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Sorted by Commenter - Ethics - State of California

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The Commission recommends that <strong>California</strong> retain the unconscionability standard for disciplining lawyers that is found in current<br />

rule 4-200. Seventy-five years ago, in a case seeking disbarment <strong>of</strong> an attorney, the <strong>California</strong> Supreme Court rejected a<br />

“reasonable fee” standard in discipline:<br />

We think the proper rule in such cases is that the mere fact that a fee is charged in excess <strong>of</strong> the reasonable value <strong>of</strong> the<br />

services rendered will not <strong>of</strong> itself warrant discipline <strong>of</strong> the attorney involved. Ordinarily, the propriety <strong>of</strong> the fee charged should<br />

be left to the civil courts in a proper action. As was said <strong>by</strong> the Washington court in Re Wiltsie, 109 Wash. 261, 186 P. 848:<br />

“The board also found, as one <strong>of</strong> the grounds for his disbarment, that the charges made for these services were excessive.<br />

We do not feel like depriving a practitioner <strong>of</strong> his right to continue his pr<strong>of</strong>ession on a question as debatable as the propriety <strong>of</strong><br />

the amount <strong>of</strong> a fee. Such a question is so much a matter <strong>of</strong> individual opinion that it should not be the basis for disbarment,<br />

except in the most aggravated and extreme case. So far as the record discloses, the fees were voluntarily paid, and, were it<br />

the only charge here that such fees were excessive, the extreme penalty would not be merited.”<br />

See Herrscher v. <strong>State</strong> Bar (1934) 4 Cal.2d 399, 402-403 [49 P.2d 832] (citations omitted). The Court then went on to state what<br />

it believed was the appropriate test for imposing discipline on a lawyer:<br />

In the few cases where discipline has been enforced against an attorney for charging excessive fees, there has usually been<br />

present some element <strong>of</strong> fraud or overreaching on the attorney's part, or failure on the attorney's part to disclose the true facts,<br />

so that the fee charged, under the circumstances, constituted a practical appropriation <strong>of</strong> the client's funds under the guise <strong>of</strong><br />

retaining them as fees.<br />

Generally speaking, neither the Board <strong>of</strong> Governors nor this court can, or should, attempt to evaluate an attorney's services in<br />

a quasi-criminal proceeding such as this, where there has been no failure to disclose to the client the true facts or no<br />

overreaching or fraud on the part <strong>of</strong> the attorney. It is our opinion that the disciplinary machinery <strong>of</strong> the bar should not be put<br />

into operation merely on the complaint <strong>of</strong> a client that a fee charged is excessive, unless the other elements above mentioned<br />

are present. (Emphasis added) (Citations omitted).<br />

RRC - 4-200 1-5 - Compare - Introduction - DFT4 (2-5-10)KEM-RD-RD.doc<br />

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