Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

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States Could Experience Adverse Selection and Lose Money With ong>Managedong> ong>Careong> 368 Rkk-A4tid Rhi. ad RIk-6h.t Coo Drueld B.Wkid impossible situation. However, these states had limited ability to verify or refute such claims with any certainty. Health plans are not the only players in the ong>Medicaidong> managed care marketplace thai can face adverse selection and financial risks. When prepaid managed care plan enrollment is voluntary (as it is in 11 of the 17 states now using prepaid care for some or all of their disabled beneficiaries), the state may experience adverse selection. Specifically, where participation is voluntary, beneficiaries with relatively few health care needs (who may have few, if any, existing relationships with specialists) may choose prepaid care, while beneficiaries needing more expensive care (who may have long-standing relationships with specific providers) may choose to remain in fee-for-service care. When enrollment is mandatory but exceptions are allowed, a state may similarly face adverse selection Enrollment patterns in which the users of the most expensive medical services are in fee-for-service care and the relatively healthy in prepaid managed care are not problematic if the rate the state pays the health plans is adequately adjusted for the health status of the enrollees However, in many cases, the rates paid to health plans are based on the average cost of providing care to an entire eligibility category and may not appropriately account for those that do not elect prepaid care. Consequently, the state pays the ful cost of treating the expensive beneficiaries through fee-for-service care and too high a rate for the lower-cost health plan members. This problem may be compounded in that it is likely that future capitation rates would be based on the costs of serving those remaining in fee-for-service care-individuals who are likely to be less healthy and consequently more costly. Just as it is difficult to tell f a health plan is experiencing adverse selection, it is very difficult to determine whether a state is experiencing adverse selection. An Oregon ong>Medicaidong> official suspects that the state's enrollment exemption process for disabled individuals, which allows case workers to determine if prepaid managed care is appropriate for individual beneficiaries, may be resulting in adverse selection for the state. PM. 62 gCIAMEa-II-ISS Medlkid MFed C,,, for Q. D6.bid

Risk Adjustment and Reinsurance Have Some Impact on Incentives for Favorable Selection or Underservice Risk Adjustment Is Largely Untested for Disabled Enrollees Risk Adjustment Using Prior Utilization Rates Cb.pmo 4 369 HeiP Red-e I.l em 1,JUd. Drued sewn.A ICdp hdoo iiO-.iiv .0 To address the concerns associated with adverse and favorable selection, some states are beginning to experiment with risk-adjusted methods for setting capitation rates. Risk adjustment is an attempt to match the rates paid to health plans with the expected costs of providing appropriate services to individual recipients. It essentially groups beneficiaries according to expected future expense and narrows the gap between the highest-and lowest-cost individuals in any given rate ceri. This reduces tLe payoff for selecting only the healthiest recipients and provides better assurance that the state is not paying too much for individuals who are relatively healthy or too little for individuals who need such complex and expensive care that health plans are at best unwilling to attract and at worst unwilling or unable to accommodate them. However, the actual application of risk-adjustment methods to the development of capitation rates for disabled ong>Medicaidong> beneficiaries is very lirnited.Y To date, only two states (Massachusetts and Ohio) have implemented any risk-adjustment methods, and only one other state (Missouri) has active plans to do so. Other states told us that risk adjustment was too administratively difficult to implement and that they looked to reinsurance to protect plans that experience adverse selection. Reinsurance does not, however, affect plans' incentive to seek favorable selection. The three states experimenting with risk-adjusted rates have based their adjustments on a beneficiary's prior utilization of medical services or a beneficiary's clinical diagnosis. Researchers point out that such measures may better predict future costs since disabled individuals, compared with the population as a whole, have a higher percentage of their health care costs related to chronic (recurring or consistent) conditions than to acute (random) conditions. Still, for risk-adjustment methods to be useful, attention must be paid to whether the predictive measures are sufficiently reliable and administratively feasible to collect. Utilization-based risk adjustment attempts to predict a person's future health care costs based on a measure of prior use, such as the costs of services or the number of hospital days used in a previous period. For example, a health plan could be paid a higher-than-average amount if the wro doe. -hion n-k ~ms t omahi h. Escend mooe -aeb U. Ihe Medite sepuialon. we eWoieed ookg4i-s hedma oo-oo mnglie MeWdico pponton mm -o emus MeWdmo Chow eo HMO110 Sme seo M d Are Needed 10. R5d, Poam Cogl (GAO/HE 5X Ibimig HMO Pym-ePPloblel, (GAO/HEtfiRF2l, Nov.5, l). tmG. Ep , Add, Ued m-y io P.e r.3 GA0iEHSO-915 Mdi.9d Etdfed Caft toh Dibled

Risk Adjustment and<br />

Reinsurance Have<br />

Some Impact <strong>on</strong><br />

Incentives for<br />

Favorable Selecti<strong>on</strong><br />

or Underservice<br />

Risk Adjustment Is Largely<br />

Untested for Disabled<br />

Enrollees<br />

Risk Adjustment Using Prior<br />

Utilizati<strong>on</strong> Rates<br />

Cb.pmo 4<br />

369<br />

HeiP Red-e I.l em 1,JUd.<br />

Drued sewn.A<br />

ICdp hdoo iiO-.iiv .0<br />

To address the c<strong>on</strong>cerns associated with adverse and favorable selecti<strong>on</strong>,<br />

some states are beginning to experiment with risk-adjusted methods for<br />

setting capitati<strong>on</strong> rates. Risk adjustment is an attempt to match the rates<br />

paid to health plans with the expected costs of providing appropriate<br />

services to individual recipients. It essentially groups beneficiaries<br />

according to expected future expense and narrows the gap between the<br />

highest-and lowest-cost individuals in any given rate ceri. This reduces tLe<br />

payoff for selecting <strong>on</strong>ly the healthiest recipients and provides better<br />

assurance that the state is not paying too much for individuals who are<br />

relatively healthy or too little for individuals who need such complex and<br />

expensive care that health plans are at best unwilling to attract and at<br />

worst unwilling or unable to accommodate them.<br />

However, the actual applicati<strong>on</strong> of risk-adjustment methods to the<br />

development of capitati<strong>on</strong> rates for disabled <str<strong>on</strong>g>Medicaid</str<strong>on</strong>g> beneficiaries is very<br />

lirnited.Y To date, <strong>on</strong>ly two states (Massachusetts and Ohio) have<br />

implemented any risk-adjustment methods, and <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e other state<br />

(Missouri) has active plans to do so. Other states told us that risk<br />

adjustment was too administratively difficult to implement and that they<br />

looked to reinsurance to protect plans that experience adverse selecti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Reinsurance does not, however, affect plans' incentive to seek favorable<br />

selecti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

The three states experimenting with risk-adjusted rates have based their<br />

adjustments <strong>on</strong> a beneficiary's prior utilizati<strong>on</strong> of medical services or a<br />

beneficiary's clinical diagnosis. Researchers point out that such measures<br />

may better predict future costs since disabled individuals, compared with<br />

the populati<strong>on</strong> as a whole, have a higher percentage of their health care<br />

costs related to chr<strong>on</strong>ic (recurring or c<strong>on</strong>sistent) c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s than to acute<br />

(random) c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s. Still, for risk-adjustment methods to be useful,<br />

attenti<strong>on</strong> must be paid to whether the predictive measures are sufficiently<br />

reliable and administratively feasible to collect.<br />

Utilizati<strong>on</strong>-based risk adjustment attempts to predict a pers<strong>on</strong>'s future<br />

health care costs based <strong>on</strong> a measure of prior use, such as the costs of<br />

services or the number of hospital days used in a previous period. For<br />

example, a health plan could be paid a higher-than-average amount if the<br />

wro doe. -hi<strong>on</strong> n-k ~ms t omahi h. Escend mooe -aeb U. Ihe<br />

Medite sepuial<strong>on</strong>. we eWoieed ookg4i-s hedma oo-oo mnglie MeWdico pp<strong>on</strong>t<strong>on</strong> mm<br />

-o emus MeWdmo Chow eo HMO110 Sme seo M d Are Needed 10. R5d, Poam Cogl<br />

(GAO/HE 5X<br />

Ibimig HMO Pym-ePPloblel, (GAO/HEtfiRF2l, Nov.5, l).<br />

tmG. Ep , Add, Ued m-y io<br />

P.e r.3<br />

GA0iEHSO-915 Mdi.9d Etdfed Caft toh Dibled

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