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ORNL-TM-7207 - the Molten Salt Energy Technologies Web Site

ORNL-TM-7207 - the Molten Salt Energy Technologies Web Site

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92<br />

cooled drain tank. The system primary containment, which is defined as<br />

<strong>the</strong> set sf hermetically sealed concrete-shielded equipment cells, would<br />

probably not be threatened by such a spill, but cleanup operations would<br />

be d5fficult e<br />

A unique safety feature of <strong>the</strong> DMSR is that, under accident shutdown<br />

conditions, <strong>the</strong> fuel material would be led to <strong>the</strong> emergency core cooling<br />

system gECCS> (represented by drain tank cooling) ra<strong>the</strong>r than vice versa.<br />

The reactor and containment must be designed SO that <strong>the</strong> decay-heated fuel<br />

salt reaches <strong>the</strong> drain tamk under any credible accident conditions. In<br />

any case, <strong>the</strong> decay heat is associated with a very large mass of fuel salt<br />

so that melt-through (or “China Syndrome”) is apparently not a problem.<br />

The safety philosophy for accidents involving <strong>the</strong> reactor core is<br />

very different for fluid-fueled than for solid-fueled react~rs because<br />

<strong>the</strong> heat source is mainly in <strong>the</strong> liquid-fuel salt and not in a solid,<br />

which requires csntinuous cooling to avoid melting. An LMFBR, for exam-<br />

ple, has a large amount of stored energy (which must be removed under<br />

any accident conditions) in <strong>the</strong> fuel pins. DPy~ut, which means immediate<br />

meltdown in an LMFBR, would not be nearly as severe in <strong>the</strong> DMSR because<br />

<strong>the</strong> heat source is removed along dth <strong>the</strong> cooling capability. First-order<br />

analysis has shsm that a flow blockage of a central coolant channel of<br />

<strong>the</strong> reference DKSR which reduces <strong>the</strong> flow to less than -20% of nominal<br />

will probably result in local voiding of that channel. This was not true<br />

of <strong>the</strong> old MSBR design8 because <strong>the</strong> channels were more strongly <strong>the</strong>mally<br />

coupled. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> safety implications of this will lead to modifica-<br />

tions of <strong>the</strong> DMSR reference design must be shorn by future safety analy-<br />

sis studies. Under any off-nsmal conditions, <strong>the</strong> fuel salt will be chan-<br />

neled to <strong>the</strong> drain tank, which must have reliable systems for decay heat<br />

removal. No credible means exists for achieving recrfticality once <strong>the</strong><br />

fuel salt has left <strong>the</strong> graphite-moaeratea cores<br />

There are no significant differences in <strong>the</strong> enviromental effects of<br />

routine operations between an MSl? and reactors presently in commercial<br />

operation. No gaseous or liquid radioactive effluent discharge occurs

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