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Wimpfheimer_ Is it not so.pdf

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64 ❙ Barry <strong>Wimpfheimer</strong><br />

reachÐwhile the renter is liable for ordinary loss or theft. The ®nal ®gure in the<br />

scale, one who watches an <strong>it</strong>em as a favor to <strong>it</strong>s owner (Free Watchman), is liable<br />

ne<strong>it</strong>her for force majeure nor for events of ordinary loss.⁵⁹ W<strong>it</strong>hin tanna<strong>it</strong>ic law there<br />

are two decisive factorsÐowner presence and negligenceÐeach w<strong>it</strong>h the power to<br />

undermine categorical liabil<strong>it</strong>y. On one extreme, owner presence exonerates those<br />

who are ordinarily liable. On the oppos<strong>it</strong>e extreme, negligence obligates those who<br />

are ordinarily <strong>not</strong> liable.⁶⁰<br />

In several cases elsewhere in the Talmud, Rava challenges the mishnaic sliding<br />

scale and requires a greater degree of fault than the one implic<strong>it</strong> in the Mishnah's<br />

model (see table 2). In one case, Rava exonerates a borrower if the animal dies (force<br />

majeure) in the course of ordinary work.⁶¹ In a<strong>not</strong>her instance, when called upon to<br />

adjudicate an unambiguous case involving the ordinary loss of a shepherdÐwho<br />

falls into the same category as the renterÐRava exonerates the shepherd against<br />

the objections of colleagues because the loss did <strong>not</strong> stem from any unwarranted<br />

activ<strong>it</strong>y.⁶² Even w<strong>it</strong>hin the exceptional case of a free watchman who is liable for<br />

negligence, Rava disagrees w<strong>it</strong>h his colleague Abayei and will <strong>not</strong> obligate if the<br />

negligence is <strong>not</strong> directly responsible for the animal's death.⁶³ Though the opening<br />

of the barn door that allows the animal to walk into dangerous terrain is a textbook<br />

example of negligence, Rava will <strong>not</strong> obligate the watchman if the animal dies of<br />

natural causes in the dangerous terrain. Since the act of negligence is <strong>not</strong> directly<br />

responsible for the loss, ne<strong>it</strong>her is the watchman.<br />

These cases combine to illustrate Rava's mindset when approaching the case in<br />

our narrative. Our case represents a con¯ict of decisive factorsÐthe exonerating<br />

owner presence and the obligating negligence. Because of Rava's focus on immediate<br />

causal<strong>it</strong>y as the only reliable <strong>so</strong>urce of liabil<strong>it</strong>y, he hears negligence and instantly<br />

obligates Bei ¼ozai. When the students point to Mar's presence as a factor, Rava is<br />

ashamed.<br />

But Rava's activism w<strong>it</strong>hin the liabil<strong>it</strong>y matrix has a supplemental explanation,<br />

one that deepens the shame portrayed in the narrative. In all three instances of<br />

maverick adjudication, Rava expresses lenience toward the one watching the other's<br />

goods. These lenient rulings form a pattern since the borrower or shepherd is<br />

generally the economically weaker party in this l<strong>it</strong>igation. Furthermore, in all three<br />

cases, the Talmud w<strong>it</strong>nesses the plea of this weaker party, <strong>so</strong>metimes in the

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