Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ...

Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ... Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ...

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The institutionalisation of green electricity 181 to loss of captive consumers, new strategic orientation vis à vis future competitors, development of marketing competences) in combination with the acquired competences in renewable energy production due to policy pressure led to the conception of green electricity. The company perceived increasing societal attention on climate change as an opportunity to distinguish itself from its competitors by developing a green profile and exploiting the shifting preferences of open-minded users. Cooperation with an environmental organisation was entered into in order to increase the product’s legitimacy, which was also an illustration of the changed culture in the electricity distributor. This coalition of actors turned out to be able to successfully introduce the concept of green electricity, and a specific governance arrangement that supported it. Momentum for the new product increased as competitors imitated the product and familiarity with the concept became widespread. The role of policy was significant for accelerated diffusion and scaling up of the concept through the introduction of the regulatory energy tax and the exemption of green electricity from the tax. The introduction of the regulatory energy tax, already discussed from the beginning of the nineties, happened to coincide with the emergence of green electricity. Due to the infeasibility of introducing an energy tax throughout Europe, the tax was solely oriented to small consumers to prevent inflicting costs and loss of international competitiveness of Dutch business. The main pillar of legitimacy on which the tax rested, providing incentives for energy saving of households, was soon complemented by another pillar of promoting demand for green electricity. The introduction of the tax also coincided with a shift in problem perception regarding slow penetration of renewable energy. A bias to supply-driven incentives and a lack of market incentives was increasingly seen as a main barrier for further spread of renewable energy. The second significant policy development was the decision to accelerate the liberalisation of the retail green electricity market prior to the full liberalisation of the retail market for conventional electricity. What was not well thought out however was the effect of mismatches between national regulatory frameworks on strategies of energy companies 27 . Especially in the light of governance arrangements to account for green electricity still in their 27 Prof. Van Wijnbergen, a previous top-level civil servant at Economic Affairs, phrased it in a more outspoken way: ‘It was plain stupidity; they just did not know what they were doing’ (Köper, 2003). Also the fact that energy policy experts at ECN had clearly pointed these implications contributes to the conclusion that the dynamics and effects of companies shifting their strategies to exploit these differences were severely underestimated.

182 Chapter 6 infancy, energy companies had a treat in exploiting these mismatches 28 . Moreover, the initial goal of stimulating demand in order to trigger new renewable energy production facilities was eluded for the moment as the sole focus was on being able to satisfy demand. In combination with the EU directive for renewable energy and anticipation of further trade in renewable electricity certificates the events in the Netherlands led to an increasing focus on developing more appropriate governance arrangements. The success of the green electricity concept also facilitated the decision of Essent to construct the biomass-fired power plant. Other factors were the importance of the power plant for realising the goals of the environmental action plan, and the company’s strategy to be the front-runner in gaining experience with the logistics of large-scale biomass-based electricity generation. The company’s ability to build a network in which skills, knowhow and experience regarding the logistics of the biomass resource were accumulated, and its relative power within policy networks, were crucial factors for the power plant to succeed. The case points up several aspects that are relevant to success in diverging from established paths: for example, in response to climate change. One is the important role of ‘prime movers’, such as in raising awareness, undertaking investment and providing legitimacy for new technologies or products (Jacobsson and Johnson 2000). Clearly there is risk involved in developing new products and technologies, and companies often tend to play a strategic game of wait-and-see, especially when new product or technology characteristics are more a reflection of policy pressure than of market demand. This case shows that if a company is able to read the latent demands of the market it may be able to gain some first-mover advantage. As prime movers may trigger wider transformation processes, as in our case through the acceleration of the greening of the tax system and further institutional change towards labelling of electricity flows, they are likely to be well placed to take advantage of the momentum that is generated. Second, the case has also shown that in order to be able to acquire first-mover advantages the company needed to build new networks that provided the competences and legitimacy it lacked individually. Other research has confirmed that the building or restructuring of networks is required to diverge from familiar paths and to establish new practices (Rycroft and Kash 2002). Third, the introduction of a new product or technology often needs to be accompanied by further institutional change in order to gain momentum and to change a technological system. Processes of standardisation, building 28 Some pointed out the possibility of double dividend: electricity imported from facilities that had received domestic support also could become eligible for exemption of the Dutch regulatory energy tax.

The <strong>institutional</strong>isation of green electricity 181<br />

<strong>to</strong> loss of captive consumers, new strategic orientation vis à vis future<br />

competi<strong>to</strong>rs, development of marketing competences) in combination with<br />

<strong>the</strong> acquired competences in renewable energy production due <strong>to</strong> policy<br />

pressure led <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> conception of green electricity. The company perceived<br />

increasing societal attention on climate <strong>change</strong> as an opportunity <strong>to</strong><br />

distinguish itself from its competi<strong>to</strong>rs by developing a green profile <strong>and</strong><br />

exploiting <strong>the</strong> shifting preferences of open-minded users. Cooperation with<br />

an environmental organisation was entered in<strong>to</strong> in order <strong>to</strong> increase <strong>the</strong><br />

product’s legitimacy, which was also an illustration of <strong>the</strong> <strong>change</strong>d culture in<br />

<strong>the</strong> electricity distribu<strong>to</strong>r. This coalition of ac<strong>to</strong>rs turned out <strong>to</strong> be able <strong>to</strong><br />

successfully introduce <strong>the</strong> concept of green electricity, <strong>and</strong> a specific<br />

governance arrangement that supported it. Momentum for <strong>the</strong> new product<br />

increased as competi<strong>to</strong>rs imitated <strong>the</strong> product <strong>and</strong> familiarity with <strong>the</strong><br />

concept became widespread.<br />

The role of policy was significant for accelerated diffusion <strong>and</strong> scaling up of<br />

<strong>the</strong> concept through <strong>the</strong> introduction of <strong>the</strong> regula<strong>to</strong>ry energy tax <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

exemption of green electricity from <strong>the</strong> tax. The introduction of <strong>the</strong><br />

regula<strong>to</strong>ry energy tax, already discussed from <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> nineties,<br />

happened <strong>to</strong> coincide with <strong>the</strong> emergence of green electricity. Due <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

infeasibility of introducing an energy tax throughout Europe, <strong>the</strong> tax was<br />

solely oriented <strong>to</strong> small consumers <strong>to</strong> prevent inflicting costs <strong>and</strong> loss of<br />

international competitiveness of Dutch business. The main pillar of<br />

legitimacy on which <strong>the</strong> tax rested, providing incentives for energy saving of<br />

households, was soon complemented by ano<strong>the</strong>r pillar of promoting dem<strong>and</strong><br />

for green electricity. The introduction of <strong>the</strong> tax also coincided with a shift in<br />

problem perception regarding slow penetration of renewable energy. A bias<br />

<strong>to</strong> supply-driven incentives <strong>and</strong> a lack of market incentives was increasingly<br />

seen as a main barrier for fur<strong>the</strong>r spread of renewable energy. The second<br />

significant policy development was <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>to</strong> accelerate <strong>the</strong><br />

liberalisation of <strong>the</strong> retail green electricity market prior <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> full<br />

liberalisation of <strong>the</strong> retail market for conventional electricity. What was not<br />

well thought out however was <strong>the</strong> effect of mismatches between national<br />

regula<strong>to</strong>ry frameworks on strategies of energy companies 27 . Especially in <strong>the</strong><br />

light of governance arrangements <strong>to</strong> account for green electricity still in <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

27 Prof. Van Wijnbergen, a previous <strong>to</strong>p-level civil servant at Economic Affairs, phrased it in<br />

a more outspoken way: ‘It was plain stupidity; <strong>the</strong>y just did not know what <strong>the</strong>y were<br />

doing’ (Köper, 2003). Also <strong>the</strong> fact that energy policy experts at ECN had clearly pointed<br />

<strong>the</strong>se implications contributes <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> conclusion that <strong>the</strong> dynamics <strong>and</strong> effects of<br />

companies shifting <strong>the</strong>ir strategies <strong>to</strong> exploit <strong>the</strong>se differences were severely<br />

underestimated.

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