Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
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(ii) The problems of defining with certainty the range of conduct falling within the<br />
public policy bar on insurance<br />
1.252 Any concept which is used to define the category of particularly serious conduct<br />
which not only warrants a punitive damages award, but also justifies the further<br />
step of a public policy bar on insurance, should be capable of precise definition:<br />
legal <strong>and</strong> commercial certainty so require. We do not consider that a concept such<br />
as ‘particularly outrageous conduct’ satisfies this requirement.<br />
1.253 A possible response is to adopt instead a concept which draws a parallel with<br />
conduct meriting prosecution within the criminal law. One example is ‘conduct<br />
constituting a criminal offence’. However, although this offers greater conceptual<br />
clarity, we consider it to be objectionable in principle.<br />
1.254 Our objections are three-fold. The first is that the judgment concerning the<br />
criminality of the defendant’s conduct would have to be made within a civil court;<br />
it cannot be assumed that such court would have the experience in dealing with<br />
such matters. The second, <strong>and</strong> more important, is that to utilise any such concept<br />
would involve denying a defendant the procedural <strong>and</strong> evidential safeguards found<br />
within a criminal trial; it is also open to accusations that any adverse or favourable<br />
finding could prejudice any subsequent criminal prosecution that may be brought.<br />
The third is that ‘conduct constituting a criminal offence’ will not in fact capture,<br />
<strong>and</strong> capture only, the most outrageous examples of conduct meriting a punitive<br />
damages award. The notion of a ‘crime’ does not include only intentional or even<br />
advertent interferences with important interests; 803<br />
it also embraces certain forms<br />
of grossly 804<br />
or ordinary negligent conduct, 805<br />
<strong>and</strong>, in the case of crimes of ‘strict<br />
liability’, conduct that does not display even this degree of fault. The result is that<br />
there is still a need for some additional concept which delineates the most serious<br />
forms of crime.<br />
(iii) The range of culpable conduct<br />
1.255 We would also question a key assumption underlying option 2. This is that there is<br />
an extensive range of conduct which merits a punitive damages award, ranging<br />
from the highly to the barely culpable; the corollary, it is argued, is that conduct at<br />
the ‘lower’ end of this spectrum should be capable of being insured against, whilst<br />
conduct at the ‘higher’ end of this spectrum should not.<br />
1.256 The critical point is that even though there is such a range of conduct, a basic<br />
minimum threshold of bad conduct must have been reached before an award of<br />
punitive damages can properly be made by a court. The aim of an award is the<br />
same wherever on the spectrum a particular defendant’s conduct falls: the conduct<br />
is thought to be sufficiently bad to require punishment. If this is so, it is<br />
incoherent for the law then to be seen to say: “even though we thought fit to<br />
803 But many more serious crimes do require such a higher degree of fault or culpability.<br />
804 See eg the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 1 <strong>and</strong> s 2 (causing death by dangerous driving;<br />
dangerous driving - for the meaning of dangerous, see s 2A).<br />
805 See eg the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 3 <strong>and</strong> s 3A (careless or inconsiderate driving; causing<br />
death by careless or inconsiderate driving).<br />
171