1 - American Memory

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Nell W. Chamberlain sums It up: "Congress Is hardly an appropriate agency to
deal with an ad hoc dispute . . . Unless there is some issue which so stirs up emo-
tions as to prompt a solid response, such as violence on the picket line or flagrant
disregard of puljllc welfare, congressional debate over the merits of the dispute
will simply reproduce the partisan arguments of the bargaining table without
even the relevant knowledge which the negotiators possessed. If emotions are
suflSdently inflamed to lead to quick decision, we can toe sure the decision will for
that reason be uninformed.
"Moreover, when one considers that typically collective bargaining involves not
just one or two but a dozen or two of separate and often complex issues, the possi-
bilities for protracted debate and inexpert conclusion are many times multiplied,
r agree wholeheartedly with Professor Richard Lester when he says, 'It is diffi-
cult to think of a more inappropriate body to which to submit a labor dispute for
final adjudication than the Congress.' " '
We feel that the Congress would be perfectly content to leave the thankles."*
problem of settling emergency disputes to someone else
Our conclusion is that the Taft-Hartley Act and the Railway Labor Act are
badly In need of overhaul, that the type of legislation that should be enacted to
replace them is fairly well agreed upon in general outline, and that the Congress
should act. On the other hand. President Nixon seems to have backed away from
his earlier proposals along this line (S. 560) and Labor Secretary Peter Brennan
has said that as long as he remains In the administration, he will advocate only
voluntary means to settle all labor disputes including strikes in the trucking,
maritime, longshore, airline, and rail industries. This attitude of the administra-
tion certainly does not preclude the Congress from acting, but it clearly make*
action somewhat more difficult.
Also, our experience in Hawaii has been that when we have been crippled by
a destructive transportation strike, it is extremely hard to get the ear of many
people in Washington.
Realistically, then we move to our final proposal, which is the recommenda-
tion of this report.
PROPOSAL C. PABTIAl. OPERATION FOK HAWAU
One of the three options provided for in S. 560 was 'the partial operation oj)-
tion. This proposal (in one form or another) was also Included in the Staggers-
Williams bill and the Javits bill and is currently in both the Fong (S. 640) and
the Inouye (S. 231) bills. We propose that this portion of the suggested legis-
lation be enacted to apply specifically to Hawaii in the event of longshore, marl-
time, or trunk carrier airline strikes or threats of strikes.
Under this option as contained in S. 560, the President would appoint an im-
partial, three-member board to determine the feasibility of partial operations
In essential portions of a struck industry. The board would hold public hear-
ings and order the extent and conditions of partial operation. The parties
would be subject to the board's order for a period determined by the board, of
not more than 180 days.
The partial operations law that we are proposing here would be more explicit
than the terms of S. 560. It would provide that in the event of a longshore
strike, or maritime strike, or a national strike of airline trunk carriers affect-
ing service to Hawaii, the President would ^rder service to Hawaii maintained
at its normal prestrlke level that a three-man impartial presidential board
would administer this order by determining—in the light of all the Interests
involved—-which carriers would operate at what volume to maintain the pre-
strlke level of service to Hawaii, and what the terms and conditions of employ-
ment would be, and what the returns to the operators would be.
Partial operation involves only a minimum of government intervention. If
confined to a small segment of the industry. It leaves the economic pressures of
the shutdown in the major portion of the industry to serve as an incentive to
settlement. It in no way interferes with the process of collective bargaining. It
is fair to both parties to the disimte in that the bill would require that no order
of the board shall place a greater economic burden on any party than that which
a total cessation of operations would impose. And finally as applied to Hawaii,
« N. W. Cbambcrlnin. "The Problem of Strikes." In ProreeOingn of Neir York T'nivrrtttu
Thirteenth Annual Conference on Labor, Matthew Bender, New York, 1960. pp. 444-40.