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KCE Reports 118 <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> 69<br />

4.5.1.3 Blood Pressure<br />

Ashworth et al (2008) conducted a historical comparison study with multiple time<br />

points, after the introduction of the QOF, adjusting <strong>for</strong> practice size and other not<br />

specified possible confounding factors. They reported on BP recording and management<br />

of BP control in the general patient population (i.e. not in a patient group with a specific<br />

condition). Blood pressure recording systematically rises over the years. Initially, there<br />

was a 1.7% gap between mean blood pressure recording levels in practices located in<br />

the least deprived fifth of communities compared with the most deprived fifth, but,<br />

three years later, this gap had narrowed to 0.2%. Improvements in achievement have<br />

resulted in the near disappearance of the achievement gap between least and most<br />

deprived areas. 169<br />

4.5.1.4 Generic findings<br />

Exception reporting has been introduced within QOF to allow practices to pursue the<br />

quality improvement agenda and not be penalized, where, <strong>for</strong> example, patients do not<br />

attend <strong>for</strong> review, or where a medication cannot be prescribed due to a<br />

contraindication or side-effects. However, there is some concern that exception<br />

reporting will worsen health care disparities because financial incentives encourage<br />

providers to ‘cherry pick’ healthier patients or exclude those not achieving targets from<br />

public reporting mechanisms, mostly socially deprived patients or patients with a<br />

different ethnic background. Additionally, such incentives may widen health care<br />

disparities if they increase the resource gap between high and low per<strong>for</strong>ming health<br />

care providers. Despite this potential <strong>for</strong> harm, in<strong>for</strong>mation on the impact of P4P<br />

incentives on health care disparities remains limited. 158<br />

We identified five studies looking at the phenomenon of exception reporting and the<br />

84 , 134 , 147 , 160, 230<br />

possible impact of it on inequity in health care.<br />

In one cross-sectional study immediately after the introduction of the new GMS, Doran<br />

et al (2008) analyzed determining factors in the rate of exception reporting by English<br />

physicians. They found that characteristics of patients and practices explained only 2.7%<br />

in the variance of exception reporting. Living in income deprived households and being a<br />

member of racial or ethnic minority were small but statistically significant determinants.<br />

84<br />

Doran et al (2006) assessed the effect of exception reporting on reported achievement<br />

in a cross sectional study in 2005. They found that an increase of 1% in the estimated<br />

proportion of patients excluded was associated with an increase of 0.31% in achieved<br />

quality <strong>for</strong> every 1000 patients on the practice list. 147<br />

Sigfrid et al (2006) explored whether exception reporting is linked to socioeconomic<br />

deprivation. They found that patients with diabetes living in deprived areas are more<br />

likely to be ‘exception reported’ from QOF clinical indicators. 160<br />

Simpson et al (2006) did an analysis on a cross sectional database to study exception<br />

reporting <strong>for</strong> TIA and stroke. They found no significant association between the<br />

practice’s exception reporting and the practice having proportionately more female,<br />

older or deprived stroke/TIA patients. Stroke/TIA patients with the ‘top level’ exclusion<br />

code ‘patient unsuitable <strong>for</strong> inclusion’ were more likely to be female, older, and have a<br />

diagnosis with dementia when compared to those patients without such a code. The<br />

youngest and patients from more deprived parts of Scotland were more likely to have<br />

the exception codes: ‘in<strong>for</strong>med dissent’ or ‘no response to letters’. Females were more<br />

likely to be excluded from the specific quality indicators of achieving blood pressure or<br />

cholesterol control. More deprived patients were not likely to be excluded from these<br />

quality indicators. Younger and more deprived patients were more likely to be<br />

recorded as having refused to attend <strong>for</strong> review or not replying to letters asking <strong>for</strong><br />

attendance at primary care clinics. 134

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