Announcing 'Stammering Research' - Stammering Research - UCL
Announcing 'Stammering Research' - Stammering Research - UCL
Announcing 'Stammering Research' - Stammering Research - UCL
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<strong>Stammering</strong> <strong>Research</strong>. Vol. 1.<br />
AUTHORS’ RESPONSE TO CONTINUING COMMENTARIES<br />
Can the Usage-Based Approach to Language Development be<br />
Applied to Analysis of Developmental Stuttering?<br />
C. Savage 1 and E. Lieven 2<br />
1 Department of Psychology, University College London, Gower St., London WC1E 6BT,<br />
England<br />
c.savage@ucl.ac.uk<br />
2 Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig<br />
lieven@eva.mpg.de<br />
Abstract. The authors offer a response to commentaries by Julie Anderson & Julien Musolino and Katherine<br />
Demuth. They first clarify their position and then address the issues raised. The authors acknowledge that they<br />
do not provide conclusive answers, but they suggest that their paper provides an opportunity to open a dialogue<br />
among child language and childhood stuttering researchers that includes the contributions of the UB approach.<br />
Key Words: Usage-Based Approach, slot-and-frame schema, phonological word.<br />
We were pleased to receive responses from Anderson & Musolino and Demuth to our article<br />
(Savage & Lieven, 2004). Both raise important issues which need to be addressed. After briefly<br />
clarifying our position, we attempt to address the major issues raised, but we are certainly far from<br />
being able to give definitive answers.<br />
The Usage-Based (UB) approach considers abstract representations as developing out of usage.<br />
Initially, representations are local and lexically-specific (i.e. not abstract). These representations remain<br />
available while, during development, more complex and more abstract representations build up. A<br />
child’s early linguistic representations may constitute very lexically-specific slot-and-frame patterns,<br />
that cut across the abstract syntactic categories of syntactic theory, for example if want and to are fused<br />
together in ‘wanna X’. Determining what these representations are is an empirical issue, not a linguistic<br />
one. In so far as they do not vary between speakers this will result from the lexical statistics of the<br />
spoken language that children hear. In so far as they vary between speakers, this will depend on<br />
particular properties of the input that children hear and what they as individuals take from it. Our<br />
position is that the empirical evidence provides more support for this approach than for the idea that<br />
children possess abstract linguistic representations from the outset of language development. In<br />
addition, the evidence suggests that while different aspects of children’s linguistic representations start<br />
to generalise and become more abstract at different points in time, there is a major change in the<br />
representation of argument structure around the end of the third year. Here we are indeed at odds with a<br />
Generativist approach. From a UB perspective competence and performance are not radically distinct,<br />
as they are in Generativist theory. Anderson and Musolino (2004) are wrong, however, in suggesting<br />
that competence accounts within the Generativist tradition have nothing to say about performance.<br />
Whatever one’s view on whether they should have something to say, there is a long and interesting<br />
literature of attempts to account for performance facts in terms of competence theory (notably, for<br />
example, Valian’s 1986, 1991 performance limitations theory).<br />
Our article was an exploration of the possibility that the UB approach might have something to<br />
offer to the understanding of stuttering. As we understand it, the evidence suggests that when young<br />
children stutter they tend to do so on function words, whereas adults stutter on content words. We<br />
suggested that this might be due to the different nature of the linguistic representations that young<br />
children have compared to those of adults (less paradigmatic and more syntagmatic would be one way<br />
of thinking of it). The evidence also suggests that stuttering tends to onset at around 3;0, around the<br />
time when we suggest that children are moving from item-based usage to more abstract usage.<br />
As a stand alone hypothesis, the UB theory is incomplete. Of course we recognise that a full<br />
explanation for stuttering will need to account for its persistence into adulthood for some speakers and<br />
for the fact that not all children are diagnosed as having a stutter. However, if there is an increase in<br />
disfluency by most children around the age of 3;0, then the question is why this persists for some<br />
children and not for others. We were attempting to suggest where such an increase in disfluency might<br />
come from and thus to shift the question to asking how it persists and whether this relates to the nature<br />
of the linguistic representations that children who continue to stutter have. To be specific, there are<br />
three possible explanations for the high recovery rate for childhood stuttering: 1) All CWS represent<br />
the most disfluent end of a continuum of normal disfluency and their stuttering only persists into<br />
adulthood if a further change in their speech abilities occurs during adolescence (i.e. the EXPLAN<br />
model, Howell & Au Yeung, 2002); 2) CWS fall into two groups, with those who later recover<br />
representing the disfluent end of the normal fluency curve and those whose stutter persists representing<br />
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