[Sample B: Approval/Signature Sheet] - George Mason University

Assassination. He recounted his meeting with Oswald during his visit to the Soviet
embassy in Mexico City. Nechiporenko also included formerly secret KGB documents
and the reminiscences of his former colleagues who had direct knowledge of the Oswald
case – a sort of KGB oral history. The Colonel described Oswald as a “tourist non grata”
in Moscow, that he was judged to be too inept to be an American agent, and not valuable
as a source for intelligence or for propaganda. Nevertheless, Nechiporenko wrote that
Oswald was able to manipulate events: “He acted with an enviable stubbornness, raised
the stakes by attempting suicide, and placed the highest Soviet government organs in a
difficult position.” 241 The result was that the Soviet authorities decided to take a wait-
and-see attitude, grant Oswald residency but not citizenship, and wait a year to determine
whether he could be a spy or of use to the USSR. The KGB believed that Oswald “fit the
description” of other defectors who later changed their minds and returned to their
homeland. 242
Nechiporenko acknowledged that Oswald was under KGB surveillance
throughout his stay in Minsk, but that he did not seem to be involved in any intelligence
activities – although, before being allowed to return to the United States, the KGB,
according to Nechiporenko, observed Oswald trying to build a bomb. This “quirky and
unsettling” attempt fizzled, to the relief of the KGB 243 . Through these and other
disclosures, Nechiporenko bolstered the Warren Commission’s view of Oswald as
unstable and violence-prone.
241 Nechiporenko, 50.
242 Nechiporenko, 55.
243 Nechirporenko, 63.
114