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Part 1: General - Computer Security Resource Center - National ...

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March, 2007<br />

1. Private key used to sign a root certificate in a public key infrastructure<br />

2. Symmetric key transport key shared by a large number of users<br />

3. Private asymmetric key transport key shared by a large number of users<br />

4. Master key used in the generation of keys by a large number of users<br />

5. Symmetric data encryption key used to encrypt data in a large distributed database<br />

6. Symmetric key shared by a large number of communications network participants<br />

7. Key used to protect a large number of stored keys<br />

8. A certification authority’s (CA’s) private key<br />

In all of these cases, a large number of holders would need to be immediately notified of the<br />

compromise. Inclusion of the key identifier on a Compromised Key List (CKL) or Certificate<br />

Revocation List (CRL) to be published at a later date would not be sufficient. This means that a<br />

list of holders would need to be maintained and a means for communicating news of the<br />

compromise to the holders would be required. News of the compromise and the replacement of<br />

keys should be sent only to the affected entities so as not to encourage others to exploit the<br />

situation.<br />

In all of these cases, a secure path for replacing the compromised keys is required. In order to<br />

permit rapid restoration of service, an electronic (e.g., over-the-air) replacement path is preferred<br />

(see Section 8.2.3). In some cases, however, there may be no practical alternative to manual<br />

distribution (e.g., compromise of a root CA’s private key). Contingency distribution of alternate<br />

keys may help restore service rapidly in some circumstances (e.g., compromise of a widely held<br />

symmetric key), but the possibility of simultaneous compromise of operational and contingency<br />

keys would need to be considered.<br />

Damage assessment can be extraordinarily complex, particularly in cases such as the<br />

compromise and replacement of CA private keys, widely used transport keys, and keys used by<br />

many users of large distributed databases.<br />

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