1 - American Memory

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«.3 percent In Norember and 6.f) percent by February—the bigbest rates expe-
rienced since 1954, and the first period since 1956 when Hawaii's unemployment
rate exceeded the national averajse.
And finally, transportation interruptions often send prices soaring at a time
when Hawaii's families can least afford it. The impact of these strikes on
Hawaii's consumer prices Is well documented l)y the consumer price and food
price indexes compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Consumer prices in Hawaii climbed 3 percent during the May-October local
dock strike in 1949, while nationally prices declined slightly.
The effect was even greater during the 100-day West Coast dock strike In the
third quarter of 1971. Even with Pliase I of the wage-price freeze in effect begin-
ning mid-August. Honolulu food prices jumped 4.5 percent between June and
October. By contrast. I'.S. fof)d prices declined 0.3 percent over the same period.
The major reason for the sharp increase in food prices was that grocery chains
were forced to airlift fresh produce from the Mainland at much higher freight
costs. The higher transiwrtation costs were pa.ssed on to consumers because raw
agricultural products were exempted from price controls. The fruits-and-vege-
tables price Index for Honolulu vaulted 8.2 percent In August 1971 and 5.3 per-
cent In September, while nationally these prices declined 1.9 percent In August
and 5.7 percent in September. Hawaii's fresh produce prices normally would have
followed this seasonal decline.
The same pattern of rising food prices appeared when the 1971 dock strike
was resumed in January 1972 after the Taft-Hartley cooling-off period, and
again during the strike of the Masters, Mates and Pilots Union In the fall of
1972.
Price indexes are academic, but the effect on the pocketbook Is not. How
many Mainland families would have been willing to pay 72(t for a head of lettuce,
$1.45 for a dozen oranges, or $2.28 for 10 pounds of potatoes in February 1972?
Yet in Hawaii, where salaries are generally no higher than on the Mainland,
these were the average prices families had to pay—or do without.
These effects are most pronounced during a long transportation stoppage, but
It should be realized that it isn't just long transportation strikes that hurt
Hawaii. Short strikes are short strikes only in retrospect; they could turn into
long strikes, and they trigger the response that a long strike would provoke:
stockpiling, boarding, panic buying, etc. And even the threat of a strike that
never comes off Is only a threat in retrospect: when the threat looms on the
horizon, businessmen and consumers adopt a here-we-go-again attitude and a
resulting behavior pattern that can be as costly and disruptive as would l>e
the case if the strike ultimately occurred.
The conclusion is clear: Hawaii must somehow And her way out of this pre-
carious situation that she has been in for so long.
CHAPTER III—WHAT To Do?
We have seen in Chapter I that Hawaii is completely dependent on water-
borne commerce and air transportation. We have seen In Chapter II that dock,
maritime, and airline strikes have in fact brought Hawaii, economically speak-
ing, to her knees on many occasions. Now let us ask and answer In this chapter
what should, can, and must be done about this.
Out of all the froth and debate on this subject, three proposals seem to stand
out. They are:
PROPOSAL A
Amend Taft-Hartley and the National Railway Labor Act so that they could
be applied to regional or local emergencies, rather than only to national emer-
gencies.
PROPOSAL B
Make a major revision of Taft-Hartley ha.sed upon experience with these two
acts over the decades and Include railroads and airlines under this act rather
than under the Railway Labor Act.
PROPOSAL o
Pnsh for special legislation that would exempt Hawaii from dock or maritime
strikes and national airline strikes.