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Part 1: General - Computer Security Resource Center - National ...

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March, 2007<br />

6 Protection Requirements for Cryptographic Information<br />

This section gives guidance on the types of protection for keying material. Cryptographic keying<br />

material is defined as the cryptographic key and associated information required to use the key.<br />

The specific information varies depending on the type of key. The cryptographic keying material<br />

must be protected in order for the security services to be “meaningful.” Much of the protection<br />

needed may be provided by a FIPS140-2 validated cryptographic module; however, whenever<br />

the keying material exists external to a FIPS140-2 cryptomodule, additional protection is<br />

required. The type of protection needed depends on the type of key and the security service for<br />

which the key is used.<br />

6.1 Protection Requirements<br />

Keying material should be (operationally) available as long as the associated cryptographic<br />

service is required. Keys may be maintained within a cryptographic module while they are being<br />

actively used, or they may be stored externally (provided proper protection is afforded) and<br />

recalled as needed. Some keys may need to be archived if required beyond the key’s originator<br />

usage period (see Section 5.3.5).<br />

The following protections may be provided to the keying material.<br />

Integrity protection (Also called assurance of integrity) shall be provided for all keying<br />

material. Integrity protection always involves checking the source and format of received<br />

keying material (see Section 5.4.1). Integrity protection can be provided by cryptographic<br />

integrity mechanisms (e.g. cryptographic checksums, cryptographic hashes, MACs, and<br />

signatures), non-cryptographic integrity mechanisms (e.g. CRCs, parity, etc.) (see<br />

Appendix A), or physical protection mechanisms. Guidance for the selection of<br />

appropriate integrity mechanisms is given in Sections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.2.2.<br />

The confidentiality of all symmetric and private keys shall be protected. Public keys<br />

generally do not require confidentiality protection. When the symmetric or private key<br />

exists internal to a validated cryptomodule, confidentiality protection is provided by the<br />

cryptomodule in accordance with [FIPS140-2]. When the symmetric or private key exists<br />

external to the cryptomodule, confidentiality protection shall be provided either by<br />

encryption (e.g., key wrapping) or by controlling access to the key via physical means<br />

(e.g. storing the keying material in a safe with limited access). The security and<br />

operational impact of specific confidentiality mechanisms varies. Guidance for the<br />

selection of appropriate confidentiality mechanisms is given in Sections 6.2.1.3 and<br />

6.2.2.3.<br />

Association protection shall be provided for a cryptographic security service by ensuring<br />

that the correct keying material is used with the correct data in the correct application or<br />

equipment. Guidance for the selection of appropriate association protection is given in<br />

Sections 6.2.1.4 and 6.2.2.4.<br />

Assurance of domain parameter and public key validity provides confidence that the<br />

parameters and keys are arithmetically correct (see Section 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). Guidance for<br />

the selection of appropriate validation mechanisms is given in [SP800-56], [FIPS186-3],<br />

as well as this document.<br />

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