New meanings of Panafricanism in the era of globalisation

New meanings of Panafricanism in the era of globalisation New meanings of Panafricanism in the era of globalisation

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macro-economic strategies prescribed by the multilateral institutions and the corporate puppeteers behind the scenes of the world stage, on which they like to strut at Davos, Geneva, New York, Washington and elsewhere. In a devastatingly honest and surgical analysis of the African condition, Colin Leys, almost 10 years ago demonstrated that the colonial legacy will take many years and a combination of improbable developments to be eliminated. In particular, he points to the fact that under colonial rule, “household production of commodities replaced household production for subsistence and local exchange…” and that this resulted in the destruction ofthe precolonial economies and the social orders based on them, without putting in their place economies or social systems capable of defending themselves against ‘world market forces’ after independence” (Leys 1994:44-45). Five years later, together with John Saul, he described Africa south of the Sahara (excluding South Africa) as a place where there is “some capital but not a lot of capitalism” (Saul and Leys 1999). Our understanding of the reasons for the tragedy of Africa in the modern world has been enhanced by many incisive analyses but in the short time at my disposal, I cannot enter into the specifics of any of them. Suffice it to say that the failure of the postcolonial African state and the initially populist orientation of most post-independence African governments culminated in the domino-like collapse of most of them after the oil priceinduced economic crisis of the mid-1970s. The structural adjustment prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions that were supposed to restore the economies of these states to health notoriously exacerbated their condition and catapulted most of them into the debt trap, where they languish up to this day 9 . Today, there is hardly any publicist or analyst that does not record and lament the fact and the scale of the marginalisation of the continent. Inevitably, suggestions for solutions have oscillated between accepting a kind of recolonisation of the continent, with effective government and decision-making taking place from Northern capitals, and what has been called (by Ndegwa 1992) “collective self-reliance for economic recovery and growth”. In 9 For a useful review of the process, see Bond 2001:17-28. 10

fact, it does not detract from the credit of President Mbeki when one maintains that both the outline and the details of his programme, which has come to be known as the African renaissance, have been prefigured in a long series of studies undertaken by African as well as UN-based research institutes and political think tanks 10 . It is not surprising that the impetus for the regeneration of the continent has come from the new South Africa. Besides the more intangible factors of particular biographies and personalities, it is the paradoxical legacy of apartheid and of the struggle against apartheid that has draped the mantle of leadership over the shoulders of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and their colleagues. Elsewhere 11 , I have specified in more detail the dynamics involved in this evolution. Suffice it to say that against the background of the marginalisation of Africa (“the forgotten continent”), referred to above and which can only be described as a de facto de-linking from the world economy, as the statistics 12 make abundantly clear, the domestic capitalist class in South Africa has been presented with the unprecedented opportunity to move into the “African hinterland” virtually undeterred by any rivals from the disillusioned and nervous investors in the North. In this connection, the demoralising words of Colin Leys (1994:44) force themselves on to the page: …. (Unless) the global economic and political forces bearing on Africa radically alter, much if not most of the continent is doomed to further decline, material and moral degradation and suffering. This is not to say that no region of the continent can become, at least for a while, poles of capital accumulation – where there is a resource of interest to capital in general, and where local class forces are able to appropriate some of the surplus generated in exploiting that resource, and have the ability and will to use that as 10 See, for example, the detailed study edited by Obasanjo and Mosha (1992). 11 Alexander 2002, especially Chapter 7. 12 11 of the 12 poorest countries in the world are located in Africa; the continent as a whole accounts for less than 3% of world trade and of the global GDP in spite of the fact that it is home to more than 10% of the world’s population. It is “the most indebted area in the world”. Africa’s external debt, “as a percentage of GNP, … rose from 39.6 percent in 1980 to 87.7 percent in 1994; as a percentage of the value of exports it went up from 97 percent in 1980 to 324 percent in 1990” (Castells, cited in Saul and Leys 1999). In 1998, the Economic Commission for Africa stated that “… according to current estimates, close to 50% of the population live in absolute poverty. This percentage is expected to increase at the beginning of the next millennium…” (Cited in Saul and Leys 1999). 11

macro-economic strategies prescribed by <strong>the</strong> multilat<strong>era</strong>l <strong>in</strong>stitutions and <strong>the</strong> corporate<br />

puppeteers beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> scenes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world stage, on which <strong>the</strong>y like to strut at Davos,<br />

Geneva, <strong>New</strong> York, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton and elsewhere.<br />

In a devastat<strong>in</strong>gly honest and surgical analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> African condition, Col<strong>in</strong> Leys,<br />

almost 10 years ago demonstrated that <strong>the</strong> colonial legacy will take many years and a<br />

comb<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> improbable developments to be elim<strong>in</strong>ated. In particular, he po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong><br />

fact that under colonial rule, “household production <strong>of</strong> commodities replaced household<br />

production for subsistence and local exchange…” and that this resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> destruction<br />

<strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong> precolonial economies and <strong>the</strong> social orders based on <strong>the</strong>m, without putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong>ir place economies or social systems capable <strong>of</strong> defend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>mselves aga<strong>in</strong>st ‘world<br />

market forces’ after <strong>in</strong>dependence” (Leys 1994:44-45). Five years later, toge<strong>the</strong>r with<br />

John Saul, he described Africa south <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sahara (exclud<strong>in</strong>g South Africa) as a place<br />

where <strong>the</strong>re is “some capital but not a lot <strong>of</strong> capitalism” (Saul and Leys 1999). Our<br />

understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reasons for <strong>the</strong> tragedy <strong>of</strong> Africa <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern world has been<br />

enhanced by many <strong>in</strong>cisive analyses but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> short time at my disposal, I cannot enter<br />

<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> specifics <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Suffice it to say that <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> postcolonial<br />

African state and <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itially populist orientation <strong>of</strong> most post-<strong>in</strong>dependence African<br />

governments culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>o-like collapse <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m after <strong>the</strong> oil price<strong>in</strong>duced<br />

economic crisis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1970s. The structural adjustment prescriptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

Bretton Woods <strong>in</strong>stitutions that were supposed to restore <strong>the</strong> economies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se states to<br />

health notoriously exacerbated <strong>the</strong>ir condition and catapulted most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> debt<br />

trap, where <strong>the</strong>y languish up to this day 9 .<br />

Today, <strong>the</strong>re is hardly any publicist or analyst that does not record and lament <strong>the</strong> fact<br />

and <strong>the</strong> scale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent. Inevitably, suggestions for solutions<br />

have oscillated between accept<strong>in</strong>g a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> recolonisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent, with effective<br />

government and decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g tak<strong>in</strong>g place from Nor<strong>the</strong>rn capitals, and what has been<br />

called (by Ndegwa 1992) “collective self-reliance for economic recovery and growth”. In<br />

9 For a useful review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> process, see Bond 2001:17-28.<br />

10

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