Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
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punish you, in reality we are not concerned about whether it will be efficacious, or<br />
not, because your conduct was not that bad”.<br />
(d) The reasons for rejecting option 3: a public policy bar in all cases<br />
1.257 Option 3 would, in its practical impact, be most closely consistent with what may<br />
be the existing judicial approach to insurance against criminal punishment. 806<br />
The<br />
policy which might be thought to justify option 3 was well expressed by Denning J<br />
in Askey v Golden Wine Co Ltd:<br />
It is, I think, a principle of our law that the punishment inflicted by a<br />
criminal court is personal to the offender, <strong>and</strong> that the civil courts will<br />
not entertain an action by the offender to recover an indemnity against<br />
the consequences of that punishment. In every criminal court the<br />
punishment is fixed having regard to the personal responsibility of the<br />
offender in respect of the offence, to the necessity for deterring him<br />
<strong>and</strong> others from doing the same thing against, to reform him ... All<br />
these objections would be nullified if the offender could recover the<br />
amount of the fine <strong>and</strong> costs from another by process of the civil<br />
courts. 807<br />
1.258 We anticipate that any conduct satisfying the test of a ‘deliberate <strong>and</strong> outrageous<br />
disregard of the defendant’s rights’ would be conduct which is sufficiently serious<br />
to merit a bar within the criminal law, if such conduct were to constitute a criminal<br />
offence. Nevertheless, despite this analogy, <strong>and</strong> the force of the arguments which<br />
underlie it, we believe that a more powerful set of counter-arguments (namely, the<br />
five reasons set out above for favouring option 1) 808<br />
entail that a different approach<br />
can <strong>and</strong> must be adopted in relation to punitive damages awarded in civil actions,<br />
than is applied to crimes.<br />
(e) Some alternative proposals suggested by consultees<br />
1.259 Several consultees made some interesting proposals for dealing with insurance<br />
against punitive damages in ways which differed from options 1-3. We think it<br />
useful <strong>and</strong> necessary to describe them, <strong>and</strong> to give some reasons why we ultimately<br />
reject them.<br />
(i) Insurance is permitted only to the extent that there is a shortfall caused by a<br />
wrongdoer’s inability to meet his or her liability<br />
1.260 One suggestion 809<br />
was (in effect) that any insurance cover for punitive damages<br />
should be limited to such sums as are necessary to meet a shortfall arising due to<br />
806 See para 4.108 above. The approach to contracts of indemnity is also applicable to other<br />
forms of indemnity (eg by way of a tort action for damages) in respect of fines paid by way<br />
of punishment, <strong>and</strong> even against the adverse financial implications of conviction (eg loss of<br />
business profits).<br />
807 [1948] 2 All ER 35, 38C-E. Askey did not deal with a contract of indemnity, but with the<br />
attempt by a wrongdoer to obtain an indemnity by means of an action in tort (conspiracy)<br />
against others - viz, the suppliers who had knowingly sold Askey the products which gave<br />
rise to his subsequent criminal liability.<br />
808 See paras 5.237-5.248 above.<br />
809 Made by the Police Federation.<br />
172