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1 - American Memory

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181<br />

It would free this isolated island community from the continuing threat of a<br />

devastating cutting of its lifeline.<br />

It would have the further advantage of giving this proposal a laboratory test<br />

to see how it works and what administrative problems would be involved if<br />

legisaltion providing for partial operation in struck transportation industries<br />

were enacted for the country as a whole. After all, the main objection to lim-<br />

ited partial operation of an industry during an emergency strike Is that the<br />

administration would be too difficult. This would provide the country with a<br />

laboratory or test tube experience with respect to the workability of such a<br />

procedure.<br />

One of the administrative problems of partial operations would be proper<br />

rate setting since unit costs tend to skyrocket when an industry is operating at<br />

only a small fraction of capacity.<br />

Since the key to the partial operations proposal is that operations must be<br />

confined to a small segment of the industry, the primary question is: What<br />

fraction of the airline industry, the longshore industry, or the maritime in-<br />

dustry would be involved if Hawaii were in effect exempted from the strike<br />

through this partial operation procedure? As we shall see, the answer is such<br />

a tiny fraction that it would in no way alter the course of the negotiations.<br />

Airlines.—The ten U.S. trunk carriers operate 1,7.T6 aircraft. Of the eight trunk<br />

carriers serving Hawaii, current schedules call for 41 round trips per day from<br />

the Mainland U.S. to Hawaii. One aircraft can make at least one round trip each<br />

day. These 41 aircraft would constitute less than 2% percent of the fleet.<br />

West Coast Longshore.—-In the course of normal operation in the West Coast<br />

ports, only 3 perent of the total longshore hours worked are devoted to handling<br />

commodities bound to or from Hawaii. Or. out of the current normal work force<br />

of nearly 11,000, only about 300 men would be involved.<br />

West Coast Maritime.—Of the man-days worked by sea-going iiersonnel on<br />

U.S. flagships moving out of West Coast ports, only 7.3 perent are worked on<br />

ships in the Hawaii trade. This ranges from a low of 5.4 percent of staff ofHcers'<br />

man-days to a high of 10 percent of engineers' man-days.<br />

East and Gulf Coast Longshore and Maritime.—We have not been able to ob-<br />

tain figures for the East and Gulf Coasts that are comparable to the above fig-<br />

ures for the West Coast. However, for one sample year for which data are avail-<br />

able (1962) only 2.8 percent of all domestic dry cargo moving in or out of East<br />

Coast and Gulf ports was destined to or arriving from Hawaii. This 2.8 percent<br />

figure Is not comparable to our 7 percent figure for West Coast maritime because<br />

It Is the fraction of domestic oceanborne cargo—not total cargo carried in<br />

<strong>American</strong> flagships. A figure comparable to our West Coast one would probably<br />

be less than 2 percent. Based on West Coast ratios of maritime to longshore de-<br />

voted to the Hawaiian trade (7 percent maritime to 3 percent longshore), a<br />

comparable figure for the fraction of longshore man-hours that are devoted to<br />

the Hawaii trade in the Bast and Gulf ports would probably be less than 1<br />

percent.<br />

In our opinion, keeping approximately 2% percent of the airlines flying in the<br />

event of a national strike of trunk carriers, or 3 percent of the longshoremen<br />

working In the event of a West Coast dock strike or less than 1 percent in the<br />

event of an East Coast or Gulf dock strike, or some 7 percent of the West Coast<br />

maritime workers on the job in the event of a West Coast maritime strike, or 2<br />

percent in the event of an East Coast or Gulf maritime strike, would not in any<br />

sense remove from either the union or the companies involved any economic<br />

pressures to continue to bargain and to try to reach a settlement. The issue,<br />

dearly, is de minimis.<br />

It is obvious that in this discussion no mention has been made of the problems<br />

Hawaii would face if her own docks were closed by a labor dispute. An integral<br />

part of this proposal would have to be a provision such as is contained in the<br />

Fong bill (S. 640) that would make this proposal applicable if Hawaii is deprived<br />

of essential transportation services, regardless of the locale of the disruption.<br />

Our conclusion therefore is that all interested parties should join hands and<br />

work diligently to persuade the Congress to enact legislation which would pro-<br />

vide for partial operation of the docks, the maritime industry, and the trunk air<br />

carriers serving Hawaii In the event of a strike. Tills partial operation would<br />

consist of maintaining normal service between Hawaii and the Mainland U.S.<br />

This spedal legislation for Hawaii's problems would be in no way incompatible<br />

with other, broader legislation (Proposal B above) In the emergency labor dls-

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