REFORMING INSURANCE LAW: - Law Commission
REFORMING INSURANCE LAW: - Law Commission
REFORMING INSURANCE LAW: - Law Commission
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had that been the conduct prohibited by the policy. 330 Equally, s 54(2) is engaged where the<br />
assured drives an insured vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 331 where the assured<br />
modifies the insured vehicle without requesting the permission required of the insurers 332 or<br />
where the assured fails to set an alarm as required by the policy. 333<br />
7.10 Omissions and inactions. Perhaps the key issue which has arisen under s 54 is whether the<br />
assured’s failure to exercise an option that would entitle him to cover had he exercised it can be<br />
classified as an “omission” and thus subject to the saving provisions of s 54, or whether there is<br />
simply “inaction” not amounting to omission. The main context of the question is the right of the<br />
assured under a liability policy to give notice to the insurers of circumstances likely to give rise<br />
to a claim so that he is thereby entitled to treat any subsequent claims made against him after the<br />
policy has expired as backdated to the notification of those circumstances . As will be seen below<br />
in the discussion of liability insurance, it is now settled, after a good deal of confusion, that an<br />
assured who fails to exercise a contractual option can be said to have been guilty of an omission<br />
which triggers s 54, 334 although this particular rule is likely to be reversed by legislation in due<br />
course. 335 In the same way, an assured who fails to seek the permission of liability insurers to<br />
incur defence costs falls within s 54, given that an omission includes a failure to exercise a right<br />
or choice. 336 The distinction between an option and an obligation at first sight appears to be an<br />
obvious one, but further reflection – as is demonstrated by the case law – indicates that any<br />
provision can be framed in either way. A condition precedent providing for a claim to be made as<br />
soon as reasonably practicable could equally be drafted as a clause which permits the assured to<br />
make a claim if he notifies the insurers as soon as is reasonably practicable; in the same way, the<br />
option to notify circumstances likely to give rise to a loss could be an obligation to notify<br />
circumstances which may (the more common form of wording) or are likely to give rise to a loss<br />
in order to trigger coverage. The Australian courts have, it is suggested, been correct in rejecting<br />
form and focusing on substance. There is a wider question as to whether a typical London market<br />
claims made policy should be treated in some special way, so that failure to notify circumstances<br />
is not something which can be disregarded. This is considered below.<br />
7.11 Extension of cover. An additional situation in which the distinction between option and<br />
obligation comes to the fore is under a declaration policy or other form of cover under which the<br />
risk may be extended if the assured so wishes. If the policy is obligatory in that any risk accepted<br />
by the assured is automatically binding on the insurers, then any obligation on the assured to<br />
notify would under the Australian system fall within s 54(1) because it cannot have any effect on<br />
330<br />
See also Austcan Investments Pty Ltd v Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd (1992) 7 ANZ Ins Cas 61-116.<br />
331<br />
Bunting v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd February 1994, unreported, Tas Sup Ct.<br />
332<br />
Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v Ellis (1990) 54 SASR 61.<br />
333<br />
McNeill v O’Kane [2004] QSC 144.<br />
334<br />
The leading case affirming this distinction, FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Perry (1993) 30 NSWLR 89, held<br />
that it was justified by reference to the considerations that: (a) the assured had a choice but failed to exercise it; and<br />
(b) the assured, by failing to exercise his option, did not lose any pre-existing rights. The counter arguments, which<br />
subsequently prevailed, were that: (a) the distinction gives effect to form over substance; and (b) if there is a<br />
distinction between a failure to act and a decision not to act, the law would be introducing subjective intention as the<br />
relevant test.<br />
335<br />
See infra.<br />
336<br />
Antico v Heath Fielding Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 652.<br />
64