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Part 1: General - Computer Security Resource Center - National ...

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March, 2007<br />

Transition 3: A key that is never used may transition from the pre-activation state to the<br />

compromised state when the integrity of a key or the confidentiality of a key<br />

requiring confidentiality protection becomes suspect before first use.<br />

Transition 4: Keys transition from the pre-activation state to the active state when the key<br />

becomes available for use. This transition may be activated after reaching an<br />

activation date or by an external event. In the case where keys are generated<br />

for immediate use, this transition occurs immediately after entering the preactivation<br />

state.<br />

This transition marks the beginning of a key’s cryptoperiod (see Section 5.3).<br />

Transition 5: An active key may transition from the active state to the compromised state<br />

when the integrity of a key or the confidentiality of a key requiring<br />

confidentiality protection becomes suspect. <strong>General</strong>ly, keys are compromised<br />

when they are released to or determined by an unauthorized entity.<br />

Transition 6: An active key may transition to the deactivated state if it is no longer to be<br />

used to apply cryptographic protection to data or no longer intended to be<br />

used to process cryptographically protected data. A key may transition from<br />

the active state to the deactivated state as a result of a revocation action (see<br />

Section 8.3.5) for a reason other than a key compromise, or if the key is<br />

replaced (see Section 8.2.3), or at the end of the key’s cryptoperiod (see<br />

Sections 5.3.4).<br />

Transition 7: Assuming that a key is not determined to be compromised while in the<br />

deactivated state, a key may transition from the deactivated state to the<br />

destroyed state. In general, a key transitions to the destroyed state as soon as it<br />

is no longer needed<br />

Transition 8: A deactivated key transitions from the deactivated state to the compromised<br />

state when the integrity of a key or the confidentiality of a key requiring<br />

confidentiality protection becomes suspect. <strong>General</strong>ly, keys are compromised<br />

when they are released to or determined by an unauthorized entity.<br />

Transition 9: A key in the compromised state may transition to the destroyed compromised<br />

state when the key is no longer needed to process data.<br />

Transition 10: A destroyed key transitions to the destroyed compromised state if it is<br />

determined that the key was previously compromised. Although the key itself<br />

has already been destroyed, transition to the destroyed compromised state<br />

marks the remaining key attributes to indicate a key compromise.<br />

7.3 States and Transitions for Asymmetric Keys<br />

The preceding discussion of key states and transitions applies to both symmetric and asymmetric<br />

keys; however, some observations that are specific to asymmetric keys are in order.<br />

Asymmetric keys that are or will be certified are in the pre-activation state until certified or until<br />

the “not before” date specified in a certificate has passed. The types of transitions for asymmetric<br />

keys depend on the key type. Examples of transitions follow:<br />

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