Pay for Quality
Pay for Quality
Pay for Quality
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KCE Reports 118 <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> 43<br />
4.2.4 Description of P4Q interventions<br />
4.2.4.1 United Kingdom<br />
Primary care: <strong>Quality</strong> and Outcomes Framework (QOF)<br />
British family practitioners derive their income from NHS patients. Almost all of the<br />
citizens of the UK are registered with a family practitioner, and family practitioners have<br />
registered lists of patients <strong>for</strong> whom they are responsible. Their work within the NHS is<br />
governed by a national contract, known as the General Medical Services contract that is<br />
negotiated between professional representatives of the British Medical Association and<br />
the central government. This contract is revised at infrequent intervals; since the NHS<br />
started in 1948, major contract revisions have been made only in 1966 and 1990 55 .<br />
At the core of the general practitioners contract was the <strong>Quality</strong> and Outcomes<br />
Framework (QOF), which links financial incentives to the quality of care that is provided<br />
by practices. The contract <strong>for</strong> providing medical care and all quality payments relate to<br />
the practice rather than to the individual physician. Under the 2004 contract,<br />
responsibility moves from the individual family practitioner to the practice, which is a<br />
group of, typically, one to six physicians. In 2004, the National Health Service<br />
committed £1.8 billion ($3.2 billion) in additional funding over a period of three years<br />
<strong>for</strong> a new pay <strong>for</strong> per<strong>for</strong>mance programme <strong>for</strong> family practitioners.<br />
The quality-of-care payments make up approximately 20 percent of the government’s<br />
total family practice budget.<br />
These figures are gross numbers and there<strong>for</strong>e include the additional costs (e.g., <strong>for</strong> the<br />
employment of nurses) that physicians may need to incur in order to deliver high<br />
standards of care. The percentage increase in available resources <strong>for</strong> individual<br />
physicians thus depends on the extent to which they have already invested in highquality<br />
systems in their practices.<br />
This programme was intended to increase family practitioners’ income by up to 25<br />
percent, depending on their per<strong>for</strong>mance with respect to 146 quality indicators relating<br />
to clinical care <strong>for</strong> 10 chronic diseases, organization of care, and patient experience.<br />
1. <strong>Quality</strong> is measured against a set of clinical activity indicators relating to<br />
aspects of care <strong>for</strong> several common chronic diseases, with practices<br />
rewarded according to the proportion of eligible patients <strong>for</strong> whom each<br />
target is achieved. Family practitioners earn more points if higher proportions<br />
of these patients have undergone “process measures” and further points <strong>for</strong><br />
“intermediate outcomes” (i.e. management of these risk factors within certain<br />
limits). Generally, more points are available <strong>for</strong> the intermediate outcomes<br />
than <strong>for</strong> the process measures, which reflect the increased difficulty of<br />
achieving these standards. The number of points that can be earned <strong>for</strong> each<br />
indicator was determined partly by the academic advisory group and partly by<br />
a <strong>for</strong>mal scoring process undertaken by groups of family practitioners in<br />
England and Scotland. The intention behind this process was to allocate<br />
points on the basis of the workload required to provide care to the relevant<br />
standard.<br />
For the clinical indicators, practices claim points that generate payments<br />
according to the proportion of patients <strong>for</strong> whom they achieve each target.<br />
Points are awarded on a sliding scale within the payment range. For example,<br />
<strong>for</strong> asthma indicator number 6, practices gain points <strong>for</strong> clinically reviewing at<br />
least 25 percent of patients with asthma in the previous 15 months. The<br />
maximum of 20 points is gained if at least 70 percent of patients with asthma<br />
are reviewed.<br />
For 2004–2005, payment was limited to £76 ($133) per point, adjusted <strong>for</strong><br />
the relative prevalence of the disease (payment is multiplied by the square<br />
root of the prevalence of the disease among the patients served by the<br />
practice and divided by the square root of the mean national prevalence of<br />
the disease). A maximum of 1 050 points was available, which was equivalent