1 - American Memory

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The latter three unions are certified as a single bargaining unit under the
name of "Pacific District—Seafarers' International Union," but each component
union maintains its autonomy and negotiates separately for "departmental
working rules" and wage application.
To indicate the extent of the cargo handling operations covered by the PMU-
ILWU agreement, the PMA 1973 annual payroll for longshoremen and maritime
clerics was $146,884,949 for wages and vacations, and $41,921,550 for fringe
benefits. 11,745 registered men were regularly employed, and 70,524,772 tons of
dry cargo were loaded or discharged. Liquid cargo, such as petroleum. Is not
included in these figures.
Pacific Coast based American Flag vessels covered by the agreements with
seafaring unions averaged 61 during the year 1973. The annual payroll for all
seafarers amounted to $64,641,588 in wages and vacations, and $35,777,291 in
fringe benefit payments. The average number of seamen employed was 3,437.
These totals do not Include costs, vessels or employment of seamen for American
Flag vessels under Atlantic or Gulf Coast union agreements, nor similar figures
for foreign flag vessels calling at Pacific Coast ports.
Dry cargo operations on the Pacific Coast amount to between 20 and 25 per-
cent of the national total.
Against this brief background description of Pacific Coast employer-union re-
lationships and the scope of maritime operations, we intend to discuss the pro-
posals contained in H.R. 7189, which affords strike protection for Hawaii and
other U.S. Pacific Islands.
At the outset of this discussion. Pacific Maritime Association would like the
record to show that it is very much aware of the hardships visited upon Hawaii
and other U.S. Pacific Islands when a West Coast dock or shipping strike cuts
off supplies and sources of income needed for the day to day life of those islands.
The intent of H.R. 7189 Is, of course, to relieve those hardships.
Nevertheless, we cannot support H.R. 7189 for the following three principal
reasons:
1. It would weaken the economic bargaining power of the employers,
2. It would create divisiveness among the employers in the multi-employer
bargaining group, and
3. It would dilute the weight of public interest pressure that might either
prevent a work stoppage or force an early termination of a work stoppage.
1. ECONOMIC BABOAimNO POWEB OF THE EMPL0TEB8
H.R. 7189, in a West Coast dock strike, would require the handling by long-
shoremen of cargo destined to or coming from Hawaii or other designated United
States Pacific islands. This means that part of the striking longshore work force
would be provided Income during the strike. Stripped of niceties, the proposed
bill provides strike benefits to longshoremen. Strike benefits, particularly when
they do not come out of the usual source—namely, the union treasury—make a
union less apprehensive about calling a strike, and once a strike is called less
impelled to terminate it. Thus, whatever balance of economic bargaining power
is supposed to exist between employers and unions is tilted in favor of unions.
Some who favor adoption of H.R. 7189 argue that the longshore hours required
to handle Hawaiian cargo, for example, is not so great as to create any worrisome
imbalance. We do not have a precise breakout of these hours, but conservatively
we believe that it would probably be at least 5% of total hours normally worked
on the West Coast. Not much? Perhaps not in isolation. But there are also hours
required to handle military cargo and some continuing ever-present longshore
activities. During the 1971-72 West Coast dock strike, in some weeks in the San
Francisco Bay Area alone, the hours for handling military and other activities
went above 30% of hours normally worked in nonstrike periods.
Thus with Hawaiian and other island cargo hours thrown in, there would be
substantial work opportunity for "striking workers." The industry Is thus forced
to subsidize the strike against the industry. And the .situation would likely
worsen. After Hawaii, how do you avoid the same consideration for Alaska?
Or for a distressed California citrus industry? Or for a Northwest grain indus-
try? The exceptions would proliferate.
2. DIVISIVENESS AMONG THE EUPLOTEBS
Paclflc Maritime Association bargains with shoreslde and some of the oflTshore
anions In a multi-employer bargaining unit, as required by decisions of the