Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty

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Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty Democracy be discussed in relation to democratic principles. Most often, the countries’ own constitutions include protection for the freedoms of association, assembly and speech that arguably could be infringed by specific party regulations. IDEA will address this dimension of party regulations in its future work and research partnerships. The second dimension, that of the consequences of regulations for political competition and democracy, is important but also very delicate to analyse. In many cases, too little time has passed since the introduction of regulations for us to pass judgement on the success or otherwise of the engineering of laws for democratic purposes. It is also clear that regulations may be put in place for other reasons than promoting democracy, not least for reasons of maintaining political power; but such conclusions should be the result of analysis and not prejudged statements. The first dimension, of regulations and democratic principles, needs to be evaluated against some widely accepted definition of democracy. Regulations could also be measured against the extent to which they harmonize with or breach international and national principles and standards of democracy. Ultimately, regulations that are less than democratic and do not achieve the stated aims should be identified and avoided, and the same applies to democratic regulations that do not achieve their aims; these may even have harmful consequences for democratization. Democratic regulations that do achieve their aims are less problematic; but most interesting of all may be those cases where the regulations can be questioned on the democratic dimension but achieve more long-term effects that are positive for democratization and democratic consolidation. Quotas may be a good example of the latter case. How, then, should political party regulations be enforced? 6.5 Regulations, electoral management bodies and enforcement Mechanisms for the enforcement of regulations vary, but from IDEA’s research on political parties it is clear that contacts between electoral management bodies (EMBs) and political parties are frequent. This holds true both for the formal representation of parties on EMBs and for informal, consultative forms of engagement. Why are relations between EMBs and political parties arguably so important for further democratization? It is important to keep in mind that, despite the progress of democracy, there are too many superficial democracies in which patronage and autocracy are excused for economic or security reasons. Constitutions which should
International Idea set the stage for participatory democratic practices are often treated as tools for rulers rather than instruments for checks and balances. There is widespread agreement that democracy is the best tool for the peaceful management of social and political conflicts, and hence lays the most solid foundation for political and economic development. Yet, since democratization involves profound changes in the distribution of power and in the relationship between citizens and the state, democracy often generates violence before it becomes able to manage conflict, and elections are often at the centre of such conflict. Elections are in too many cases staged events with predetermined outcomes rather than expressions of true democratic processes. EMBs can often be influenced by ruling elites to produce the desired outcomes. We know from other research that political parties, so crucial for the good functioning of democracy, are among the least trusted institutions in all parts of the world. Hence, two of the central institutions of democracy, EMBs and political parties, are increasingly interlinked and often also increasingly questioned. To further complicate the situation, EMB–political party relations are also often characterized by low levels of mutual confidence and trust— even if good relations also prevail in some countries. This is of central importance for conflict management and democracy, as democratic consolidation can only be established through citizens’ trust in the institutions that represent them and regulate elections. A central function of EMBs is the extent to which they enforce regulations on political parties. A more detailed look at these relations is part of the ongoing process of analysing the available data. Drawing on the experience of quotas for women in politics, it is clear that the enforcement of regulations tends to be relatively effective when it is placed in the hands of EMBs. The reason for this is obvious: EMBs in most cases can choose not to register parties for elections if they are in breach of the regulations. This further underscores the importance of more research on EMB–political party relations and on how predictability and trust can be built into the enforcement of regulations and the management of elections. The next section is descriptive and is meant to inform the reader of what types of political party regulations exist in Africa and whether their application has contributed to a better political dispensation. Below we deal with the regulations that governing five principal aspects of the operation of political parties in Africa: the requirements political parties and candidates must meet before they can contest elections; the funding of political parties and election campaigns; political fund- Party Structures and Internal Organization
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Political Parties in Africa: Challe
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Besides this report on political pa
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5. Party Structures and Internal Or
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0 Chapter 1 Methodology
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Mauritius Labour Party Mauritian Mi
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Chapter 2 Introduction
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Chapter 3 Context
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3.1 The internal context 3.1.1 Soci
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3.2 The external context Political
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Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty

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