1 - American Memory

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There are different issues involved: different union leaderships; different rela-
tions between the leadership and the rank and file members; different manage-
ment attitudes; different styles of negotiating; different histories of conflict
between the parties; different levels of maturity in the union-management
relationship; different attitudes toward the public welfare; different suscepti-
bilities to public pressure; etc., etc., etc., etc.
If this approach were to be adopted with the provision that any approach the
President tools could be vetoed by either house of the Congress, the fear that this
would give too much discretion to the Chief Executive would be overcome. As a
matter of fact, it has been pointed out that there is no escaping executive dis-
cretion in triggering any strike control so far devised. The Congress in writing
the Taft-Hartley Act tried to be every explicit in detining the emergency disputes
where it would be applicable, yet no one has ever prevented the President from
Invoking it when he wanted to nor forced him to invoke it when he didn't want
to. Furthermore, on the subject of the alleged possible "abuse of discretion,"
former Secretary of Labor W. WiUard Wirtz has said : ''AVhen, under the present
law. a strike is stopped by an injmiction, the exercise of governmental ijower is
no less real for its having been authorized by a statute passed years earlier by
Congres.s. If that injunction is either unfair or ineffective as applied to the
particular case, the evil of the exercise of centralized power is no less than If it
resulted from either the inadevertent or malicious error of an executive or
judicial oflBcer armed with discretionary authority to apply the injunction. There
is as much power exercised in the one case as in the other, and the automaticity
regulating the form of its exercise in the one instance is as great a potential
source of injustice as Is the possible abuse of discretion in the other. It has not
been shown, and is probably not true, that the exercise of executive discretion in
these situations would result in greater unfairness than does automatic applica-
tion of a single legislative prescription. It does not appeal to reason to argue
that recourse in all hou.sehold emergencies to a particular bottle of {patent medl-
cine avoids the possibility of human error which arises If the doctor is called
In."'
In the last session of the Congress there were two major bills in the Senate
which—between the two of them—included almost every proposal that has been
put forward to cope with emergency labor disputes.
These include the following:
1. Covering regional emergencies.
2. Partial operation—providing that the struck company will provide partial
service.
3. Selective operation—providing that some companies in the struck industry
would continue to operate.
4. An additional "cooling-off" period beyond the 80 days provided for by Taft-
Hartley.
5. Authorizing boards of Inquiry to make recommendations for settlement
rather than merely report a finding of facts.
6. After a certain period of forced operation under an Injunction, authorizing
the President, subject to congressional veto, to:
a. Order extension of the status quo.
b. Seize the struck operation and operate it.
c. Order compulsory arbitration.
d. Order mediation "to finality"—I.e., lock up the parties until they come to an
agreement.
7. Final offer selection—I.e., requiring the parties to the dispute to submit
their final offers to a panel which would select one of the final offers In its en-
tirety (without modification).
If the President had available to him all the above options which he could use
as he saw fit depending upon the circumstances of the case (subject only to veto
by one of the Houses of the Congress), he would truly have an arsenal of weapons
for forcing a settlement of any dispute that was seriously detrimental to the
country or to some portion of the country. He would not. as he has had to do in
80 many cases, have to go to Congre.ss to seek special legislation aimed at .settling
a particular strike—a procedure that Is almost universally condemned. As Dr.
»W. WIrtz. "The 'Cholce-of-Procediires' Approach to National Emergency Disputes," In
I. Bernstein. H. Enatson. and R. Fleming (etls.), Emergenc;/ DUputta and National Potici/,
Harper. New York, 1955, p. 15S.