Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard ...
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard ...
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard ...
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e used for current year compliance. We considered a number <strong>of</strong> possible approaches for<br />
accomplishing this, some <strong>of</strong> which are discussed below. After consultation with<br />
stakeholders, we decided that the best approach would be to place a percentage cap on the<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> an obligated party's <strong>Renewable</strong> Volume Obligation (RVO) that can be met using<br />
previous-year RINs. We are proposing that this cap be set at 20 percent. Thus each<br />
obligated party would be required to use current-year RINs to meet at least 80 percent <strong>of</strong> its<br />
RVO, with a maximum <strong>of</strong> 20 percent being derived from previous-year RINs. The cap<br />
would not be effective until compliance year 2009, since no rollover is possible in years 2007<br />
or 2008.<br />
Any previous-year RINs that an obligated party may have that are in excess <strong>of</strong> the 20<br />
percent cap could be traded to other obligated parties that need them. If the previous-year<br />
RINs in excess <strong>of</strong> the 20 percent cap were not used by any obligated party for compliance,<br />
they would expire. The net result would be that, for the market as a whole, no more than 20<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> a given year's renewable fuel st<strong>and</strong>ard could be met with RINs from the previous<br />
year.<br />
Furthermore, we believe that the 20 percent cap provides the appropriate balance<br />
between, on the one h<strong>and</strong>, allowing legitimate RIN carryovers <strong>and</strong> protecting against<br />
potential supply shortfalls that could limit the availability <strong>of</strong> RINs, <strong>and</strong> on the other h<strong>and</strong><br />
ensuring an annual dem<strong>and</strong> for renewable fuels as envisioned by the Act. We believe this<br />
approach also provides the certainty all parties desire in implementing the program. The<br />
same cap would apply equally to all obligated parties, <strong>and</strong> the cap would be the same for all<br />
years, providing certainty on exactly how obligated parties must comply with their RVO<br />
going out into the future. A 20 percent cap would be readily enforceable with minimal<br />
additional program complexity, as each obligated party's annual report would simply provide<br />
separate listings <strong>of</strong> previous-year <strong>and</strong> current-year RINs to establish that the cap had not been<br />
exceeded. A 20 percent cap would have no impact on who would own RINs, their valid life,<br />
or any other regulatory provision regarding compliance.<br />
Rather than employing a fixed 20 percent cap, we also considered an approach<br />
whereby we would set the cap annually based on the actual excess renewable fuel<br />
production. Table III.D.3.c-2 provides an example <strong>of</strong> how the caps would be calculated if<br />
the EIA projections for ethanol production prove accurate.<br />
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