Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging
Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging
364 Chapter 4 Risk-Adjusted Rates and Risk-Sharing Can Help Reduce Incentives to Underserve Disabled Beneficiaries Adequate quality-of-care safeguards provide some protection against the potential risks of prepaid managed care. Paying health plans a capitation rate in advance to provide enrollees a set of services creates an incentive to improve efficiency by eliminating unnecessary services. However, it simultaneously creates certain risks. First is a risk of underservice, because plans can profit by reducing the number or quality of beneficial services. Second is the risk that when the same capitation rate is paid for enrollees with different health care needs, plans will seek to enroll the healthier, less expensive individuals. These risks may be greater when plans feel financial pressure from actual or potential losses from serving enrollees with extreme needs. States are examining ways to reduce these incentives and pressures in prepaid care plans that have a disproportionate share of beneficiaries with high-cost medical needs, such as severely disabled people. States' efforts have been of three main types: . Using risk-adjusted capitation rates to more closely match the reimbursement rates with anticipated costs of treating individual recipients. * Sharing financial risk by providing retrospective adjustments (called 'reinsurance') to reimburse plans for losses resulting from very high-cost individuals or disproportionate numbers of enrollees with above-average costs. * Establishing funding agreements with Brisk corridors" that reimburse plans for a portion of losses but also require plans to return part of the profits exceeding a specified level. For the 17 states we contacted with managed care programs for disabled beneficiaries, most state activity to date has centered on reinsurance. Initiatives to establish risk-adjusted rates for disabled enrollees or to set up risk corridors in funding agreements are fewer in number and have much shorter track records. Risk-adjusted rates-currently implemented in only two states-are seen as potentially beneficial by many states but also as administratively difficult to develop and maintain. As the only mechanism that specifically limits health plan profits, risk corridors appear to have the greatest potential for reducing plans' incentives to underserve or to enroll only the healthier beneficiaries. To date, five states have taken steps to build risk corridors into their payments to plans. rP.9 48 GAIHEUS-9-138 SMdliaid !-M~ed Cut for Uke Ml-.blWd
TYaditional Rate-Setting Approach Does Not Address Negative Incentives and Pressures 365 ratw 4 Rkk4d hri Ra-ms Cr rBwp hd..r.ot w row Dnob k In setting capitation rates, states make an effort to account for differences in expected costs for broad categories of beneficiaries. To do this, they frequently divide the eligible population into subgroups, or cells, of individuals with similar characteristics Of the 17 states we contacted, 16 established rate cells according to
- Page 316 and 317: 314 If a state contracts with or in
- Page 318 and 319: Appendix A State Activity* 316 Many
- Page 320 and 321: GA { I ~United States (3 Mu General
- Page 322 and 323: Results in Brief E.. - 320
- Page 324 and 325: Significant Efforts Needed to Ensur
- Page 326 and 327: Recommendations Agency Comments E-d
- Page 328 and 329: cow 326 Chapter 4 Traditional Rate-
- Page 330 and 331: Chapter I Background 328 Me
- Page 332 and 333: ovapt I 330 the option of extending
- Page 334 and 335: Federal Requirements Govern State U
- Page 336 and 337: Table 1.2: Comparison of Ma
- Page 338 and 339: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
- Page 340 and 341: 338 Chapter 2 States Are Moving Tow
- Page 342 and 343: Table 21 nEnollmen of Disabled Bene
- Page 344 and 345: 342 chona Se. As To~ed Id C"fn, Dai
- Page 346 and 347: Table a& Eabent to Which 17 State I
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- Page 350 and 351: Table 2.5: Extent to Which 17 State
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- Page 356 and 357: Addressing Concerns Through Enrollm
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- Page 362 and 363: Targeted Quality-of-Care</s
- Page 364 and 365: Encounter Data Analysis Shows Poten
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- Page 382 and 383: 380 Ob-e-eU-o, Co-ded, end C-ost pr
- Page 384 and 385: 382 United States General Accountin
- Page 386 and 387: Results in Brief B-Z70335 384 manag
- Page 388 and 389: B-2Kn0 386 assess service utilizati
- Page 390 and 391: Table 1: Characteristics of <strong
- Page 392 and 393: B-27035 390 numbers of patients. In
- Page 394 and 395: B-270335 392 number of primary care
- Page 396 and 397: B-Z7Oa33 394 developed on the premi
- Page 398 and 399: States Challenged to Develop Effect
- Page 400 and 401: B-270335 398 that beneficiary use o
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- Page 404 and 405: States Could Learn More From Improv
- Page 406 and 407: Targeted Analyses of Grievance Data
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- Page 410 and 411: B-270335 408 Finally, the experts w
- Page 412 and 413: 410 Appendix I Scope and Methodolog
- Page 414 and 415: - I 412 App-edU I Sw Wd Methodology
TYaditi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Rate-Setting Approach<br />
Does Not Address<br />
Negative Incentives<br />
and Pressures<br />
365<br />
ratw 4<br />
Rkk4d hri Ra-ms Cr<br />
rBwp hd..r.ot w row<br />
Dnob k<br />
In setting capitati<strong>on</strong> rates, states make an effort to account for differences<br />
in expected costs for broad categories of beneficiaries. To do this, they<br />
frequently divide the eligible populati<strong>on</strong> into subgroups, or cells, of<br />
individuals with similar characteristics Of the 17 states we c<strong>on</strong>tacted, 16<br />
established rate cells according to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Medicaid</str<strong>on</strong>g> eligibility category, such as all<br />
disabled people or all children in AF'c-eligible famnilies, with some<br />
adjustment for age or the geographic area in which the beneficiaries<br />
reside.m<br />
Setting capitati<strong>on</strong> rates in this way meets HCFA requirements and provides<br />
appropriate payments to plans as l<strong>on</strong>g as each plan's enrollment mix of<br />
beneficiaries with complex health care needs is comparable with the mix<br />
of the populati<strong>on</strong> used to set the ratesr The m<strong>on</strong>ey saved serving<br />
enrollees with lower4han-average costs pays the cost of serving enrollees<br />
with higher-than-average costs. However, plans may not enroll disabled<br />
people with health care needs comparable with those included in setting<br />
the rates. While some disabled enrollees may require little medical<br />
treatment, others may have disabilities, such as quadriplegia, that require<br />
extensive treatment The identifiability of such groups and the high costs<br />
associated with their care heighten the incentives for health care plans to<br />
avoid enrolling such individuals.<br />
In most state programs, the rate-setting methods do not take into account<br />
the cost variati<strong>on</strong> associated with different types of disabling c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Researchers have identified significant variati<strong>on</strong> in medical costs within<br />
different subcategories of c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s. For example, using 1992<br />
fee-for-service claims data divided al<strong>on</strong>g clinical diagnoses, researchers<br />
found average annual costs ranging from nothing (for the 5 percent of the<br />
disabled populati<strong>on</strong> that had no medical claims during the year) to $35,000<br />
per year in <strong>on</strong>e state for an individual diagnosed with quadriplegia.<br />
Similarly Oreg<strong>on</strong> found tremendous variati<strong>on</strong> in 1993 health care costs<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g its 199 highest-cost children The 6-m<strong>on</strong>th group average was<br />
$21,472, but amounts varied from a high of $410,420 to a low of $5,014. In<br />
'Frra-.* s<strong>on</strong>. 11195a t th ugJhuy Sqrnbr,) -grre re f- rdoty dble<br />
didk1 torili ordter. -di p-eny lke I. $126.1i t -tke.llU. -rooge<br />
s to<br />
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