Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. - How Appealing
Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. - How Appealing Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. - How Appealing
circumstances, one of which is “evident partiality” by the arbitrator(s)). Before deciding whether Marston’s alleged failure to disclose evidences “evident partiality” against Stone, we must first determine what “evident partiality” means. This is no easy task, as the parties (and the courts) disagree on the appropriate standard. Respondents, relying on an oft-cited footnote from the Third Circuit’s 1994 opinion in Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, argue for a stringent “evident partiality” standard which would make it more difficult for us to vacate the award: In order to show “evident partiality,” “the challenging party must show ‘a reasonable person would have to conclude that the arbitrator was partial’ to the other party to the arbitration.” Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir.1989) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990). “Evident partiality” is strong language and requires proof of circumstances “powerfully suggestive of bias.” Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681-82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983), mandate modified, 728 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.1984). Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1523 n.30 (emphasis added). For present purposes, we label this the “actual bias” standard. On the other hand, Stone, relying on Justice Black’s forty-year-old opinion in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), contends that we should vacate an arbitration award whenever an arbitrator fails to “disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.” Id. at 149 (emphasis added). We label this the “appearance of bias” standard. This formulation of “evident partiality” undoubtedly favors those seeking to overturn arbitration awards, as the universe of non-disclosures that “might create an impression of possible bias” is quite large. The Third Circuit has recognized but not yet resolved this apparent conflict in the law. See HSM Constr. Servs., Inc. v. MDC Sys., Inc., 239 Fed. App’x 748, 752-53 (3d Cir. 2007) (non-precedential). Case 2:11-cv-05118-LDD Document 22 Filed 05/29/12 Page 12 of 35 12
Case 2:11-cv-05118-LDD Document 22 Filed 05/29/12 Page 13 of 35 The uncertainty stems from the unusual nature of the Supreme Court’s Commonwealth Coatings opinion. Factually, the Commonwealth Coatings case concerned an arbitrator’s failure to disclose his own “repeated and significant” business relationship with one of the parties, a relationship that “went so far as to include the rendering of services on the very projects involved in [the] lawsuit.” 393 U.S. at 146. On these extreme facts, Justice Black, delivering “the opinion of the Court,” interpreted “evident partiality” to encompass an arbitrator’s failure to “disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.” Id. at 147-49. In concurrence, Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, stated he was “glad to join” Justice Black’s opinion but then went on to add significant qualifications to it. For example, Justice Black would hold arbitrators to a higher standard of impartiality than judges because arbitrators “have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review.” Id. at 148-49. Conversely, Justice White stated that “[t]he Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges.” Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring). While Justice White, like Justice Black, stressed the importance of arbitrator disclosure, Justice White sought to cabin the Court’s holding: “But it is enough for present purposes to hold, as the Court does, that where the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be disclosed.” Id. at 151-52 (White, J., concurring). In other words, Justice Black and Justice White actually agreed on little but the result. Further complicating matters, Justices White’s concurrence was pivotal to the Court’s judgment because three Justices dissented. Id. at 152-55. This has importance because when “no one view garners a majority of the Justices . . . the ‘holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” U.S. v. 13
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Case 2:11-cv-05118-LDD Document 22 Filed 05/29/12 Page 13 of 35<br />
The uncertainty stems from the unusual nature of the Supreme <strong>Co</strong>urt’s <strong>Co</strong>mmonwealth<br />
<strong>Co</strong>atings opinion. Factually, the <strong>Co</strong>mmonwealth <strong>Co</strong>atings case concerned an arbitrator’s failure to<br />
disclose his own “repeated and significant” business relationship with one of the parties, a<br />
relationship that “went so far as to include the rendering of services on the very projects involved in<br />
[the] lawsuit.” 393 U.S. at 146. On these extreme facts, Justice Black, delivering “the opinion of the<br />
<strong>Co</strong>urt,” interpreted “evident partiality” to encompass an arbitrator’s failure to “disclose to the parties<br />
any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.” Id. at 147-49.<br />
In concurrence, Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, stated he was “glad to join” Justice<br />
Black’s opinion but then went on to add significant qualifications to it. For example, Justice Black<br />
would hold arbitrators to a higher standard of impartiality than judges because arbitrators “have<br />
completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review.” Id.<br />
at 148-49. <strong>Co</strong>nversely, Justice White stated that “[t]he <strong>Co</strong>urt does not decide today that arbitrators<br />
are to be held to the standards of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges.” Id.<br />
at 150 (White, J., concurring). While Justice White, like Justice Black, stressed the importance of<br />
arbitrator disclosure, Justice White sought to cabin the <strong>Co</strong>urt’s holding: “But it is enough for present<br />
purposes to hold, as the <strong>Co</strong>urt does, that where the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which<br />
has done more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be disclosed.” Id. at 151-52 (White,<br />
J., concurring). In other words, Justice Black and Justice White actually agreed on little but the<br />
result. Further complicating matters, Justices White’s concurrence was pivotal to the <strong>Co</strong>urt’s<br />
judgment because three Justices dissented. Id. at 152-55. This has importance because when “no one<br />
view garners a majority of the Justices . . . the ‘holding of the <strong>Co</strong>urt may be viewed as that position<br />
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” U.S. v.<br />
13
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