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NESTA Crime Online - University of Brighton Repository

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allow them to secure high pr<strong>of</strong>it margins and maintain the barriers <strong>of</strong> entry. Meanwhile,<br />

at the lower level <strong>of</strong> the chain, criminal activity (the cashiers and criminal gangs) is<br />

becoming more sophisticated in organisational management, increasing the number <strong>of</strong><br />

victims and multiplying their comparably lower pr<strong>of</strong>it-margin activities.<br />

2.2.1 Capabilities and specialisation for data harvesting<br />

(a) Use <strong>of</strong> non-cyber skills to harvest data.<br />

Credit card fraudsters and identity thieves use a combination <strong>of</strong> ‘traditional’ skills to<br />

acquire data and perpetrate fraud. Rummaging in trashcans for personal and financial<br />

data is a tried and tested way but increasingly unrewarding as more people now use<br />

shredders. Rummaging is also time consuming and can sometimes yield little for the<br />

effort expended whilst running the risk <strong>of</strong> being caught or arousing suspicion. 177<br />

A quicker, more effective and increasingly common method involves working with<br />

‘subcontractors’ or thieves. Cybercriminals pay them well - each card is worth £250 and<br />

if accompanied by a PIN, it fetches about £500. 178 ‘Insider agents’, employees <strong>of</strong><br />

companies such as in financial institutions, call centres and bars and restaurants are the<br />

prime targets. “They [the fraudsters] just brazenly hang around outside the <strong>of</strong>fice<br />

complex gates,” admits a Risk and Security Manager <strong>of</strong> a leading online computer<br />

retailer. 179 Prices will be lower if the call centres are in low cost countries, such as India,<br />

where passwords, addresses and passport details can change hands for a little more<br />

than £4. 180<br />

Credit card fraudsters and identity thieves directly approach potential accomplices who<br />

have two distinct characteristics: (1) those who have easy access to customers’ personal<br />

or financial details; (2) those in poorly paid jobs with access to financial data, so the<br />

financial incentive is so attractive that it outweighs concerns about collusion with the<br />

fraudster. Fraudsters who use this approach report a high level <strong>of</strong> cooperation and admit<br />

177 According to a manager in a credit checking company the “going rate” for three ‘identifiers’ for the same<br />

individuals was worth £5 to the homeless in Camden who were ‘contracted’ to rummage through the rubbish<br />

bins. Identifiers which could be used to apply for a passport was worth £50. Interview conducted on 29 th<br />

January 2008.<br />

178 192.com Business Services, (2008), The Fraudster’s Modus Operandi. London.<br />

179 192.com Business Services, (2008), The Fraudster’s Modus Operandi. London.<br />

180 Biswas, S., (2005) How secure are India’s call centres?, BBC News, 24 June,<br />

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4619859.stm.<br />

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