Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission
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Are we concerned about ‘conviction’ or particular punishments?<br />
1.106 A criminal court is likely to have a large range of possible methods of dealing with<br />
a particular offender, following his or her conviction for an offence. They may<br />
include an absolute or conditional discharge, binding over, a community service<br />
order, a fine or a prison sentence. In our view, the discretionary or absolute bar to<br />
an award of punitive damages must apply whatever method of disposition has been<br />
selected by the criminal court. The important point should be that the defendant<br />
has been convicted for the conduct which is alleged to justify an award of punitive<br />
damages.<br />
1.107 Some may argue that where a defendant has been absolutely discharged following<br />
conviction, there is no risk that he or she will be ‘doubly punished’ if he or she is<br />
subsequently held liable to pay punitive damages for the same conduct. And, so<br />
the argument would run, if he or she will not be doubly punished, there should be<br />
no bar to an award of punitive damages. We disagree. As we shall see, the<br />
justification for a bar to a claim to punitive damages following a criminal<br />
conviction is not just that it avoids the risk of ‘double punishment’; it is also that a<br />
civil court should not generally be permitted to reopen the question, which has<br />
been answered by the criminal court, of what is an appropriate response to the<br />
offender/wrongdoer’s conduct. This is an argument for respecting the criminal<br />
court’s choice of response, regardless of its nature.<br />
1.108 We would point out that, in any case, this point is never likely to be problematic in<br />
practice. An absolute discharge will usually reflect the triviality of the offence, or<br />
the low culpability of the offender, or that he or she had good reason (not<br />
amounting to a legal defence) for behaving as he or she did. In those<br />
circumstances it will be difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff successfully to<br />
demonstrate that the same conduct showed a ‘deliberate <strong>and</strong> outrageous disregard’<br />
of his or her rights. And if he or she cannot do so, no award of punitive damages<br />
can be made.<br />
1.109 One practical problem is that section 1C(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act<br />
1973 provides that, subject to specified exceptions, where an offender has been<br />
absolutely or conditionally discharged following conviction for an offence:<br />
... [the] conviction ... shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any<br />
purpose ...<br />
1.110 Without more, s1C(1) could mean that any principle in our draft Bill which is<br />
expressed to apply where the defendant has ‘been convicted of a criminal offence’<br />
would not apply if the defendant was absolutely or conditionally discharged. This<br />
would be unfortunate. We have therefore recommended 687<br />
that section 1C of the<br />
Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 must be ignored by a court when it applies<br />
the principle stated in recommendation (21)(a), which we explain below, that<br />
punitive damages must not usually be awarded if, at any time before the decision<br />
falls to be made, the defendant has been convicted of an offence involving the<br />
conduct for which the punitive damages are claimed.<br />
687 See para 5.44, recommendation (21)(a), above.<br />
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