Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ...

Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ... Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ...

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The institutionalisation of green electricity 169 6.3 Early success with green electricity: policy and competitors’ reactions Although initially the number of customers opting for the new product was limited, with 400 customers after the pilot project (see Table 6.1), the launch was a success in several ways. An important objective was to make customers familiar with the product and to convince the general public of the reliability of its ‘green’ sources. As the media covered the launch of green electricity quite extensive, familiarity with the product rose steadily. The partnership with WWF, with the environmental organisation acting as a verifier of the renewable source for green electricity, gave the product the legitimacy it needed to transcend regular commercial product launches by giving it a flavour as being for the common good. Milestones in the introduction of green electricity are presented in Table 6.1. The new product also triggered reactions from other energy companies and from policy makers. Energy distributors started to imitate the concept by introducing other names for electricity based on renewable sources in their region 15 . Policy makers reacted by exempting green electricity from the regulatory energy tax that was introduced in 1996. The supply-oriented policy approach towards renewable energy was at that time shifting towards a stronger market orientation in line with a broader shift in energy policy and other policies 16 . The regulatory energy tax, initially initiated to promote energy saving behaviour of households, thus became an important driver of green electricity. Exemption of green electricity from the tax turned out to be a rather effective policy strategy to support the concept 17 . This side-effect 15 At that time also other utilities had adopted the principles of green electricity, but under other names (nature power, eco-power) because of the trademark of Essent on the name green electricity. WWF promoted the general idea of green electricity and not the specific brand names. 16 In 1994 a new government coalition was formed by liberal and social-democrat parties that had as its main motto: markets where possible, government if necessary. The Minister of Economic Affairs, Wijers, was a strong proponent of relying on market mechanisms which was reflected in the second energy policy note of 1996, and should also be explained in the context of an European process towards a liberalised European energy market. Both at the European and Dutch level also the relative successful liberalisation of telecommunications served as example (Oosterwijk, 2003). 17 The magnitude and potential of this side-effect of the regulatory energy tax was only understood after it was initiated. One reason for the subsequent rises in the regulatory energy tax in the following years was the effect on demand for green electricity. Here some similarities can be seen with the introduction of the waste-water levy in the Netherlands in the seventies, intended to raise funds for the construction of public wastewater treatment plants but with the unintended but welcomed side-effect of reducing industrial waste-water production and stimulating innovation (Bressers, 1983, 1988; Bressers and Lulofs, 2003; Hofman, 2000). Both policies thus had important learning

170 Chapter 6 became in turn one of the legitimising pillars for the regulatory energy tax 18 . The exemption initially led to a small reduction of the premium paid for green electricity, but with tax hikes in 1999 and 2000 it led to competitive prices for green electricity from 2000 on (see figure 6.2). Figure 6.2 Evolution of Regulatory Energy Tax (in €cents per Kwh) for electricity consumption by households 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 First signs of institutionalisation of the new governance arrangement After the introduction of green electricity by PNEM in the province of North-Brabant in 1995, other energy distributors followed PNEM’s example through introduction of green electricity under similar names in their respective distribution areas from 1996 on. The principal elements of the governance arrangement introduced by PNEM were followed by all providers. Thus, it was guaranteed that not more green electricity was sold than was produced and additional income through green electricity sales was invested in new capacity based on renewable energy sources. Verification of these obligations was done by the WWF for most distributors, although occasionally another NGO acted as verifier. As of 1996, therefore, marketdriven incentives accompanied policy-driven incentives in strategies for electricity generation based on renewable sources by the energy distribution effects, both in terms of the interpretation of behaviour of target groups, as in terms of the nature of policies that could induce change in this behaviour. The wastewater levy facilitated the further implementation of the polluter pays principle in combination with propagating ‘pollution prevention pays’ for target groups; while the regulatory energy tax facilitated the concept of ‘greening the tax system’. 18 The initial objective of stimulating energy saving behaviour in households remained another pillar, and an evaluation study concluded in 2001 that the tax had resulted in lower energy consumption in the period until 2000 (SEO, 2001).

The <strong>institutional</strong>isation of green electricity 169<br />

6.3 Early success with green electricity: policy <strong>and</strong><br />

competi<strong>to</strong>rs’ reactions<br />

Although initially <strong>the</strong> number of cus<strong>to</strong>mers opting for <strong>the</strong> new product was<br />

limited, with 400 cus<strong>to</strong>mers after <strong>the</strong> pilot project (see Table 6.1), <strong>the</strong> launch<br />

was a success in several ways. An important objective was <strong>to</strong> make<br />

cus<strong>to</strong>mers familiar with <strong>the</strong> product <strong>and</strong> <strong>to</strong> convince <strong>the</strong> general public of <strong>the</strong><br />

reliability of its ‘green’ sources. As <strong>the</strong> media covered <strong>the</strong> launch of green<br />

electricity quite extensive, familiarity with <strong>the</strong> product rose steadily. The<br />

partnership with WWF, with <strong>the</strong> environmental organisation acting as a<br />

verifier of <strong>the</strong> renewable source for green electricity, gave <strong>the</strong> product <strong>the</strong><br />

legitimacy it needed <strong>to</strong> transcend regular commercial product launches by<br />

giving it a flavour as being for <strong>the</strong> common good. Miles<strong>to</strong>nes in <strong>the</strong><br />

introduction of green electricity are presented in Table 6.1. The new product<br />

also triggered reactions from o<strong>the</strong>r energy companies <strong>and</strong> from policy<br />

makers. Energy distribu<strong>to</strong>rs started <strong>to</strong> imitate <strong>the</strong> concept by introducing<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r names for electricity based on renewable sources in <strong>the</strong>ir region 15 .<br />

Policy makers reacted by exempting green electricity from <strong>the</strong> regula<strong>to</strong>ry<br />

energy tax that was introduced in 1996. The supply-oriented policy approach<br />

<strong>to</strong>wards renewable energy was at that time shifting <strong>to</strong>wards a stronger<br />

market orientation in line with a broader shift in energy policy <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

policies 16 . The regula<strong>to</strong>ry energy tax, initially initiated <strong>to</strong> promote energy<br />

saving behaviour of households, thus became an important driver of green<br />

electricity. Exemption of green electricity from <strong>the</strong> tax turned out <strong>to</strong> be a<br />

ra<strong>the</strong>r effective policy strategy <strong>to</strong> support <strong>the</strong> concept 17 . This side-effect<br />

15 At that time also o<strong>the</strong>r utilities had adopted <strong>the</strong> principles of green electricity, but under<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r names (nature power, eco-power) because of <strong>the</strong> trademark of Essent on <strong>the</strong> name<br />

green electricity. WWF promoted <strong>the</strong> general idea of green electricity <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> specific<br />

br<strong>and</strong> names.<br />

16 In 1994 a new government coalition was formed by liberal <strong>and</strong> social-democrat parties that<br />

had as its main mot<strong>to</strong>: markets where possible, government if necessary. The Minister of<br />

Economic Affairs, Wijers, was a strong proponent of relying on market mechanisms which<br />

was reflected in <strong>the</strong> second energy policy note of 1996, <strong>and</strong> should also be explained in <strong>the</strong><br />

context of an European process <strong>to</strong>wards a liberalised European energy market. Both at <strong>the</strong><br />

European <strong>and</strong> Dutch level also <strong>the</strong> relative successful liberalisation of telecommunications<br />

served as example (Oosterwijk, 2003).<br />

17 The magnitude <strong>and</strong> potential of this side-effect of <strong>the</strong> regula<strong>to</strong>ry energy tax was only<br />

unders<strong>to</strong>od after it was initiated. One reason for <strong>the</strong> subsequent rises in <strong>the</strong> regula<strong>to</strong>ry<br />

energy tax in <strong>the</strong> following years was <strong>the</strong> effect on dem<strong>and</strong> for green electricity. Here<br />

some similarities can be seen with <strong>the</strong> introduction of <strong>the</strong> waste-water levy in <strong>the</strong><br />

Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s in <strong>the</strong> seventies, intended <strong>to</strong> raise funds for <strong>the</strong> construction of public wastewater<br />

treatment plants but with <strong>the</strong> unintended but welcomed side-effect of reducing<br />

industrial waste-water production <strong>and</strong> stimulating innovation (Bressers, 1983, 1988;<br />

Bressers <strong>and</strong> Lulofs, 2003; Hofman, 2000). Both policies thus had important learning

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