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Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary ... - Law Commission

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Are we concerned about ‘conviction’ or particular punishments?<br />

1.106 A criminal court is likely to have a large range of possible methods of dealing with<br />

a particular offender, following his or her conviction for an offence. They may<br />

include an absolute or conditional discharge, binding over, a community service<br />

order, a fine or a prison sentence. In our view, the discretionary or absolute bar to<br />

an award of punitive damages must apply whatever method of disposition has been<br />

selected by the criminal court. The important point should be that the defendant<br />

has been convicted for the conduct which is alleged to justify an award of punitive<br />

damages.<br />

1.107 Some may argue that where a defendant has been absolutely discharged following<br />

conviction, there is no risk that he or she will be ‘doubly punished’ if he or she is<br />

subsequently held liable to pay punitive damages for the same conduct. And, so<br />

the argument would run, if he or she will not be doubly punished, there should be<br />

no bar to an award of punitive damages. We disagree. As we shall see, the<br />

justification for a bar to a claim to punitive damages following a criminal<br />

conviction is not just that it avoids the risk of ‘double punishment’; it is also that a<br />

civil court should not generally be permitted to reopen the question, which has<br />

been answered by the criminal court, of what is an appropriate response to the<br />

offender/wrongdoer’s conduct. This is an argument for respecting the criminal<br />

court’s choice of response, regardless of its nature.<br />

1.108 We would point out that, in any case, this point is never likely to be problematic in<br />

practice. An absolute discharge will usually reflect the triviality of the offence, or<br />

the low culpability of the offender, or that he or she had good reason (not<br />

amounting to a legal defence) for behaving as he or she did. In those<br />

circumstances it will be difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff successfully to<br />

demonstrate that the same conduct showed a ‘deliberate <strong>and</strong> outrageous disregard’<br />

of his or her rights. And if he or she cannot do so, no award of punitive damages<br />

can be made.<br />

1.109 One practical problem is that section 1C(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act<br />

1973 provides that, subject to specified exceptions, where an offender has been<br />

absolutely or conditionally discharged following conviction for an offence:<br />

... [the] conviction ... shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any<br />

purpose ...<br />

1.110 Without more, s1C(1) could mean that any principle in our draft Bill which is<br />

expressed to apply where the defendant has ‘been convicted of a criminal offence’<br />

would not apply if the defendant was absolutely or conditionally discharged. This<br />

would be unfortunate. We have therefore recommended 687<br />

that section 1C of the<br />

Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 must be ignored by a court when it applies<br />

the principle stated in recommendation (21)(a), which we explain below, that<br />

punitive damages must not usually be awarded if, at any time before the decision<br />

falls to be made, the defendant has been convicted of an offence involving the<br />

conduct for which the punitive damages are claimed.<br />

687 See para 5.44, recommendation (21)(a), above.<br />

132

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