Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

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514 Option A is still quite rare. Pioneered by the Arizona Long Term ong>Careong> System and PACE (Program of All-inclusive ong>Careong> for the Elderly), this approach includes all ong>Medicaidong> funded services in a single capitated payment to the managed care contractor. Minnesota recently moved in this direction with its Senior Health Options program, though contractor liability for nursing facility services has been capped at 6 months in that program, with additional nursing facility payments on a fee-for-service basis when needed. The perceived advantage of this approach is the ability to hold a contractor accountable for total care while closing off avenues for cost shifting from capitated services to those reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis. This may not be possible, however, if the contractor does not have a comprehensive enough network to provide the full range of services or is not willing to be at risk for the full range. Also, a state may not want to use a single contractor for policy, program or political reasons. For example, a state may desire to preserve a direct relationship with community mental health centers or home- and community-based long term care providers. Most managed care programs for older people or people with disabilities capitate some but not all services, in some variation of Option B. The most common arrangement (e.g., parts of California, Oregon, Pennsylvania) is to capitate primary and acute care and reimburse LTC on a fee-for-service basis beyond short, post-acute stays, but some states are experimenting with other combinations. For example, New York has a set of pilot programs in which LTC is capitated, but primary and acute care are paid fee-for-service. Regardless of which sector a state capitates, it needs to consider the incentives for cost shifting that such systems can create. One way to address this concern is to establish fee-for-service utilization targets and to hold contractors financially responsible when they exceed the targets or reward providers for containing its enrollees utilization of fee-for-service services, an approach that has proven effective in Wisconsin. Other variations on Option B stem from particular state laws passed with the support of certain provider groups. These include arrangements that exclude pharmacy or dental services from capitation. Option C appears to be growing in popularity as a number of new states create mental health carve out programs. In those states, mental health services are capitated to a specialty contractor, which may be a national behavioral health firm (as in Massachusetts) or a locally-created entity with roots in the county mental health system (as in parts of Oregon). Primary and acute care are typically capitated to a second contractor, with LTC remaining fee-for-service. Medicare Services As previously noted, most older beneficiaries and many younger beneficiaries with disabilities also have Medicare coverage. When Medicare coverage exists, ong>Medicaidong> becomes the last payor for most primary and acute care services, raising implications The National Academy for State Health Policy e 0 8/97 IV-11t

515 for ong>Medicaidong> capitation rates and coordination of services. These implications are discussed later in this chapter. How Will Quality Be Ensured? Given the warnings of early research, how can states ensure high quality in their managed care programs for special populations? Boothl' has suggested that the design features of most state managed care programs for TANF (formerly AFDC) beneficiaries do not fully address the needs of special populations, but provide a solid foundation for state efforts in this area. States will most likely find that the same techniques used in their quality management systems for TANF beneficiaries (e.g. use of practice guidelines, credentialing, licensing and certification) can also be used to ensure quality of care for the elderly and persons with disabilities, but that the system will need to address new issues that are of particular importance to these new enrollees. One challenge is the broader range of providers often used by special populations. Commercial managed care organizations are not generally accustomed to having Independent Living Centers, home and community based service providers, or adult foster homes in their networks. Even if these services are not the direct responsibility of the capitated contractor, states should consider monitoring the degree to which all of these distinct provider systems come together to provide seamless care to the beneficiary. Health plans have their own quality initiatives (e.g., NCQA accreditation). Also, many types of providers are already steeped in their own quality initiatives (e.g., the Minimum Data Set (MDS) for nursing facilities and the Outcome and Assessment Information Set (OASIS) for home health) while others have virtually no focused quality improvement programs. As a starting point, states should consider implementing dynamic processes that can provide early warnings of problems and give voice to beneficiaries. State experience has shown that complaint and grievance systems are most effective when they offer multiple avenues for registering problems, include staff who can communicate effectively with special populations, and are easy to use. Ombudsman or other special positions might be created to address individual and systemic problems that arise around the needs of special populations. (Volume R contains more information on complaints and grievances.) In the longer term, states will need to define desirable outcomes that are specific to the groups their programs serve, and develop performance indicators to measure success. This is a more difficult undertaking that will evolve as programs gain 11 Maureen Booth, Look Before You Leap: Assuring the Ouality of ong>Careong> of ong>Managedong> ong>Careong> Programs Serving Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities, (Portland, ME: National Academy for State Heahh Policy, 1996). The National Academy for State Health Policy e 0 8/97 IV-12

514<br />

Opti<strong>on</strong> A is still quite rare. Pi<strong>on</strong>eered by the Ariz<strong>on</strong>a L<strong>on</strong>g Term <str<strong>on</strong>g>Care</str<strong>on</strong>g> System and<br />

PACE (Program of All-inclusive <str<strong>on</strong>g>Care</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the Elderly), this approach includes all<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>Medicaid</str<strong>on</strong>g> funded services in a single capitated payment to the managed care<br />

c<strong>on</strong>tractor. Minnesota recently moved in this directi<strong>on</strong> with its Senior Health<br />

Opti<strong>on</strong>s program, though c<strong>on</strong>tractor liability for nursing facility services has been<br />

capped at 6 m<strong>on</strong>ths in that program, with additi<strong>on</strong>al nursing facility payments <strong>on</strong> a<br />

fee-for-service basis when needed. The perceived advantage of this approach is the<br />

ability to hold a c<strong>on</strong>tractor accountable for total care while closing off avenues for<br />

cost shifting from capitated services to those reimbursed <strong>on</strong> a fee-for-service basis.<br />

This may not be possible, however, if the c<strong>on</strong>tractor does not have a comprehensive<br />

enough network to provide the full range of services or is not willing to be at risk<br />

for the full range. Also, a state may not want to use a single c<strong>on</strong>tractor for policy,<br />

program or political reas<strong>on</strong>s. For example, a state may desire to preserve a direct<br />

relati<strong>on</strong>ship with community mental health centers or home- and<br />

community-based l<strong>on</strong>g term care providers.<br />

Most managed care programs for older people or people with disabilities capitate<br />

some but not all services, in some variati<strong>on</strong> of Opti<strong>on</strong> B. The most comm<strong>on</strong><br />

arrangement (e.g., parts of California, Oreg<strong>on</strong>, Pennsylvania) is to capitate primary<br />

and acute care and reimburse LTC <strong>on</strong> a fee-for-service basis bey<strong>on</strong>d short, post-acute<br />

stays, but some states are experimenting with other combinati<strong>on</strong>s. For example,<br />

New York has a set of pilot programs in which LTC is capitated, but primary and<br />

acute care are paid fee-for-service. Regardless of which sector a state capitates, it<br />

needs to c<strong>on</strong>sider the incentives for cost shifting that such systems can create. One<br />

way to address this c<strong>on</strong>cern is to establish fee-for-service utilizati<strong>on</strong> targets and to<br />

hold c<strong>on</strong>tractors financially resp<strong>on</strong>sible when they exceed the targets or reward<br />

providers for c<strong>on</strong>taining its enrollees utilizati<strong>on</strong> of fee-for-service services, an<br />

approach that has proven effective in Wisc<strong>on</strong>sin.<br />

Other variati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> Opti<strong>on</strong> B stem from particular state laws passed with the<br />

support of certain provider groups. These include arrangements that exclude<br />

pharmacy or dental services from capitati<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Opti<strong>on</strong> C appears to be growing in popularity as a number of new states create<br />

mental health carve out programs. In those states, mental health services are<br />

capitated to a specialty c<strong>on</strong>tractor, which may be a nati<strong>on</strong>al behavioral health firm<br />

(as in Massachusetts) or a locally-created entity with roots in the county mental<br />

health system (as in parts of Oreg<strong>on</strong>). Primary and acute care are typically capitated<br />

to a sec<strong>on</strong>d c<strong>on</strong>tractor, with LTC remaining fee-for-service.<br />

Medicare Services<br />

As previously noted, most older beneficiaries and many younger beneficiaries with<br />

disabilities also have Medicare coverage. When Medicare coverage exists, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Medicaid</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

becomes the last payor for most primary and acute care services, raising implicati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

The Nati<strong>on</strong>al Academy for State Health Policy e 0 8/97 IV-11t

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