Pay for Quality
Pay for Quality
Pay for Quality
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KCE Reports 118 <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Quality</strong> 23<br />
On theoretical grounds it can be stated that behaviour and consequences should be<br />
related in time as closely as possible. However, a continuous preoccupation with the<br />
incentive effects would also divert attention of providing care on a regular daily basis<br />
without an excessive additional programme related workload. The costs of a continuous<br />
reporting and payment system are likely to exceed the benefits due to time related gain<br />
in quality improvement. There<strong>for</strong>e, like in other sectors, P4Q programmes often<br />
provide payment only on one or a few fixed time points such as at the end of the year.<br />
This also gives providers a sufficient amount of time to invest in intermediate quality<br />
improvement in between quality measurements. A related question is whether the<br />
incentive is stable and long enough 67 . Incentives which are given on predefined time<br />
points with a sufficient duration over time would offer the providers the assurance that<br />
their ef<strong>for</strong>ts in achieving the indicators, will be warranted 67 .<br />
What is the weight allocated to the different dimensions of quality and to the different<br />
criteria within each dimension 35 ? Some P4Q programmes, like the <strong>Quality</strong> and<br />
Outcome Framework (QOF) in the UK, attach payment weights to specific quality<br />
targets as a function of the estimated related workload or time investment necessary to<br />
affect the targets. The weights can also express other criteria like the relative<br />
importance of specific targets in terms of public health. The QOF example also uses<br />
another weighting approach, based on the distinction of a clinical and organizational<br />
domain. The clinical domain contains process and intermediate outcome targets. The<br />
organizational domain contains a set of structural targets. An extreme <strong>for</strong>m is the<br />
expectation that a provider should per<strong>for</strong>m perfectly on all included quality targets. This<br />
is translated in some programmes into an all-or-none approach, meaning that the P4Q<br />
incentive is only provided if all targets have been met 99 , 100 .<br />
Is the reward relative or absolute? In case of an absolute reward, anyone who per<strong>for</strong>ms<br />
well obtains this reward no matter how the others per<strong>for</strong>m. If the reward is relative,<br />
providers compete against one another to obtain a bigger share of the available money.<br />
This is also called the “tournament approach”. The tournament approach has some<br />
theoretical advantages: it is cheaper or at least the expenses are more under control,<br />
and there is also a continuous incentive (to outper<strong>for</strong>m the others). 78 Disadvantages<br />
may include the uncertainty about what can be achieved, so that providers may judge<br />
investments in quality improvement to be unacceptably risky, and decide not to engage<br />
in the programme. 78 The choice between both options is related to what are considered<br />
to be the defining aspects of the level of per<strong>for</strong>mance to be achieved. It is easy to state<br />
that the percentage of HbA1c