

807 [1948] 2 All ER 35, 38C-E. Askey did not deal with a contract of indemnity, but with the<br />

attempt by a wrongdoer to obtain an indemnity by means of an action in tort (conspiracy)<br />

against others - viz, the suppliers who had knowingly sold Askey the products which gave<br />

rise to his subsequent criminal liability.<br />

808 See paras 5.237-5.248 above.<br />

809 Made by the Police Federation.<br />

172

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