The Humphreys family in America - citizen hylbom blog

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the enemy's artillery giving effect to its picturcsqueness. The division, brigade and regimental flags were flying.
'After the battle of Gettysburg, Meade, looking about for a chief-of-staff, and jx-rfcctly well aware of the
merits of Humphreys, tendered the appointment to him. Humphreys was loath to accept it; he yearned to remain
in the command of troops, but he clearly discerned that to do so would be utterly incompatible with the suggestions
of common sense and self-respect. A short reflection determined his course, and he joined Meade as chief-of-stafi" of
the Army of the Potomac, a position of which the importance is so utterly miscomprehended among a people so
entirely unmilitary, while so grandly warlike, as those of the United States. The affectionate language with which
Humphreys took leave of his associates of the Third corps is worthy of record and attention: * * * 'In
parting from this celebrated division [the White Division, originally under Hooker], after having commanded it for
the brief period of fifty days, I trust that I may be excused for expressing my admiration for its high soldierly qualities.
It is impossible to pass it in review even without perceiving that its ranks are filled with men that are soldiers in the
best meaning of this term; and that it possesses, in the grade of commissioned officers, men whose skill, courage and
accomplishments woidd grace any service.'
"Was greater praise ever addressed by a competent judge to the men and officers of the old Third corjis?
It would be difficult to produce its equivalent. In looking through a correspondence of the most intimate and interesting
character, which extended over a period commencing about the close of the war, and ending absolutely and
with the very decease of General Humphreys—a correspondence which would fill a large trunk— there are letters of
Humphreys which contain the most lively incidents and striking occurrences in connection with the Rebellion which
have never appeared in print. These, however must await a more opportune time for publication.
" Swinton, in his History of the Army of the Potomac, styles the operations of the faU and early winter of 1S63
a 'Campaign of Manoeuvres.' * * Unquestionably during the campaign. Destiny placed three times the Army
of Northern Virginia in a situation to become the prey of the Army of the Potomac if its commander had listened
solely to the counsels of his chief-of-staff, Humphreys. ***** b,,)^ instead of according full
attention to Humphreys, who perfectly comprehended the situation, sufficient heed was not paid to his orders and
Meade listened to the counsels of others, and thus leaned upon a Pharaoh's reed which broke and wounded him
instead of affording him support. * * Lee escaped the intended stroke of a steam-ram directed against the
vulnerable amid-ships—a blow which might have crushed in his army long strung out as a nut is cracked by an
artistic instrument. A similar neglect occurred later in the following winter, when Humphreys formed a plan which
would have settled the fate of the Army of Northern Virginia then and there. How he felt the loss of the occasion
is best expressed in his own words. In a letter from him, dated July 26, 1869, he writes as follows: 'I have glanced
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at Decker but find no mention of demonstration —nor do I recall any discussion of it—but I do recall some powerful
demonstrations made by the Army of the Potomac, when I w-as chief-of-staff, and their complete success, when even
the commanders of the highest rank carrying them on did not know their object—nor what the other part of the
army was doing—or expected to do; thinking theirs was the true operation. And there was one of those operations
of which I shall tell the story some day, for I alone can tell it— General Meade was absent, sici in Philadelphia, at
the time. I had formed a plan for surprising Lee, in mid-winter [1863], which I breathed to no one, and was watching
the coming of suitable weather, which I knew would come before the winter was over, when it was all spoilt. How
is tie story; and the spoiling proved that the surprise woi4ld have been complete and we should have had a brilliant
success and my reputation would have been made.''
"The third occasion was intermediate, when the elements of triumph were prepared by Humphreys— the Mine
Run campaign. How he felt, in consequence of the failure through the criminal negligence of subordinates, can
never be known, because he has seen fit to be silent in his little work, Gettysburg to the Rapidan, published by
Charles Scribner's Sons, in which the truth might have been triumphantly manifested. If his plan had been carried
out in spirit and to the letter, a far different and victorious result might have been chronicled and credited to the
Army of the Potomac. His plans were masterly; the result was an exemplification of the fable, the mountain in labor
eventuated in the issue of a mouse. Yes, indeed, the Mine Run fiasco would have resulted in a triumph, if the advice
and plan of Humphreys had been executed with anything like exactness and an energy akin to his own, whereas a
bloody catastrophe nearly rewarded a sagacious inspiration. No wonder that a military genius was perfectly willing
to relinquish a thankless task of endeavoring to bring the conclusions of science to liear upon the conceptions of
expediency, and take the command of troops where the personal force of the individual could electrify the mass and
convert inertia and incompetency into alacrity and precision. How often have these opinions been repeated, now with
indignant emphasis, again with positive sadness.
" However important results had shown to be the services rendered by Humphreys as chief-of-staff of the Army
of the Potomac, his office was one which, while useful in the extreme to the army and to the nation, could in no
event be brilliant for himself. Had he been the very sum and sun of military ability, his rays could scarcely pene-
trate the dense atmosphere of circumstances and of official fog, to make themselves perceptible to the world. Uttwoeii
him and ordinary comprehension of his influence were almost impassible barriers, impermeable screens or blinds. To