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116 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:1<br />

homeland to suffer <strong>the</strong> lack of <strong>the</strong> emigrants’ contribution to society at <strong>the</strong><br />

same time that <strong>the</strong>ir wives and children suffered <strong>the</strong> absence of <strong>the</strong>ir husbands<br />

and fa<strong>the</strong>rs” (p. 139). I think that this is still going on in many parts<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Muslim world. The difference may be that <strong>the</strong> sultans at that time<br />

were more progressive than Muslim leaders today, because in <strong>the</strong> early<br />

1920s attempts were made to limit <strong>the</strong> display of material wealth in order<br />

to protect <strong>the</strong> poorer native population. For instance, silk and decorated<br />

clothing and certain pieces of jewelry could be worn in public only on special<br />

occasions. They even regulated <strong>the</strong> wedding parties and <strong>the</strong> number of<br />

celebration parties that <strong>the</strong> returning emigrants could hold!<br />

In summary, Boxberger has provided us with an exemplary piece of<br />

history from a dynamic part of <strong>the</strong> Muslim world. And, as we all know,<br />

without history <strong>the</strong> future will be much more complicated.<br />

Soumaya Pernilla Ouis<br />

Human Ecology Division, Lund University<br />

Lund, Sweden<br />

Lebanon’s <strong>Second</strong> <strong>Republic</strong>:<br />

<strong>Prospects</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> Twenty-First Century<br />

Kail C. Ellis, ed.<br />

Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002. 236 pages.<br />

It has now been over a decade since Lebanon’s long civil war ended.<br />

Indeed, <strong>the</strong> new constitutional structures that emerged from <strong>the</strong> war –<br />

Lebanon’s second republic – will soon have a longer life than <strong>the</strong> war<br />

itself. This book examines both <strong>the</strong> depth and sustainability of Lebanon’s<br />

new-found stability and brings toge<strong>the</strong>r both academics specializing in<br />

contemporary Lebanese affairs as well as several Lebanese professionals.<br />

It is divided into three sections: Lebanon’s future in <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong><br />

Middle East peace process, questions of sectarianism and identity within<br />

Lebanon, and selected questions relating to social justice and economic<br />

per<strong>for</strong>mance in <strong>the</strong> postwar world. The book is also flanked by an introduction<br />

and an epilogue written by Ellis.<br />

The volume first examines <strong>the</strong> regional and global contexts in which<br />

Lebanon finds itself. Modern Lebanon has always been vulnerable to<br />

external interference in its affairs. Hafeez Malik argues that in <strong>the</strong> nineteenth<br />

century, it was <strong>the</strong> competition between <strong>the</strong> great powers that led to


Book Reviews 117<br />

<strong>the</strong> creation of Lebanon’s religiously based sectarian political system,<br />

which was a departure from <strong>the</strong> longstanding reliance on tribal networks<br />

as a way of structuring political life. In <strong>the</strong> twentieth century, paralleling<br />

this global competition <strong>for</strong> power, now articulated through cold war logic,<br />

was <strong>the</strong> emergence of fierce competition <strong>for</strong> regional hegemony between<br />

Nasserism, Palestinian nationalism, and Israeli irredentism, all of which<br />

penetrated, destabilized, and eventually contributed to <strong>the</strong> breakdown of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Lebanese polity.<br />

This book clearly states that today, <strong>the</strong>se destabilizing regional and<br />

global influences have subsided <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> time being and have been replaced<br />

by American acquiescence to Syrian hegemony over Lebanese affairs. In an<br />

interesting article on Israeli-Lebanese relations, Kirsten Schulze adds Israel<br />

to <strong>the</strong> list of powers acquiescing to this geo-strategic situation, having, in<br />

effect, abandoned any larger projects aimed at fostering <strong>the</strong> creation of a<br />

Christian ministate to its north. As Ellis stresses, however, Lebanon’s resultant<br />

stability remains grounded in uncertainty, since it is a hostage to<br />

progress in <strong>the</strong> region’s overall peace process.<br />

The second part focuses on Lebanon’s cultural and religious heritage.<br />

The contributors argue that sectarian identities have become more<br />

entrenched in <strong>the</strong> postwar world. Paul Nabil Sayyah’s article explains this<br />

phenomenon with respect to <strong>the</strong> increasing challenges faced by traditional<br />

elites, as well as <strong>the</strong> underlying social patterns of coexistence between religious<br />

communities, from such new religious movements as Hizballah,<br />

which are questioning Lebanon’s “pacted” system of power-sharing. Fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />

contributing to this predicament, argues Nabeel Haidar, is Lebanon’s educational<br />

system, which has largely failed to <strong>for</strong>ge a strong sense of Lebanese,<br />

as opposed to communal, identity. Thus, <strong>the</strong> people continue to view <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

particular religious leader as <strong>the</strong>ir “political mediator” instead of looking to<br />

<strong>the</strong> state.<br />

Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most pointed example of <strong>the</strong>se hardening communal barriers<br />

is found in Julie Peteet’s excellent article on <strong>the</strong> Palestinian community<br />

in Lebanon. Highlighting a new war and a postwar process of “o<strong>the</strong>ring,”<br />

she argues that Palestinian relations with <strong>the</strong> Lebanese have become more<br />

socially and spatially polarized, a development that has reversed a more<br />

blurred prewar reality. Camp borders are now “brutally” defined and <strong>the</strong><br />

extent of Palestinian working rights have been increasingly restricted, both<br />

of which have contributed to a dramatic deterioration in <strong>the</strong> community’s<br />

socioeconomic well-being. Mona Khalaf’s article on <strong>the</strong> status of women<br />

in postwar Lebanon paints a similar picture of marginalization, character-


118 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:1<br />

ized both by <strong>the</strong> “feminization of poverty” as well as by <strong>the</strong> entrenchment<br />

of legal discrimination, symbolized by <strong>the</strong> difficulties in re<strong>for</strong>ming<br />

Lebanon’s religiously controlled personal status laws and courts.<br />

The third section deals with a variety of socioeconomic problems.<br />

Wassim Shahin’s article on <strong>the</strong> Lebanese economy provides a stark statistical<br />

analysis of its poor per<strong>for</strong>mance, though it only alludes to some of <strong>the</strong><br />

underlying causes, such as “inefficient allocations,” namely, corruption.<br />

More pointedly critical articles – indeed, along with that by Peteet, <strong>the</strong> volume’s<br />

best – are Fuad Hamdan’s examination of Lebanon’s ecological crisis<br />

and Michael Davie’s critique of Lebanon’s postwar plans <strong>for</strong> urban<br />

reconstruction. Hamdan refers to Lebanon as “drowning in its own waste,”<br />

plagued by a corrupt Council <strong>for</strong> Development and Reconstruction and a<br />

weak Ministry of <strong>the</strong> Environment. Davie similarly refers to <strong>the</strong> country’s<br />

“chaotic” urban landscape, where development is increasingly determined<br />

by <strong>the</strong> trade-offs among Lebanon’s sectarian elites. By excluding <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />

of grass-roots participation, this reality contributes to what Davie<br />

calls “a social deficit” in postwar Lebanon.<br />

This is not a comprehensive examination of Lebanon’s second republic,<br />

<strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong>re is a very glaring omission: <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>mal political process, namely,<br />

elections, Parliament, and <strong>the</strong> judicial system. Instead, <strong>the</strong> book gives a great<br />

deal – and in my mind undue – attention to questions of Muslim-Christian<br />

relations and dialogue. This deflects attention away from <strong>the</strong> real sources of<br />

sectarianism in Lebanon: entrenched elite power. Ellis also provides no<br />

editorial justification <strong>for</strong> why some topics were included and o<strong>the</strong>rs were<br />

omitted. Presumably, <strong>the</strong>se were simply <strong>the</strong> ones that emerged from <strong>the</strong> conference,<br />

sponsored jointly by Villanova and <strong>the</strong> Lebanese American<br />

University in 1998, on which this collection is based. In addition, many of<br />

<strong>the</strong> articles have a subjective feel to <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong>y were written by Lebanese<br />

who are actively involved in <strong>the</strong> processes <strong>the</strong>y describe. While extremely<br />

useful as potential primary source materials <strong>for</strong> scholars, this makes <strong>the</strong>m<br />

somewhat less useful as pieces of objective analysis.<br />

Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, this volume lacks a rigorous analytical focus, preferring<br />

instead to play it safe at a higher level of generalization and pragmatic prescription.<br />

To describe Lebanon as being a “hostage” to <strong>the</strong> peace process,<br />

<strong>for</strong> example, exaggerates its own lack of empowerment, however constrained<br />

it might be by outside <strong>for</strong>ces. The contributions of Peteet, Hamdan,<br />

and Davie address <strong>the</strong> country’s real fault lines in a more explicit manner:<br />

lamenting <strong>the</strong> predominance of elite alliances that, at present, determine <strong>the</strong><br />

direction of much of <strong>the</strong> country’s reconstruction processes, and arguing


Book Reviews 119<br />

instead <strong>for</strong> promoting “non-violent and democratic models of social trans<strong>for</strong>mation.”<br />

It is this “democratic deficit” in Lebanon, found at <strong>the</strong> political,<br />

economic, and social levels, that is <strong>the</strong> main obstacle clouding its prospects<br />

in this new century.<br />

These criticisms aside, however, this volume has a number of excellent<br />

contributions and reaches some sensible, if scattered, conclusions<br />

about <strong>the</strong> challenges that Lebanon faces.<br />

Paul Kingston<br />

Department of Political Science, University of Toronto<br />

Toronto, Canada<br />

Suits and Uni<strong>for</strong>ms: Turkish Foreign Policy<br />

since <strong>the</strong> Cold War<br />

Philip Robins<br />

Seattle: Washington University Press, 2003. 352 pages.<br />

Philip Robins contends that Turkish <strong>for</strong>eign policy has faced four challenges<br />

in four distinct periods of its history: (1) consolidating <strong>the</strong> emergent<br />

Turkish <strong>Republic</strong> through external recognition (1930s), (2) remaining<br />

neutral during <strong>the</strong> <strong>Second</strong> World War (1940s), (3) confronting <strong>the</strong><br />

challenge of Soviet expansionism (<strong>the</strong> cold war era), and (4) responding<br />

to <strong>the</strong> end of bipolarity (post-cold war era). Robins examines <strong>the</strong>se <strong>for</strong>eign<br />

policy issues in <strong>the</strong> last period.<br />

The main <strong>the</strong>sis of this work is threefold: First, Turkey is a status quo<br />

power in <strong>the</strong> way that its <strong>for</strong>eign policy elites have fastened <strong>the</strong>ir thinking<br />

and practice to <strong>the</strong> framework of “<strong>the</strong> sanctity of borders, of states, of<br />

multilateral institutions and of norms of conduct, even when it became<br />

clear that systemic changes had rendered some of <strong>the</strong>se continuities no<br />

longer tenable” (p. 6). <strong>Second</strong>, Turkey continues to be firmly oriented<br />

westwards in terms of its <strong>for</strong>eign relations, which are characterized by its<br />

strong commitment to NATO as well as its desire to join <strong>the</strong> European<br />

Union (EU). Finally, Turkish <strong>for</strong>eign policy has been characterized more<br />

by “caution than daring,” quoting Malik Mufti. Despite <strong>the</strong> increase in its<br />

power relative to its neighbors, Turkey has avoided an interventionist <strong>for</strong>eign<br />

policy by emphasizing <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>mation of multilateral frameworks <strong>for</strong><br />

conflict resolution.<br />

Robins defends <strong>the</strong>se arguments by analyzing <strong>the</strong> international systemic<br />

and domestic politics context in which Turkish <strong>for</strong>eign policy is

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