2013 - CESM - ROYAL NAVY - English v2x

Vincent DESNOS
Avril 2012
In « Océans, enjeux de défense et de sécurité »
“Royal Navy: Past resilience and future
renunciation?”
'
Subjected to unprecedented austerity, the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) has had
to undertake a Strategic Review (SDSR) in 2010 to compensate for cuts in its budget.
The Review involved a reduction in the size of the Royal Navy and was a major turning
point: fewer sailors, downgrading of equipment programs, and mainly early
withdrawal of ships, including the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal. From March 11 th
2011, the British Navy saw itself thus deprived of its fleet air arm, until the entry in
service of the new aircraft carrier scheduled for 2020. Ironically, since then, the Royal
Navy has been tapped more than ever. A week later, on March 19, the intervention
began in Libya, involving the sending of sixteen British ships to participate in the
NATO Unified Protector international operation. With no aircraft carrier to establish a
no-fly zone over Libya, the British honourably waged air action from forward bases in
the Mediterranean, but this recalled the bitterness of a Royal Navy left without the
means of its ambitions by the SDSR. And now, thirty years after the start of the
Falklands War which pitted for 75 days London and Buenos Aires, tensions have
resurfaced about the string of islands in the South Atlantic and the black gold that it
contains. Argentine bellicose attitudes are giving credit to the voice lamenting the
downgrading of the Royal Navy to second tier.
To analyze the impact of the SDSR on the operations of the Royal Navy, it is useful to
introduce the concept of resilience. As is the case in France, where this concept is still
exploratory 1 , it offers a good reading grid to address the means by which the Royal Navy is
able to absorb the shocks and restore normal operation. In 1982, the restoration of British
sovereignty over the Falklands showed strong resilience of the Navy. SDSR in 2010, Libya in
2011 and the more recent posturing about the South Atlantic archipelago are all events
assessed in the light of the resilience of the British navy. Is the Royal Navy still in a position
to fulfil its roles? Does it still have adequate resources for its political and military objectives?
Let’s first define resilience applied to the military and illustrate it with the Falklands War of
1982, before analyzing the current and long-term format of the Royal Navy.
‘
I. The notion of resilience applied to armed forces
The concept of military resilience was introduced from 2007 into British joint military doctrine
and has been defined as “the means by which MOD units and establishments survive and
recover from events, which significantly impair their ability to carry out normal functions." 2
From a British point of view, it means special attention is paid to the ability to provide ongoing
and sustainable support to overseas operations. In France, the 2008 White Paper on
1 The concept of resilience was introduced in 2008 in the White Paper on Defence, and has since been a
reflection of CICDE about possible implications for the armed forces
2 Joint Doctrine Publication 02, 2007, "Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience", second
edition, pp. 2-36

defence and national security provided a definition of military resilience for the first time,
relatively similar to the British one. The CICDE then presented an exploratory concept to
describe the fundamentals and principles as well as the overall process. The French define
resilience as “the willingness and ability of a country to withstand the consequences of an
attack or major disaster, and then quickly restore their ability to function normally, or at least
in a socially acceptable way. " 3 The resilience effort should involve both capability and
willingness, and include men, organization and equipment. A fundamental condition of
resilience is the ability of the actors, structures and equipment to act in spite of degraded
situation. Resilience is the result of a "dynamic process, over time, to be understood in all its
phases" 4 : the preparation which conditions the subsequent ability to resist, the resistance
itself, the restoration of a normal situation and the long-term consolidation.
II. A model of resilience: The "Falkland effect" of 1982
The Falklands crisis of 1982 illustrates effective resilience of the Royal Navy, and more
broadly of the United Kingdom. The origin of the conflict that broke out in April 1982 between
London and Buenos Aires is a 19th century dispute about the sovereignty of the islands of
the South Atlantic, owned by London but claimed by Buenos Aires. By focusing its public
opinion on the issue of Argentine Falklands, the military junta in power since 1976 was able
to distract it from the failure of its policies as it was unable to stem the serious economic
crisis Argentina was faced with. For their part, the British dithered about the protection of the
islands and had stripped their defence. The 1981 strategic review had decided a few weeks
prior to the conflict to remove the last unit of the Royal Navy of the islands, and (already)
proposed the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier, no decision yet being made at the
outbreak of the conflict 5 . Argentines therefore took advantage of this degree of British
uncertainty and the invasion of the islands began April 2, 1982. The reaction of Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher was firm. Supported by the British public, intervention was
decided to restore British sovereignty over the Falklands. In less than five days, a British
carrier battle and amphibious group had assembled then left Portsmouth bound for the South
Atlantic. The naval battle began on May 1, and the troops of the Royal Marines landed on
May 21. On 14 June, the Argentine garrison stationed at Port Stanley was officially defeated,
and the cessation of hostilities declared by the British on June 20. The fighting rose to 652
dead, 1136 injured, eight sunken ships and 101 aircraft destroyed on the Argentine side, and
255 dead, 777 wounded, 6 ships sunk, 34 aircraft destroyed on the British side.
For the Royal Navy, the war of 1982 shows a resilience process. Unpreparedness could
have been disastrous, but the process ultimately proved operating. The ability to avoid
strategic surprise supposed monitoring capabilities and a performing alert system. But in
1982, the British intelligence services had only a vague idea of Argentine intentions 6 .
Vulnerabilities were not identified, as evidenced by the withdrawal of units of the Royal Navy
from the Island shortly before the invasion. The poor initial decisions of the British thus
facilitated invasion by the Argentines, but their resilience allowed restoring the initial status
quo.
The first signs of resilience showed in the immediate response capability of the Royal Navy
and the British forces. Following the invasion, London reacted with firmness and organized
diplomatic pressure on Buenos Aires. Concurrently, the military preparations were made
quickly in order to set up the intervention force as soon as possible and independently. The
3
LBDSN 2008, cited in the joint exploratory concept "Resilience" of CICDE (No. 202/DEF/CICDE/NP
December 12, 2011)
4
CICDE, December 2011, Joint Concept exploratory "Resilience", No. 202/DEF/CICDE/NP p. 37
5
Goussot C., B. Gomis, March 29, 2012, "Grande Bretagne - France: the new deal," available at
http://www.marine-oceans.com/geopolitique/71-grande-bretagne-l-france-la-nouvelle-donne
6
Clarke M., 2012, "The Falklands: The Security Equation in 2012", available at
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4F6324444BE2E/

firm reaction of the British therefore enabled to contain the deteriorating situation. The first
military actions followed unsuccessful attempts of UN mediation, ensuring continuity in
action. With no base near the conflict area, the British pre-positioned their forces on
Ascension Island in the middle of the Atlantic. This forward base served as a relay for the
Royal Navy and provided support to the battle group (the Falklands are located 13,500
kilometres off the British coast, and only 480 km off the Argentinean coast). Finally, the Royal
Navy managed to overcome the high numerical inferiority of its air cover (only 14 Harriers on
board, versus 120 lined up by the Argentine side, of which 50 dedicated to air superiority).
The breaking point was reached on May 3 when the HMS Conqueror SSN (nuclear-powered
attack submarine) sank the Argentine cruiser Belgrano. This torpedo was of strategic
importance because it eliminated the Maritime Argentine threat, with its entire fleet
subsequently hiding in ports.
Ex post, the British were able to learn from the fighting experience and from the
unpreparedness which could have been fatal. After 1982, a considerable investment of 700
million pounds allowed to build a large military base around a new airport in Mount Pleasant.
Nearly 1,500 soldiers station there permanently, as opposed to 80 at the time of the invasion.
Today, four Typhoon fighters provide air defence, with the RAF effectively relaying the Royal
Navy. The British Navy has thus been able to develop a form of hyper-resilience despite the
loss of several warships and an environment that was unfavourable. What’s more the
Thatcher government was able to take advantage of the crisis, and benefited from what
should be called the "Falklands effect", a popular support to its effective management of the
crisis which allowed it to win the elections the next year.
III. Program review and current issues: the complex equation of resilience
The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
In October 2010, the National Security Council announced its Strategic Review of Defence
and Security (SDSR), whose findings would impact the format of the British defence. This
document has made concrete suggestions to achieve the savings required from the MoD by
the austerity plan that the coalition government of Tories and Libdem implemented in 2010
after the parliamentary elections. The savings for Defence have been set at about 8% in real
terms over the period 2011-2015, thus stabilizing the defence budget at around 34 billion
pounds.
The conclusions of the SDSR had a significant impact on the capabilities of the Royal Navy,
with immediate effect in certain areas. Restructuring of the Navy contained several
measures. First, the withdrawal of the Navy fleet of Harrier aircraft with vertical / short
takeoffs and landings, and the early withdrawal from active service of the aircraft carrier HMS
Ark Royal, thus depriving the Royal Navy's of its fleet air arm until at least 2020. Its
application was immediate. Then, the reduction of the number of frigates by early withdrawal
of four of them, reaching a final number of 19 frigates (types 23 and 26) and destroyers (type
45). In addition, the SDSR put on standby the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean, and retired from
active duty the light aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious. Finally, the staff of the Royal Navy is
being reduced by 5000, reaching 29,000 seamen by 2015.
Confusion about the future aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth class
While the SDSR continued building two aircraft carriers, uncertainty remains about their
technical specifications, their date of entry into service and operational number. The initial
configuration of the first aircraft carrier of the Queen Elizabeth class whose construction
began in July 2009 was due to carry the STOVL version (short takeoff and vertical landing) of
the F35B Joint Strike Fighter, which meant a flight deck without catapults and stopping wires.
Unveiled by the SDSR in 2010, the choice for the Royal Navy changed in favour of a
CATOBAR version for both aircraft carriers to accommodate the F35C. This choice was

motivated by the better capabilities of the C version (longer range, higher payload capacity),
as well as the desire for interoperability with U.S. and French navies. Only one aircraft carrier
would have been operational, the Royal Navy not being able to operate both with 29,000
seamen 7 . In November 2011, another change confirmed the use of the CATOBAR version
for one aircraft carrier only, the Prince of Wales. The Queen Elizabeth, scheduled for 2016,
would be used to qualify the crews awaiting the arrival of the second aircraft carrier from
2020. Two hundred sailors and airmen would train in parallel on the French and the U.S.
aircraft carriers to develop their takeoffs and landings skills. Crews would therefore be
operational in 2020 on the Prince of Wales, while the Queen Elizabeth would be placed in
reserve in accordance with the SDSR, and later possibly benefit from a retrofit or be resold.
However, more recent reversals maintain confusion as regards the naval capacity. The cost
of converting a single aircraft carrier to CATOBAR system would be about 1.8 billion
pounds 8 . Already at a financial impasse, the MoD should find some £ 300 million more per
year for six years, which would compromise the confirmed order of F35B. Stay tuned.
Intervention in Libya: shortness of resilience
Triggered at very short notice, the Unified Protector NATO operation tested the
responsiveness and resilience of the Royal Navy. This operation demonstrated the high level
of preparedness of the navy and the endurance of the equipment. But it also revealed the
limitations and shortcomings of a material that has been used up to its limits for a relatively
long period considering the initial unpreparedness. While the fleet has proved resilient, most
of the sixteen vessels engaged in Libya are still docked for technical stop, thus depriving the
Royal Navy of a significant presence in the sea. Recovery capabilities of the fleet are thus
impacted and resilience is less effective.
Thirty years after the war, renewed tension on Falklands
Since 2010 the Falklands crystallize tensions between London and Buenos Aires once more.
The British government has authorized oil exploration and the British Geological Survey has
established that the Falklands reserves would amount to 60 billion barrels, much similar to
those of the North Sea 9 . Early 2012, the deployment of new missile destroyer HMS
Dauntless and of a new SSN, as well as the arrival of Prince William in the Falklands are
many provocations that justified in the eyes of Buenos Aires the February 2010 complaint to
the UN to denounce the militarization of the conflict by the United Kingdom. However, the
seriousness of the escalating conflict should be relativised, as war outcome seems highly
unlikely. For the moment, it is just posturing, diplomatic one on the Argentine side, and
military on the British side. Its symbolism is certainly strong, but it’s not likely to escalate into
open conflict. The Argentine government is not comparable with its military predecessor,
politically beleaguered in 1982. Military adventurism does not seem relevant, especially as
the Argentine military equipment is aging and that bilateral trade between the two countries
amounts to 1.4 billion pounds. 10
If an Argentine attack seems very unlikely today, concerns remain high on the British side. In
November 2010, a group of former admirals of the Royal Navy reacted to the political
decision to scrap the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and her fleet of Sea Harriers 11 , saying the cuts
were a virtual invitation made to Argentina to attack the Falklands, which would impose a
7
Defencemanagement website, November 25, 2011, "Navy will be too small for two carriers", available at
http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=18127
8
Defencemanagement website, March 13, 2012, "Carrier conversion could cost £ 1.8bn", available at
http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=19140
9
Brèves Marines, March 13, 2012, « Iles Malouines : les forages de la discorde », N°143 ("Falkland Islands:
drilling of discord")
10
« The Falklands : The Security Equation in 2012 », op. cit.
11
BBC News UK, 10 November 2010, "Admirals urge rethink on Harrier and Ark Royal cuts", available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11723589

national humiliation in the UK worthy of the loss of Singapore 12 . According to them, if
Argentina were to take the islands, the British would have absolutely no way to get them
back. They did not hesitate to compare this ten year rule imposed by the Government (ten
years without naval capacity) to the previous ten-year rule of the 1930s which cost "freedom
from Hitler." Or to compare the 2010 strategic review to the 1981 one, the same causes
producing the same effects. The government may play down the consequences of the loss of
the fleet air arm capability, it nevertheless remains cautious. This is evidenced by
deployments in March of HMS Dauntless and a SSN as part of the strategy for preventing
any dispute over the Falklands. The destroyer is the projection from the sea of British power
in deterrence logic. The presence of the SSN in the South Atlantic waters illustrates a
strategy of denial of access, preventing Argentine control over the maritime area without
forcing the British to control it themselves. The British therefore display a strong preparation,
coupled with strong political will not to be surprised again. It is indeed resilience in its
preparatory phase.
IV. Eventually, renunciation of power projection but resilient force projection
Although the capabilities of the Royal Navy to conduct amphibious operations have been
reduced in the short term, the Strategic Review seems to strengthen them in the long term.
The concept of adaptable strategic posture indeed gives priority to the prevention of
international military crises, with the ability to respond if they occur. The strategic review thus
explicitly recognizes the need for and usefulness of the amphibious capability, while the
response to an unlikely but high-risk wide scale attack is devoted to nuclear deterrence
Maintaining amphibious capability is embodied in the development of a rapid reaction force
('High Readiness Response Force'), whose key element is the Royal Marines corps and its
three brigades of commandos. SDSR therefore plans to project and sustain a group of 1,800
soldiers and their equipment from the sea. For that purpose, the helicopter carrier HMS
Ocean was maintained in preference to the light aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious because it
provided more benefits for force projection 13 .
Force projection should be not only maintained but reinforced with the arrival of the future
aircraft carrier. In conventional deployment, she will carry only 12 combat aircraft, against 36
as originally planned (the payload is still maintained). This will enable it to carry more
helicopters, both transport (up to 12 Chinook or Merlin) and attack helicopters (8 Apaches).
In this configuration, the future aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth Class would rather be used
for force projection. The amphibious component could therefore prove more resilient than
expected. In contrast, the Royal Navy would relinquish power projection fully until 2020, and
at least partially beyond that date.
In the past, the Royal Navy showed resilience and has been able to gain benefits from the
shocks it had to endure. But today, the SDSR has impacted its capabilities in an
unprecedented way, including its fleet air arm. While the media air time is focusing on the
display of forces between Argentina and the United Kingdom because of heightened tension
on the Falklands, while critics are going well against a British government accused of
sacrificing the Royal Navy, it is possible that the real issue is not so much about the current
capabilities of the Royal Navy but about the possible strategic change in its future
employment. The movement launched by the SDSR which refocuses on the Royal Navy
amphibious capabilities and which seems to be confirmed by the latest configuration of the
new aircraft carrier suggests that in the future policymakers will favour force projection to
projection of power. This shows the resilience of one capability against the partial
renunciation of another one.
12
The surrender of Singapore to the Japanese forces in February 1942 is considered one of the most crushing
defeats of the British army.
13
RDS Interview, August 2011, "Maintaining the UK's Maritime Expeditionary Capability Post SDSR",
available at http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_201101_Michell2.pdf