Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty
Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty
Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty
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International Idea<br />
potential that exists there <strong>for</strong> conflict between parties based <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>stance on ethnicity<br />
and regionalism—has no requirements <strong>for</strong> parties to be of a national character, and<br />
at the same time shows no serious signs of political crisis as a result of political<br />
mobilization based on ethnicity or other social cleavages.<br />
Given these three examples, the question whether party regulations (or the absence<br />
of party regulations) aim<strong>in</strong>g to promote the national character of political parties<br />
lead to stable or unstable political parties is there<strong>for</strong>e very much open <strong>for</strong> debate. Let<br />
us take a closer look at this aspect of the impact of regulations, and also <strong>in</strong>troduce<br />
the question of their democratic legitimacy.<br />
6.4 Democratic and effective regulations?<br />
Two dimensions are central to this debate on party regulations. First, are regulations<br />
more or less democratic? Second, do the regulations result <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>ms of political<br />
competition that are better <strong>for</strong> democracy than what would have been the case<br />
without regulations? The examples drawn from Ghana, Nigeria and South <strong>Africa</strong><br />
above illustrate these two dimensions well. How democratic is it to impose regulations<br />
on the national character and organization of political parties? Do such regulations<br />
result <strong>in</strong> more democratic outcomes?<br />
The picture based on these examples is mixed and rem<strong>in</strong>ds us of the highly contextdependent<br />
character of regulations. While regulation might work <strong>in</strong> Ghana (at the<br />
moment), it is certa<strong>in</strong>ly less successful <strong>in</strong> Nigeria. Or would the alternative—no<br />
regulations <strong>in</strong> Nigeria—have produced much more adverse outcomes <strong>for</strong> democracy,<br />
like civil war or secession?<br />
One useful example that illustrates why these dimensions may be useful <strong>in</strong> evaluat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
regulations is the case of quotas <strong>for</strong> women <strong>in</strong> parliaments. Whether voluntary or<br />
legislated, quotas—like any question on affirmative action—raise the issue whether<br />
such measures are compatible with democratic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples. While this is a valid<br />
discussion <strong>for</strong> any regulation of parties or party systems, it is also widely recognized<br />
that more equal participation by and representation of women is <strong>in</strong>deed good <strong>for</strong><br />
democracy, and that quotas can achieve more <strong>in</strong>clusive <strong>for</strong>ms of political competition<br />
than what would otherwise have been the case. 14<br />
Many other <strong>for</strong>ms of regulations—such as regulations to prevent parties from<br />
mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g along ethnic, religious, regional or language group l<strong>in</strong>es—should also<br />
14<br />
Visit http://www.idea.<strong>in</strong>t <strong>for</strong> free downloads of several publications on quotas and women <strong>in</strong> politics<br />
that support this argument. See also Dahlerup 2006.<br />
Party Structures and Internal Organization