R b t M Gi obert McGinn: Technology ... - Homepage Usask

RRobert b t MMcGinn: Gi
Technology, Demography, and the
Anachronism of Traditional Rights
Robert McGinn
Chair of Science, Technology, and
Society (STS) Program at Stanford.
y( ) g
STS: The newish (faddish?) institutional
home for interdisciplinary studies in science and
technology.
His book Science, Technology, and Society (1991), inter
alia, li ddevelops l th the argument t contained t i d iin our selection. l ti
And that argument…?
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The Potentially Problematic Pattern
“‘Technological maximality,’ unfolding under the
auspices of ‘traditional traditional rights’ rights supposedly held and
exercised by a large and increasing number of
parties, is apt to dilute or diminish contemporary
societal quality of life.”
Technological Maximality (TM)
“The quality of embodying in one or more of its
aspects or dimensions the greatest scale or highest
degree previously attained or currently possible in
that aspect or dimension.”
Technologies can be “maximalist” in any of several
respects…
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1 Product size or scale Trump Tower, Trans-Canada Railway,
West Edmonton Mall
2 Product performance (power, speed,
efficiency, scope, etc.)
3 Speed of production of
a technic or system
4 Volume of production of
a technic or system
5 Speed of diffusion of
a technic or system
6 Domain of diffusion of
a technic or system
7 Intensity of use of
a technic or system
a technic or system trawling
8 Domain of use of
a technic or system
9 Duration of use of a
technic or system
Traditional Rights
Bovine Growth Hormone, GM crops,
Moore’s Law
assembly line production; Taylorism,
fast food, factory farming
television, telephone, polio vaccine
television, telephone, Coke
McGinn’s notes that rights are traditionally
construed as individual entitlements that
are timelessly valid and morally inviolable.
clear-cut forestry, ocean-bottom
trawling
paper-clips, credit cards, computers,
electricity, smart phones
Teflon, polyester, microwaveable
plastics
Note that McGinn is implicitly assuming a
basically Lockean view of rights, which
holds that rights are (self-evidently) inalienable.
For Locke, rights exist prior to society; society comes into
existence in order to better protect our natural rights rights.
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Interactive Nature of the Pattern
McGinn argues that the conjunction of
1) technological maximality with
2) traditional rights and
3) an ever-increasing number of rights-holders
“is apt to put society at risk” (59).
The conjunction of these three phenomena is what
McGinn calls the “troubling triad”
Examples of the “Troubling Triad” Pattern
Medicine: Intensive, often protracted use of an ever increasing
number of life-prolonging of technologies, for an increasing
number of patients patients, “such uses supposedly being called for by
the inviolable right to life.”
Environmental Management: The proliferation of mopeds,
ATVs, snowmobile, and other kinds of versatile transport
vehicles in special or fragile environmental areas, such use
supposedly being sanctioned by mobility rights.
Ub Pl i I i b f hi h i b ildi i
Urban-Planning: Increasing numbers of high-rise buildings in
city centers, supposedly justified by property owner or developer
rights.
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“The untoward effects exacted by the unfolding of our
triadic ad c pattern pa e included c uded steep s eep financial a c a and a d psyc psychological o og ca
tolls, the depletion and degradation of environmental
resources, and the dilution and disappearance of urban
amenities. In short, the costs of operation of the triadic
pattern are substantial and increasing.” (59-60)
Why has the “triadic” pattern
gone largely unnoticed?
1. “The effects of the behavior of the individual agent g
are negligibly problematic.”
(Compare: Hardin)
2. Powerful cultural forces encourage each element of
the pattern… p
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TM is fostered:
a) by the free-market economic system: Increased
efficiency and economies of scale provide an incentive
for TM in the form of greater profits.
b) by a general orientation in modern Western culture
towards the “technological fix” and
c) by a general expectation in Western democracies that
new or ‘better’ technologies are not to be reserved for the
elite, but made available to everyone.
According to McGinn, in the historical context in which
they were first recognized, it was (politically) essential to
imbue rights with an immutable character.
In the historical process of legitimizing the idea of rights, it
strategic to accord rights a “quasi-sacred” status (63).
But this status has now made it more difficult to think of
rights in a new way (perhaps in the right way).
We are trapped, in other words, by the strategy that was
originally used to help emancipate us.
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Similarly, it made sense, once upon a time, to encourage
rapid population growth, especially in places like the North
American West. (S (Saskatchewan: “ “The Last Best West!”) ”)
Unfortunately, this has left us with a legacy of social
attitudes and tax policies that promotes the continuation of
increasing numbers of rights-claimants.
This same phenomenon is exacerbated by the
widespread belief that reproduction is a matter of
individual right and thus not a legitimate subject for social
control. (Again, recall Hardin)
What can be done to change the pattern?
I. We could directly control the increase in the number of
rights-holders.
g
II. We could directly control individual instances/types of
technologically maximal behavior
For various reasons (political, social, economic) McGinn
suggests that coercive solutions of this sort would not
work kiin practice ti at tpresent. t
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“Contextualized” Rights
Instead, McGinn suggests that we alter the way we
conceive of rights; that we move towards a
contextualized theory of f rights.
“An acceptable theory of rights in contemporary
technological society must be able to deal with the
implications of the exercise of rights in a context in which
a rapidly changing, powerful, technological arsenal is
diffused throughout a populous, materialistic, democratic
society society. ” (66)
In other words, we need to
“…lower the threshold of individual wrongdoing to reflect
the manifest wrong effected by aggregation. With such a
revaluation, the individual would have no right to act as he
or she once did because of the newly declared immorality
of the individual act.” (66)
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Grounds for “Contextualizing” Individual Rights
The existence of society is called into question by the exercise
of the putative right.
Continued effective social functioning is threatened by the
exercise of the right.
Some natural resource essential to society is threatened due to
the exercise of the right.
A seriously debilitating financial cost is imposed on society by
the widespread or frequent exercise of the right.
Some phenomenon of significant aesthetic aesthetic, cultural, cultural historical historical,
or spiritual value to a people is jeopardized by the exercise of a
right.
Some highly valued amenity would be seriously damaged or
eliminated through the exercise of the right.
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