Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging
Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging
States Could Experience Adverse Selection and Lose Money With
Risk Adjustment and Reinsurance Have Some Impact on Incentives for Favorable Selection or Underservice Risk Adjustment Is Largely Untested for Disabled Enrollees Risk Adjustment Using Prior Utilization Rates Cb.pmo 4 369 HeiP Red-e I.l em 1,JUd. Drued sewn.A ICdp hdoo iiO-.iiv .0 To address the concerns associated with adverse and favorable selection, some states are beginning to experiment with risk-adjusted methods for setting capitation rates. Risk adjustment is an attempt to match the rates paid to health plans with the expected costs of providing appropriate services to individual recipients. It essentially groups beneficiaries according to expected future expense and narrows the gap between the highest-and lowest-cost individuals in any given rate ceri. This reduces tLe payoff for selecting only the healthiest recipients and provides better assurance that the state is not paying too much for individuals who are relatively healthy or too little for individuals who need such complex and expensive care that health plans are at best unwilling to attract and at worst unwilling or unable to accommodate them. However, the actual application of risk-adjustment methods to the development of capitation rates for disabled
- Page 320 and 321: GA { I ~United States (3 Mu General
- Page 322 and 323: Results in Brief E.. - 320
- Page 324 and 325: Significant Efforts Needed to Ensur
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- Page 328 and 329: cow 326 Chapter 4 Traditional Rate-
- Page 330 and 331: Chapter I Background 328 Me
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- Page 338 and 339: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
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- Page 342 and 343: Table 21 nEnollmen of Disabled Bene
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- Page 356 and 357: Addressing Concerns Through Enrollm
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- Page 362 and 363: Targeted Quality-of-Care</s
- Page 364 and 365: Encounter Data Analysis Shows Poten
- Page 366 and 367: 364 Chapter 4 Risk-Adjusted Rates a
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- Page 386 and 387: Results in Brief B-Z70335 384 manag
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- Page 392 and 393: B-27035 390 numbers of patients. In
- Page 394 and 395: B-270335 392 number of primary care
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- Page 398 and 399: States Challenged to Develop Effect
- Page 400 and 401: B-270335 398 that beneficiary use o
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- Page 406 and 407: Targeted Analyses of Grievance Data
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- Page 412 and 413: 410 Appendix I Scope and Methodolog
- Page 414 and 415: - I 412 App-edU I Sw Wd Methodology
- Page 416 and 417: 414 AppeAdt U Fedo.I aod Stt. Ove0s
- Page 418 and 419: 416 Appendix III Major Contributors
Risk Adjustment and<br />
Reinsurance Have<br />
Some Impact <strong>on</strong><br />
Incentives for<br />
Favorable Selecti<strong>on</strong><br />
or Underservice<br />
Risk Adjustment Is Largely<br />
Untested for Disabled<br />
Enrollees<br />
Risk Adjustment Using Prior<br />
Utilizati<strong>on</strong> Rates<br />
Cb.pmo 4<br />
369<br />
HeiP Red-e I.l em 1,JUd.<br />
Drued sewn.A<br />
ICdp hdoo iiO-.iiv .0<br />
To address the c<strong>on</strong>cerns associated with adverse and favorable selecti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
some states are beginning to experiment with risk-adjusted methods for<br />
setting capitati<strong>on</strong> rates. Risk adjustment is an attempt to match the rates<br />
paid to health plans with the expected costs of providing appropriate<br />
services to individual recipients. It essentially groups beneficiaries<br />
according to expected future expense and narrows the gap between the<br />
highest-and lowest-cost individuals in any given rate ceri. This reduces tLe<br />
payoff for selecting <strong>on</strong>ly the healthiest recipients and provides better<br />
assurance that the state is not paying too much for individuals who are<br />
relatively healthy or too little for individuals who need such complex and<br />
expensive care that health plans are at best unwilling to attract and at<br />
worst unwilling or unable to accommodate them.<br />
However, the actual applicati<strong>on</strong> of risk-adjustment methods to the<br />
development of capitati<strong>on</strong> rates for disabled <str<strong>on</strong>g>Medicaid</str<strong>on</strong>g> beneficiaries is very<br />
lirnited.Y To date, <strong>on</strong>ly two states (Massachusetts and Ohio) have<br />
implemented any risk-adjustment methods, and <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e other state<br />
(Missouri) has active plans to do so. Other states told us that risk<br />
adjustment was too administratively difficult to implement and that they<br />
looked to reinsurance to protect plans that experience adverse selecti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Reinsurance does not, however, affect plans' incentive to seek favorable<br />
selecti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The three states experimenting with risk-adjusted rates have based their<br />
adjustments <strong>on</strong> a beneficiary's prior utilizati<strong>on</strong> of medical services or a<br />
beneficiary's clinical diagnosis. Researchers point out that such measures<br />
may better predict future costs since disabled individuals, compared with<br />
the populati<strong>on</strong> as a whole, have a higher percentage of their health care<br />
costs related to chr<strong>on</strong>ic (recurring or c<strong>on</strong>sistent) c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s than to acute<br />
(random) c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s. Still, for risk-adjustment methods to be useful,<br />
attenti<strong>on</strong> must be paid to whether the predictive measures are sufficiently<br />
reliable and administratively feasible to collect.<br />
Utilizati<strong>on</strong>-based risk adjustment attempts to predict a pers<strong>on</strong>'s future<br />
health care costs based <strong>on</strong> a measure of prior use, such as the costs of<br />
services or the number of hospital days used in a previous period. For<br />
example, a health plan could be paid a higher-than-average amount if the<br />
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