Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Medicaid Managed Care - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

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173 gatekeeper, and we also wondered what were the incentives for this case manager to really be an effective gatekeeper. Now that we have created an incentive through capitation for the organization to in some sense be the gatekeeper, and we are asking the organization to hire a case manager to advocate for access to patients, the question is who is that case manager going to be accountable tothe organization or the patient. There is a tension there, and it is not clear how the incentives work out. Besides a case manager for individuals, there is also the issue of ombudsmen and grievance appeal procedures that exist within managed care organizations. Each of these needs to be emphasized, and the awareness of the information about these procedures needs to be widely disseminated so that individuals have the knowledge to know how they can address concerns or complaints about their services. The fourth area that I think is important is the issue of stratified oversight. What we are talking about with people with special needs is a very, very small segment of the population. To look at managed care organizations' performance in terms of medical reviews and analyses of encounter data, satisfaction surveys, and looking at that through a random sample is not going to capture enough of the individuals with special needs to be able to know whether those individuals are being well-served. We need to have special samples of those kinds of individuals. The last area that I think is important is that we need to be concerned about how we pay our managed care organizations. Pure capitation creates the strongest incentives to control the use of services and to profit from not delivering services. Since we are not certain about what is the appropriate level of services, it may be much better to think about dampening the incentive for underservice by establishing limits on the amount of profit that organizations can make from serving persons with special needs as well as protecting those organizations from the adverse selection that may occur w en too many individuals with special needs join their organization and the cost of serving them exceeds the capitation payments. We need to do all of these things, and it is important that we learn from all of these things. It is an expensive thing to tailor a program and to be attentive to how well it is working. What we are hoping is that in the future, we will have a much better knowledge base as to what works and what does not work, so that we can design programs that have more structure to them than we can today, but we can still have confidence that they are going to operate effectively. Thank you. Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Bill. Welcome, Barbara.

174 STATEMENT OF BARBARA SHIPNUCK, DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY, FINANCE AND REGULATION, STATE OF MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MEN- TAL HYGIENE, BALTIMORE, MD Ms. SHIPNUCK. Good morning. I am Barbara Shipnuck. I am the Deputy Secretary for Health ong>Careong> Policy, Finance and Regulation for the State of Maryland, and we are the newest 1115 to come on line. Unlike some States, we chose to go statewide and to include both our disabled and traditional moms' and children's welfare population in our demonstration project. The demonstration's official start date was on June 2; our first day of capitation and services was July 1. As of yesterday, of the 330,000 people we plan to enroll in the 5-month rollout phase between June and November, we had 89,000 individuals enrolled. The guiding principles behind the development of Maryland's 1115 waiver application and the program we designed was to place our ong>Medicaidong> recipients into what we call a "medical home"; this was the guiding principle of our secretary, Marty Wasserman, whom some of you know from his background as a local health officer and his presence in many of the national associations. So he was determined that not only would we create a medical home for these individuals and, as Mr. Scanlon pointed out, that's one of the areas where you particularly have to pay attention if you are dealing with special needs populations-ut he was also determined that we combine the ong>Medicaidong> impetus and the financing concerns that we all share with the health paradigms that often are overlooked when you try to roll into just a ong>Medicaidong> managed care program without the tie-ins to the milestones that your State is facing and the targets for the year 2000 without reassessing what your strengths and weaknesses are and without working very closely with your public health comrades in your department or your State structure. In Maryland, we may be unique in terms of the way our department is structured, because our public health and ong>Medicaidong> are under one department, and yet our eligibility and human resources and environmental health are in a separate department. So we tend to have basically two branches in the department that the Secretary supervises, and those are the ong>Medicaidong> and the public health sides. So there was a tremendous amount of linkage and collaboration as we went through the process at the department. But what Maryland did, which we are very proud of, and it is now being held up as a model for States that are beginning to enter the arena, was to have a very, very extensive public process in the development of our program from the very, very beginning. So, unlike some States where the State itself designed the program and then took it out for review or submitted it to HCFA and then got the public comments, Maryland worked with the various constituencies from the very beginning. So during 1995, there was a committee that continued to grow because different constituencies, advocacy groups, individuals, and legislators wanted to participate, and at the final count, there were 132 individuals on this committee who reviewed the various proposals and steps for what kind of waiver application the State of

173<br />

gatekeeper, and we also w<strong>on</strong>dered what were the incentives for this<br />

case manager to really be an effective gatekeeper. Now that we<br />

have created an incentive through capitati<strong>on</strong> for the organizati<strong>on</strong><br />

to in some sense be the gatekeeper, and we are asking the organizati<strong>on</strong><br />

to hire a case manager to advocate for access to patients, the<br />

questi<strong>on</strong> is who is that case manager going to be accountable tothe<br />

organizati<strong>on</strong> or the patient. There is a tensi<strong>on</strong> there, and it is<br />

not clear how the incentives work out.<br />

Besides a case manager for individuals, there is also the issue of<br />

ombudsmen and grievance appeal procedures that exist within<br />

managed care organizati<strong>on</strong>s. Each of these needs to be emphasized,<br />

and the awareness of the informati<strong>on</strong> about these procedures needs<br />

to be widely disseminated so that individuals have the knowledge<br />

to know how they can address c<strong>on</strong>cerns or complaints about their<br />

services.<br />

The fourth area that I think is important is the issue of stratified<br />

oversight. What we are talking about with people with special<br />

needs is a very, very small segment of the populati<strong>on</strong>. To look at<br />

managed care organizati<strong>on</strong>s' performance in terms of medical reviews<br />

and analyses of encounter data, satisfacti<strong>on</strong> surveys, and<br />

looking at that through a random sample is not going to capture<br />

enough of the individuals with special needs to be able to know<br />

whether those individuals are being well-served. We need to have<br />

special samples of those kinds of individuals.<br />

The last area that I think is important is that we need to be c<strong>on</strong>cerned<br />

about how we pay our managed care organizati<strong>on</strong>s. Pure<br />

capitati<strong>on</strong> creates the str<strong>on</strong>gest incentives to c<strong>on</strong>trol the use of<br />

services and to profit from not delivering services. Since we are not<br />

certain about what is the appropriate level of services, it may be<br />

much better to think about dampening the incentive for<br />

underservice by establishing limits <strong>on</strong> the amount of profit that organizati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

can make from serving pers<strong>on</strong>s with special needs as<br />

well as protecting those organizati<strong>on</strong>s from the adverse selecti<strong>on</strong><br />

that may occur w en too many individuals with special needs join<br />

their organizati<strong>on</strong> and the cost of serving them exceeds the capitati<strong>on</strong><br />

payments.<br />

We need to do all of these things, and it is important that we<br />

learn from all of these things. It is an expensive thing to tailor a<br />

program and to be attentive to how well it is working. What we are<br />

hoping is that in the future, we will have a much better knowledge<br />

base as to what works and what does not work, so that we can design<br />

programs that have more structure to them than we can<br />

today, but we can still have c<strong>on</strong>fidence that they are going to operate<br />

effectively.<br />

Thank you.<br />

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Bill.<br />

Welcome, Barbara.

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