Higher education in Asian countries and the role of international ...
Higher education in Asian countries and the role of international ...
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3.5.1.2 Cooperative game<br />
52<br />
In a cooperative game, groups <strong>of</strong> players may enforce a cooperative behavior. Cooperative game<br />
describes only <strong>the</strong> outcomes or pay<strong>of</strong>fs when players make collective choices <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y come<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> different comb<strong>in</strong>ations. Whereas <strong>in</strong> non-cooperative <strong>the</strong>ory, a game is modeled <strong>in</strong><br />
such a way that it presents all moves available for <strong>in</strong>dividual players. Cooperative games<br />
concentrate on <strong>the</strong> possibilities for agreement but not on <strong>the</strong> procedures <strong>of</strong> atta<strong>in</strong>ment. There are<br />
two major elements <strong>of</strong> every cooperative game: a set <strong>of</strong> players <strong>and</strong> a characteristic function. The<br />
characteristic function, denoted by , describes how much collective pay<strong>of</strong>f a set <strong>of</strong> players can<br />
ga<strong>in</strong> by cooperat<strong>in</strong>g with each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> a coalition setup.<br />
Here we hypo<strong>the</strong>sized a cooperative game, <strong>in</strong> which we have four players, so<br />
where player 1 is an IGO <strong>and</strong> players 2, 3 <strong>and</strong> 4 are states. There can be more states up to ,<br />
which is a f<strong>in</strong>ite number. We assume six possible situations: A, B, C, D, E <strong>and</strong> F <strong>in</strong> which<br />
players make different coalitions. Each situation presents a unique cooperative game with<br />
specific value <strong>of</strong> characteristic function . Situation A expla<strong>in</strong>s that <strong>the</strong>re is no pay<strong>of</strong>f when IGO<br />
is alone <strong>in</strong> a game <strong>and</strong> it does not f<strong>in</strong>d cooperation <strong>of</strong> any state. Situation B, C <strong>and</strong> D show that<br />
as <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> IGO members <strong>in</strong>crease collective pay<strong>of</strong>fs also <strong>in</strong>crease for all cooperat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
agents: IGO <strong>and</strong> states. Likewise situation E presents a model <strong>of</strong> where more <strong>and</strong> more states<br />
cooperate <strong>and</strong> collaborate with <strong>the</strong> IGO consequently <strong>the</strong> collective pay<strong>of</strong>f is higher. Whereas <strong>in</strong><br />
situation F all players act <strong>in</strong>dependently without enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a cooperation (collation) setup so<br />
none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m get any pay<strong>of</strong>f.<br />
A<br />
Situation A,<br />
Situation B,<br />
Situation C,<br />
Situation D,<br />
Situation E,<br />
Situation F,<br />
Where are players such that is an IGO, are states, is f<strong>in</strong>ite number <strong>of</strong> states<br />
<strong>and</strong> mean pay<strong>of</strong>fs for different choices available to participat<strong>in</strong>g IGO <strong>and</strong> states,<br />
depend<strong>in</strong>g on different types <strong>of</strong> cooperation.
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