Wimpfheimer_ Is it not so.pdf

Wimpfheimer_ Is it not so.pdf Wimpfheimer_ Is it not so.pdf

noahbickart.fastmail.fm
from noahbickart.fastmail.fm More from this publisher
02.08.2013 Views

Toward a Poetics of Legal Narrative in the Talmud ❙ 73 ashamed by the realization that sometimes the speaker may control the topic too muchÐto the point of missing issues that should be addressed, issues that other interpreters may notice. In both narratives, the text's anonymous authorsÐthe anonymous narrator and the stamÐloom large.⁷⁷ The function of the stam in the ®rst story is mirrored by that of the anonymous narrator in the second. In the ®rst narrative, an arrogant Rava asserts authority over his students. The stam actively undercuts such authority by saying ``But it is not so.'' In the second narrative, a humbled Rava hides from the students who have outsmarted him. Here the narrator of Rava's shame resuscitates Rava through an appeal outside of the lawÐan appeal to textual reality. For it turns out that in a reinterpretation of Mar v. Bei ¼ozai, the owner was not su³ciently present to invoke the exoneration. Whereas the scenario initially appeared to the students and Rava (and the reader) as one in which the owner was assisting in the animal's loading, in actuality the owner was actively contradicting the e²orts of the borrower by emerging to unload an overburdened animal. In altering the scenario, the narrator transforms Rava's erroneous judgment into a prophetic one. Though Rava was unaware of the correctness of his decision, his mistake is one of human justice, not of objective truth. In the end, his ruling, though hastily determined, is ®tting for the scenario as it actually occurred. His embarrassment is erased as his mistake metamorphoses into omniscience. Whereas once his students could see what was hidden from him, now he can see what had been hidden from all. Upon closer examination, though, it is not Rava who is omniscientÐhe does not intentionally divine the correct ruling. Were this the case, he would not be ashamed. Rather, it is his rulingÐhis textÐthat is once again empowered. His statement in the ®rst narrative is employed by the stam in the imprisonment of its creatorÐRava is in his students' service two months a year. His ruling here is employed by the narrator to liberate a quieted Rava. The redactor of these passages balances the statements of the stam and the work of the narrator, juxtaposing the two to undercut a victorious teacher and resurrect a fallen judge. The mirroring of two Rava narratives heightens the impact of each. Our ®rst narrative contains several replications of form and content that alert us to the impossibility of attaining a comfortable distance from our objects of study. That lesson is solidi®ed in the second narrative as the distance between Rava and his

74 ❙ Barry Wimpfheimer rulings collapses in a moment of shame. The force of our second narrative is generated by a series of con¯icts and alerts us to the multiplicity of tensions inherent in adjudication. This tension is foreshadowed in the ®rst story, which performs such a tension already within law's theoretical stage. Two moments of raw emotion escape from law's metonymy with life to animate our legal narratives. Rava's anger and his shame are moments in which the text becomes extraordinary, saying more than it needs to or should. They capture an intrinsic drama of legal con¯ictÐthe metamorphosis from rational investment to irrational need. These are moments that engage the reader, forcing the reader to push textual limits for new contexts that justify the events that transpire on the text's surface. These contexts are multiple, for human emotion in both life and literature is always overdetermined. Rava's anger and his shame are powerful literary moments that remind us of the multiplicity of latent meanings in life, literature, and law. Department of Religion Columbia University NOTES In addition to thanking my thesis advisor, David Weiss Halivni, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the following readers and advisors: Moshe Benovitz, Daniel Boyarin, David Damrosch, Jeremy Dauber, Shamma Friedman, Shana Gillers, Moshe Halbertal, Christine Hayes, Joshua Levinson, Pericles Lewis, Dov Linzer, Jonathan Milgram, Shlomo Naeh, Ravit Reichman, Daniel Reifman, Daniel Roth, Beth Samuels, Don Seeman, Jonathan Stein, David Stern, Elli Stern, and Ari Tuchman. 1 Yonah Fraenkel, Darkhei ha¥aggadah vehamidrash (Masada, Israel: Yad la-Talmud, 1991), and idem, Sippur ha¥aggadah, adut shel tokhen vetsurah (Tel Aviv: Ben Hayim, 2001). 2 Shamma Friedman, ``The Further Adventures of Rav Kahana: Between Babylonia and Palestine,'' in The Talmud Yerushalmi and Grñco-Roman Culture III, ed. Peter SchÈafer (TÈubingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2002), 247±71; idem, ``La¥aggadah hahistorit batalmud habavli,'' in Sefer hazikaron lerabi Sha¥ul Lieberman, ed. S. Friedman

74 ❙ Barry <strong>Wimpfheimer</strong><br />

rulings collapses in a moment of shame. The force of our second narrative is<br />

generated by a series of con¯icts and alerts us to the multiplic<strong>it</strong>y of tensions inherent<br />

in adjudication. This tension is foreshadowed in the ®rst story, which performs such<br />

a tension already w<strong>it</strong>hin law's theoretical stage.<br />

Two moments of raw emotion escape from law's metonymy w<strong>it</strong>h life to<br />

animate our legal narratives. Rava's anger and his shame are moments in which the<br />

text becomes extraordinary, saying more than <strong>it</strong> needs to or should. They capture an<br />

intrinsic drama of legal con¯ictÐthe metamorphosis from rational investment to<br />

irrational need. These are moments that engage the reader, forcing the reader to<br />

push textual lim<strong>it</strong>s for new contexts that justify the events that transpire on the text's<br />

surface. These contexts are multiple, for human emotion in both life and l<strong>it</strong>erature is<br />

always overdetermined. Rava's anger and his shame are powerful l<strong>it</strong>erary moments<br />

that remind us of the multiplic<strong>it</strong>y of latent meanings in life, l<strong>it</strong>erature, and law.<br />

Department of Religion<br />

Columbia Univers<strong>it</strong>y<br />

NOTES<br />

In add<strong>it</strong>ion to thanking my thesis advi<strong>so</strong>r, David Weiss Halivni, I would like to<br />

acknowledge the assistance of the following readers and advi<strong>so</strong>rs: Moshe Benov<strong>it</strong>z,<br />

Daniel Boyarin, David Damrosch, Jeremy Dauber, Shamma Friedman, Shana<br />

Gillers, Moshe Halbertal, Christine Hayes, Joshua Levin<strong>so</strong>n, Pericles Lewis, Dov<br />

Linzer, Jonathan Milgram, Shlomo Naeh, Rav<strong>it</strong> Reichman, Daniel Reifman,<br />

Daniel Roth, Beth Samuels, Don Seeman, Jonathan Stein, David Stern, Elli<br />

Stern, and Ari Tuchman.<br />

1 Yonah Fraenkel, Darkhei ha¥aggadah vehamidrash (Masada, <strong>Is</strong>rael: Yad la-Talmud,<br />

1991), and idem, Sippur ha¥aggadah, adut shel tokhen vetsurah (Tel Aviv: Ben<br />

Hayim, 2001).<br />

2 Shamma Friedman, ``The Further Adventures of Rav Kahana: Between Babylonia and<br />

Palestine,'' in The Talmud Yerushalmi and Grñco-Roman Culture III, ed. Peter<br />

SchÈafer (TÈubingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2002), 247±71; idem, ``La¥aggadah hahistor<strong>it</strong><br />

batalmud habavli,'' in Sefer hazikaron lerabi Sha¥ul Lieberman, ed. S. Friedman

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!