In the Superior Court of Pennsylvania - How Appealing

After reviewing the record in Coleman in light of the above facts, we
conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact for the jury. Ms.
Coleman’s diagnosis of breast cancer did not automatically place her
on notice that her injury was caused by a third party. In fact, one could
reasonably conclude, based upon the record before us, that diagnosis
would not likely trigger inquiry into a third–party cause of her injury.
There are factual inconsistencies as to what Ms. Coleman was told and
by whom and what was generally known and understood about HRT
and breast cancer. We hold that until these conflicts are resolved and
inferences are drawn from relevant facts by the factfinder, the
determination of what Ms. Coleman knew or should have known with
reasonable diligence under the circumstances remains a matter of
dispute as in Fine, supra.
Coleman v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 6 A.3d 502, 516 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (slip op. p. 25).
Summarizing its discussion of the reasonable diligence inquiry in connection
with the Coleman appeal, the Superior Court wrote:
Id. at 520 (slip op. p. 34).
On the basis of the record before us, a jury could reasonably
believe that Ms. Coleman had no reason to suspect that there was a
causal link between her breast cancer and her ingestion of HRT
medications until the WHI study was published and triggered inquiry.
See Simon, supra. The issue of her reasonable diligence is a factual one
for the jury. We believe that the recent pronouncements of our
Supreme Court in Fine and Wilson reveal a strong judicial preference
for the submission of such fact–intensive inquiries to the jury.
Defendants’ argument is also without merit as a matter of law. Under
Pennsylvania law, the discovery rule ceases to toll the running of the statute of
limitations when the plaintiff either knows or should have known of her injury and
its cause. The “should have known” formulation is sometimes referred to as
“constructive knowledge,” imputing to the plaintiff knowledge of the cause of her
injury that a reasonable investigation would have disclosed, regardless of whether
the plaintiff herself actually conducted any investigation whatsoever.
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