Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

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The research for this paper Was supported by the Center for Mental Health Services of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Departnsent of Health and Human Services. 756 nonprofit providers or groups of providers that have joined together as a more comprehensive managed care entity. This shift to managed care alters incentives in the system. Typically, managed care firms agree to provide an array of services (specified in the contract) to a defined group of individuals (also described in the contract) for a flat fee or payment negotiated in advance. Most often, the plan receives a capitation payment for each individual enrolled. The incentives under these arrangements are for managed care entities to control their costs. If they provide fewer services, they will make more profit or save more money. This directly, and deliberately, creates the opposite incentive to that in a fee-for-service system, where providers' income increases if more services are furnished. Yet, while controlling costs is an important objective for the public agency, it must be balanced with legal protections for covered individuals so that consumers have appropriate choices and are not denied services in order to save expenses or increase profit. The shift to managed care often alters the providers' role in subtle ways as well. In a fee-for-service system, the provider's clinical judgment was largely insulated from cost-saving concerns, and when the ong>Medicaidong> agency denied reimbursement, the denial was a clear-cut event which triggered a formal notice and the opportunity for appeal. Under these circumstances, the individual could often rely on the provider to support the appeal. Under managed care, the provider's role is more ambiguous, and the consumer may not have as clear a picture of the service options that can be considered or any understanding that a service has, in fact, been denied him by the treating provider. For the consumer, there is no clear 'denial event' and, as a result, less opportunity for an appeal. - The shift from rules and regulations to contracts also represents a dramatic change, and requires the recrafting of essential principles for the service system into contract language. In this process, crucial aspects of the current system could be lost if not specifically included; yet the process also provides an opportunity to improve upon and strengthen the current system. Fundamental for developing sound contracts for public mental health services are the following principles: * Even where the mental health system has been privatized, the ultimate responsibility for its operation still lies with the public agency. This includes ensuring compliance with federal ano state law. Defining 'Mcdically Necessary Services cto Protect PIan Members POLICY ANALYSIS BY THE BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW

-WHAT IS "MEDICALLY NECESSARY" IN MANAGED CARE SYSTEMS? 757 * State plans for the mental health system developed prior to the shift to managed care, and generally developed with significant public input, should be considered when moving to a restructured system. There is no need to reinvent the wheel if these plans are still appropriate, although at the same time improvements can be made. * Consumers, family members and advocates should continue to have a voice in how the system is designed and run, and their knowledge of how systems can best serve consumers and families should be drawn upon. State planning processes, open public forums and other opportunities for public comments should not be discarded as the state develops requests for proposals (RFPs), reviews bids and negotiates contracts. NMedical necessity is not a new concept. It has been used in ong>Medicaidong>, Medicare and private insurance rules for many years, and managed care plans operating in the private sector typically use procedures to decide whether a particular ser-vice is appropriate, effective and necessary for the individual. ong>Managedong> care plans agree to deliver covered services to covered individuals whenever those services are needed. They generally cannot refuse to serve an individual designated as a member of-their plan, as can most agencies operating under a grant or fee-for-service system. ong>Managedong> care plans therefore devise mechanisms for making decisions about what services to provide to whom, under what circumstances. Otherwise, the plan would have no control over utilization and expenditures and could not operate effectively. ong>Managedong> care plans use different mechanisms to control the use of services and hold down their costs. One way is to negotiate discount rates to pay their providers. However, ong>Medicaidong> rates are generally low to begin with, so plans must also create greater efficiency through stringent controls on the use of care. Some put their provider network under pressure to control costs by making capitated payments to the providers, thereby pawing on to them a substantial part of the risk. (Providers at risk face the possibility that revenues will not be sufficient to cover expenditures incurred in the delivery of necessary services.) In some managed care plans, as in fee-for-service, specific limits are placed on the duration of care (such as no more than 20 outpatient sessions or 30 inpatient hospital days per year). Definisg 'Medically Necessary' Services to Protect Plan Members POLICY ANALYSIS BY THE BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW 3

The research for this paper<br />

Was supported by the Center for<br />

Mental Health Services of the<br />

Substance Abuse and Mental<br />

Health Services Administrati<strong>on</strong>,<br />

U.S. Departnsent of Health and<br />

Human Services.<br />

756<br />

n<strong>on</strong>profit providers or groups of providers that have joined together as<br />

a more comprehensive managed care entity.<br />

This shift to managed care alters incentives in the system. Typically,<br />

managed care firms agree to provide an array of services (specified in the<br />

c<strong>on</strong>tract) to a defined group of individuals (also described in the c<strong>on</strong>tract)<br />

for a flat fee or payment negotiated in advance. Most often, the<br />

plan receives a capitati<strong>on</strong> payment for each individual enrolled. The incentives<br />

under these arrangements are for managed care entities to c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />

their costs. If they provide fewer services, they will make more<br />

profit or save more m<strong>on</strong>ey. This directly, and deliberately, creates the<br />

opposite incentive to that in a fee-for-service system, where providers'<br />

income increases if more services are furnished. Yet, while c<strong>on</strong>trolling<br />

costs is an important objective for the public agency, it must be balanced<br />

with legal protecti<strong>on</strong>s for covered individuals so that c<strong>on</strong>sumers<br />

have appropriate choices and are not denied services in order to save expenses<br />

or increase profit.<br />

The shift to managed care often alters the providers' role in subtle<br />

ways as well. In a fee-for-service system, the provider's clinical judgment<br />

was largely insulated from cost-saving c<strong>on</strong>cerns, and when the <str<strong>on</strong>g>Medicaid</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

agency denied reimbursement, the denial was a clear-cut event which<br />

triggered a formal notice and the opportunity for appeal. Under these<br />

circumstances, the individual could often rely <strong>on</strong> the provider to support<br />

the appeal. Under managed care, the provider's role is more ambiguous,<br />

and the c<strong>on</strong>sumer may not have as clear a picture of the service<br />

opti<strong>on</strong>s that can be c<strong>on</strong>sidered or any understanding that a service has,<br />

in fact, been denied him by the treating provider. For the c<strong>on</strong>sumer,<br />

there is no clear 'denial event' and, as a result, less opportunity for an<br />

appeal.<br />

- The shift from rules and regulati<strong>on</strong>s to c<strong>on</strong>tracts also represents a<br />

dramatic change, and requires the recrafting of essential principles for<br />

the service system into c<strong>on</strong>tract language. In this process, crucial aspects<br />

of the current system could be lost if not specifically included; yet the<br />

process also provides an opportunity to improve up<strong>on</strong> and strengthen<br />

the current system. Fundamental for developing sound c<strong>on</strong>tracts for<br />

public mental health services are the following principles:<br />

* Even where the mental health system has been privatized, the ultimate<br />

resp<strong>on</strong>sibility for its operati<strong>on</strong> still lies with the public agency.<br />

This includes ensuring compliance with federal ano state law.<br />

Defining 'Mcdically Necessary Services cto Protect PIan Members<br />

POLICY ANALYSIS BY THE BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW

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