Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ...
Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ... Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ...
Conclusions 213 when actors, networks, resources, and knowledge had to be mobilised outside the realm of the existing system. The mode of governance internal to the electricity system, with its centralist orientation and closed nature, failed to produce successful development of nuclear energy, wind energy, and district heating, due to its inability to anticipate and adapt to the multi-actor and multi-level processes underlying these new practices. Processes of agenda building regarding nuclear energy took place within the circles of government and the electricity sector. Expectations regarding nuclear technology were high, nuclear energy was expected to able to meet growing electricity demand, and would fit very well in the central station electricity model. Yet, agendas for nuclear energy diverged between government (building a nuclear industry) and the electricity sector (keep technology choice in-house), while society at large was not part of the process. The belief in nuclear energy, which had developed in the electricity sector over a period of decades and had its legitimatization in securing electricity supply in convergence with economic growth, was increasingly being challenged by increasing strength of the role of alternative factors (environmental and risk concerns) and actors (from civil society). Apart from being unable to legitimize the choice for nuclear technology the mode of governance also proved unable to help the development of another alternative, wind energy. Wind energy was developed initially solely to fit the requirements of the electricity system based on the heuristics of central station electricity such as large scale and continuity. This happened at a too early stage of its technological development when wind technology was not yet fit to meet these requirements, while actors outside the electricity sector were driven by different design criteria that proved to be more appropriate for further development of wind technologies. This suggests that dominant ‘institutional logics’ could not deliver appropriate strategies, modes of coordination, and learning processes, necessary to advance these technologies. Institutional changes played a central role in the implementation and acceleration of wind energy from the 1990s on. The separation between distribution and production and the uptake of decentral power generation options by distributors in competition to central producers is a core example. This was especially fostered when distributors committed to environmental goals under the new target group policy introduced with the first National Environmental Policy Plan. The development of wind power was one of the ways to reduce CO2 emissions.
214 Chapter 8 Table 8.2 Institutional aspects of paths taken in the electricity system Path taken (success) Shift from coal to gas (++) The nuclear route (-) Hybrid gas and steam turbines (++) Coal gasification (-/+) Distant heating (+/-) Decentral cogen (+) Wind power (-/+) Solar power (-/+) Biomass (+/-) Green (+) electricity Role of broader institutional arrangements New national institutional arrangement for gas production and provision negotiated between government and industry; serves as example for increasing government’s grip on the electricity sector Long built up of knowledge and political arrangements for nuclear energy; changeover to nuclear energy not taken for granted by societal groups; growth dynamics paradigm corroded by oil crises and de-legitimated by societal groups Gas turbine development driven by jet engine development, applied by power equipment producers; knowledge base expands in the Netherlands Diversification between nuclear, coal, and gas emerged as shared strategy between government and sector; gasification emerged as strong R&D priority as nuclear route stalls; political support relevant Energy saving policy and societal groups important drivers; knowledge-base limited after oil crisis Industrial policy for cogeneration and low- priced gas is relevant; industry interest diverges from electricity sector Initial failure due to top-down strategy, later more success due to institutional changes, new actors and partnerships; planning for sites remains major barrier Different knowledge base; building sector’s arrangements important Acceptance of organic fraction as renewable energy (EU) and green (NL) electricity relevant ; Legitimacy of imports Driven by market and client orientation of distributors and sustainability demand Match to central station institutional logics Path serves condition of certainty of supply and reflects the large influence of government on resource use relative to the relative autonomy of the sector with regard to production and provision Route is perfect fit to institutional logics of central station electricity system, large-scale orientation, long-term investments, and growth dynamics paradigm Path emerges as it solves particular ‘reverse salients’ of the system through symbiosis of gas turbine with dominant practices Route is perfect fit to large-scale central station orientation; collaboration between SEP and government in funding pilot power plant important, break-up of SEP leads to stranded asset Path is initially developed as by-product of existing system, with a bias to large- scale distribution. Later projects with smaller scales were more successful Mismatch with central station system; alternative design driven by industry and later distributors Initial failure of development largely because central station institutional logics were followed; recent high expectations for off-shore wind farms Total mismatch with existing institutional logics and knowledge base Co-combustion does not require major modification in design; mainly resource supply and logistical problems Unthinkable in monopolistic organisation
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- Page 245 and 246: 234 References Arentsen, M.J., and
- Page 247 and 248: 236 References Bressers, H.Th.A. an
- Page 249 and 250: 238 References De Jong, J.J., E. We
- Page 251 and 252: 240 References EPRI (1999) Electric
- Page 253 and 254: 242 References Geels, F.W. (2002b)
- Page 255 and 256: 244 References Henderson, R.M. and
- Page 257 and 258: 246 References Islas, J. (1999) The
- Page 259 and 260: 248 References Dependence and Creat
- Page 261 and 262: 250 References Nelson, R.R. (1995a)
- Page 263 and 264: 252 References Quarles van Ufford,
- Page 265 and 266: 254 References Schmidheiny S. (1992
- Page 267 and 268: 256 References SNM (2000) Frisse Wi
- Page 269 and 270: 258 References Van de Ven, A.H. and
- Page 271 and 272: 260 References VROM (1993) National
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Conclusions 213<br />
when ac<strong>to</strong>rs, networks, resources, <strong>and</strong> knowledge had <strong>to</strong> be mobilised<br />
outside <strong>the</strong> realm of <strong>the</strong> existing system. The mode of governance internal <strong>to</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> electricity system, with its centralist orientation <strong>and</strong> closed nature, failed<br />
<strong>to</strong> produce successful development of nuclear energy, wind energy, <strong>and</strong><br />
district heating, due <strong>to</strong> its inability <strong>to</strong> anticipate <strong>and</strong> adapt <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> multi-ac<strong>to</strong>r<br />
<strong>and</strong> multi-level processes underlying <strong>the</strong>se new practices. Processes of<br />
agenda building regarding nuclear energy <strong>to</strong>ok place within <strong>the</strong> circles of<br />
government <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> electricity sec<strong>to</strong>r. Expectations regarding nuclear<br />
technology were high, nuclear energy was expected <strong>to</strong> able <strong>to</strong> meet growing<br />
electricity dem<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> would fit very well in <strong>the</strong> central station electricity<br />
model. Yet, agendas for nuclear energy diverged between government<br />
(building a nuclear industry) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> electricity sec<strong>to</strong>r (keep technology<br />
choice in-house), while society at large was not part of <strong>the</strong> process. The<br />
belief in nuclear energy, which had developed in <strong>the</strong> electricity sec<strong>to</strong>r over a<br />
period of decades <strong>and</strong> had its legitimatization in securing electricity supply<br />
in convergence with economic growth, was increasingly being challenged by<br />
increasing strength of <strong>the</strong> role of alternative fac<strong>to</strong>rs (environmental <strong>and</strong> risk<br />
concerns) <strong>and</strong> ac<strong>to</strong>rs (from civil society).<br />
Apart from being unable <strong>to</strong> legitimize <strong>the</strong> choice for nuclear technology <strong>the</strong><br />
mode of governance also proved unable <strong>to</strong> help <strong>the</strong> development of ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
alternative, wind energy. Wind energy was developed initially solely <strong>to</strong> fit<br />
<strong>the</strong> requirements of <strong>the</strong> electricity system based on <strong>the</strong> heuristics of central<br />
station electricity such as large scale <strong>and</strong> continuity. This happened at a <strong>to</strong>o<br />
early stage of its technological development when wind technology was not<br />
yet fit <strong>to</strong> meet <strong>the</strong>se requirements, while ac<strong>to</strong>rs outside <strong>the</strong> electricity sec<strong>to</strong>r<br />
were driven by different design criteria that proved <strong>to</strong> be more appropriate<br />
for fur<strong>the</strong>r development of wind technologies. This suggests that dominant<br />
‘<strong>institutional</strong> logics’ could not deliver appropriate strategies, modes of<br />
coordination, <strong>and</strong> learning processes, necessary <strong>to</strong> advance <strong>the</strong>se<br />
technologies. Institutional <strong>change</strong>s played a central role in <strong>the</strong><br />
implementation <strong>and</strong> acceleration of wind energy from <strong>the</strong> 1990s on. The<br />
separation between distribution <strong>and</strong> production <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> uptake of decentral<br />
power generation options by distribu<strong>to</strong>rs in competition <strong>to</strong> central producers<br />
is a core example. This was especially fostered when distribu<strong>to</strong>rs committed<br />
<strong>to</strong> environmental goals under <strong>the</strong> new target group policy introduced with<br />
<strong>the</strong> first National Environmental Policy Plan. The development of wind<br />
power was one of <strong>the</strong> ways <strong>to</strong> reduce CO2 emissions.