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REFORMING INSURANCE LAW: - Law Commission

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4.24 The practical effect of s 21A as it stands is to require insurers to ask specific questions<br />

rather than to rely on disclosure with regard to prescribed policies. That will be confirmed by the<br />

draft amendments. Although the duty is framed as one to disclose, in effect the duty is not to<br />

misrepresent. The question then becomes whether insurers should be under a duty to ask the right<br />

questions in respect of all policies and not simply in respect of prescribed policies. The<br />

Australian approach has been to maintain this distinction, the assumption being that specialist<br />

commercial risks and life are more difficult to assess by insurers unaided by disclosure on the<br />

part of the assured and that the variable relevant factors are far more numerous in commercial<br />

cases than could be contemplated by the insurers in framing their questions. The distinction was<br />

criticised as illogical by some Australian lawyers interviewed by the author, although the<br />

evidence to the Treasury Review confirmed the need for the distinction and for the right of<br />

commercial and life insurers to rely upon disclosure of factors of which they could not possibly<br />

have been aware and in respect of which they were not in a position to raise questions. The<br />

balance of the argument appears to be in favour of retaining a residual duty of disclosure for<br />

bespoke commercial policies and in the life industry and not precluding a general question as<br />

other matters which might be covered by the duty of disclosure. That approach was specifically<br />

confirmed by the Treasury in its explanatory documents accompanying the draft Insurance<br />

Contracts Amendment Bill 2007.<br />

4.25 That said, it is also to be noted that, in the English market, brokers place the vast majority<br />

of policies which would be classified as non-prescribed. If the law remains as it is at present and<br />

the broker is treated as the agent of the assured for placement purposes, there is a powerful<br />

argument that a broker who failed to ask the right questions or to encourage disclosure would be<br />

in breach of duty to the assured, so that if the assured’s failure to disclose was the fault of the<br />

broker (as opposed to that of the assured in withholding facts known or which ought to be known<br />

to be relevant) the insurers would be off risk but the broker would face liability.<br />

Misrepresentation<br />

Materiality and inducement<br />

4.26 As has been seen above, the duty of disclosure as retained by the Insurance Contracts Act<br />

1984 is a greatly restricted principle: the prudent assured test has replaced the prudent insurer<br />

test as the touchstone for what must be disclosed, there is no duty of disclosure in the absence of<br />

clear warnings and in the case of “eligible” policies the insurers must ask questions if they wish<br />

to have any information. The focus for information-gathering has accordingly switched to<br />

misrepresentation. The 1984 Act has dramatically altered the law on misrepresentation, in<br />

particular by abolishing the long-established requirement that the insurers must prove that the<br />

judgment of a prudent underwriter would have been affected by the misrepresentation and its<br />

replacement with a prudent assured test which echoes that applicable to disclosure. Under s<br />

26(2), a false statement is not to be taken as a misrepresentation unless its maker knew, or a<br />

reasonable person in the circumstances ought to have known, that the statement would be<br />

25

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