Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ...

Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ... Innovation and institutional change: the transition to a sustainable ...

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Stability and transformation in the electricity system 91 further investments in nuclear power plants in the 1980s. Government and the power generation industry considered nuclear as a necessary fuel source for future power generation. The Dutch government was at the point of authorisation of the building of two or three new nuclear plants, when the Chernobyl accident occurred and this led to a decision to postpone the authorisation, although it was suggested that there was no connection with the accident. The general tide was also starting to turn against nuclear energy. The consumption of publicly generated electricity was not rising due to the oil crises and through energy saving measures. Moreover, due to lower oil prices the costs of nuclear power were no longer competitive with the costs of fossil-based electricity. There was enough supply of natural gas and it was possible to import electricity at lower prices. After 1987 nuclear power has no longer been a serious option for power generation, and Dutch parliament decided to phase out nuclear, by planning to close down the only Dutch nuclear plant still in operation. The knowledge infrastructure for nuclear energy did not disappear completely, initially domestic support was legitimised based upon maintaining up-to-date knowledge and expertise in the case major problems were solved (e.g. nuclear waste, and inherently safe reactor designs), later new markets were developed in the nuclear activities of ECN. Literature on the development of nuclear energy in the Netherlands is extensive and we summarise here some of the main conclusions 19 : – Dutch government implemented an active R&D strategy for nuclear energy, and pursued the development of a national industry; – The electricity sector was interested in the implementation of nuclear energy as a proven, mature technology, and was much less interested in the development of a national industry; – Nuclear energy fitted the know-how and routines of the electricity sector regarding large-scale, long-term investments, and the guiding principle of large central production units producing continuously for base-load electricity; – The decision making process regarding nuclear energy proceeded with very limited actors involved (government and sector); was from the onset very technocratic, and did not involve societal groups; – The development and possible application of nuclear energy was something fundamentally new to both Dutch society and the knowledge infrastructure. Competencies regarding the technology had to be built up (and were built up both in terms of organisation, R&D and education); however competencies regarding the ‘sociotechnical’ issue of risk were absent; 19 This is largely based on Hofman and Marquart (2001).

92 Chapter 4 – The government and the electricity sector, in ‘tacit’ co-operation had a strong belief in nuclear energy, but both actor groups could not understand that society at large did not share that belief. More importantly they did not acknowledge that these beliefs were based on certain mental models, in their case framing the risk issue in rational models of calculation. Several moments are crucial in the story of nuclear energy: – Although government efforts were focussed on developing a national industry the electricity sector decides to buy foreign technology, this accelerated the political discussion regarding the grip of the national government on the electricity sector; – Due to increasing societal resistance the government was more or less forced to initiate a broad societal discussion. Although the outcomes made clear that there was no basis for further nuclear power plants, Dutch government still felt that nuclear energy was inevitable; – The disaster at Chernobyl is more or less decisive in ending the future of nuclear energy in the Netherlands. Some overall observations can be made: – The government R&D strategy was largely top-down oriented, and did structure some of the R&D efforts through RCN and Neratoom, but government policy was not able to align various actors in a shared course for nuclear energy research and development; – The government expectations regarding nuclear energy were far too optimistic, first of all regarding the potential for building a national industry, secondly the belief that competencies could be built up, and thirdly the idea that government could decide what the market needed; the Dutch government in that period sees technology as controllable and malleable; – A technocratic process not well embedded in society, with some fundamental new features (here the issue of risk), is in this case not endorsed by society; – Society in the fifties was fundamentally different from society in the seventies: environmental concerns were spreading, and societal groups were voicing their beliefs. These changes were not translated into the decision-making processes on nuclear energy; – Despite a changing perspective towards energy saving and renewable energy dominant actors within the electricity system still had high expectations of nuclear energy until after Chernobyl; – In the fifties through eighties an influential social network was formed around nuclear energy, and was rather dominant in various councils related to electricity. Verbong (2005: 174) argues that this network was still influential throughout the nineties and is part of the explanation for

92 Chapter 4<br />

– The government <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> electricity sec<strong>to</strong>r, in ‘tacit’ co-operation had a<br />

strong belief in nuclear energy, but both ac<strong>to</strong>r groups could not<br />

underst<strong>and</strong> that society at large did not share that belief. More<br />

importantly <strong>the</strong>y did not acknowledge that <strong>the</strong>se beliefs were based on<br />

certain mental models, in <strong>the</strong>ir case framing <strong>the</strong> risk issue in rational<br />

models of calculation.<br />

Several moments are crucial in <strong>the</strong> s<strong>to</strong>ry of nuclear energy:<br />

– Although government efforts were focussed on developing a national<br />

industry <strong>the</strong> electricity sec<strong>to</strong>r decides <strong>to</strong> buy foreign technology, this<br />

accelerated <strong>the</strong> political discussion regarding <strong>the</strong> grip of <strong>the</strong> national<br />

government on <strong>the</strong> electricity sec<strong>to</strong>r;<br />

– Due <strong>to</strong> increasing societal resistance <strong>the</strong> government was more or less<br />

forced <strong>to</strong> initiate a broad societal discussion. Although <strong>the</strong> outcomes<br />

made clear that <strong>the</strong>re was no basis for fur<strong>the</strong>r nuclear power plants,<br />

Dutch government still felt that nuclear energy was inevitable;<br />

– The disaster at Chernobyl is more or less decisive in ending <strong>the</strong> future of<br />

nuclear energy in <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

Some overall observations can be made:<br />

– The government R&D strategy was largely <strong>to</strong>p-down oriented, <strong>and</strong> did<br />

structure some of <strong>the</strong> R&D efforts through RCN <strong>and</strong> Nera<strong>to</strong>om, but<br />

government policy was not able <strong>to</strong> align various ac<strong>to</strong>rs in a shared course<br />

for nuclear energy research <strong>and</strong> development;<br />

– The government expectations regarding nuclear energy were far <strong>to</strong>o<br />

optimistic, first of all regarding <strong>the</strong> potential for building a national<br />

industry, secondly <strong>the</strong> belief that competencies could be built up, <strong>and</strong><br />

thirdly <strong>the</strong> idea that government could decide what <strong>the</strong> market needed;<br />

<strong>the</strong> Dutch government in that period sees technology as controllable <strong>and</strong><br />

malleable;<br />

– A technocratic process not well embedded in society, with some<br />

fundamental new features (here <strong>the</strong> issue of risk), is in this case not<br />

endorsed by society;<br />

– Society in <strong>the</strong> fifties was fundamentally different from society in <strong>the</strong><br />

seventies: environmental concerns were spreading, <strong>and</strong> societal groups<br />

were voicing <strong>the</strong>ir beliefs. These <strong>change</strong>s were not translated in<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

decision-making processes on nuclear energy;<br />

– Despite a changing perspective <strong>to</strong>wards energy saving <strong>and</strong> renewable<br />

energy dominant ac<strong>to</strong>rs within <strong>the</strong> electricity system still had high<br />

expectations of nuclear energy until after Chernobyl;<br />

– In <strong>the</strong> fifties through eighties an influential social network was formed<br />

around nuclear energy, <strong>and</strong> was ra<strong>the</strong>r dominant in various councils<br />

related <strong>to</strong> electricity. Verbong (2005: 174) argues that this network was<br />

still influential throughout <strong>the</strong> nineties <strong>and</strong> is part of <strong>the</strong> explanation for

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