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S A G I T T A
S A G I T T A
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State Association of County Retirement Systems<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
George W. Siguler<br />
Managing Director<br />
Confidential<br />
Ver. 05.12.11<br />
May 2011
The World Today<br />
Home price<br />
depreciation<br />
Systemic banking<br />
failures Over-leveraged<br />
LBOs<br />
Implosion of the<br />
securitization industry<br />
Sustained high<br />
unemployment<br />
Opaque multi-trillion<br />
dollar credit<br />
derivatives market<br />
Global Distressed<br />
Debt and<br />
Restructuring<br />
Opportunities<br />
Soaring corporate<br />
default rates<br />
Mortgage credit<br />
meltdown<br />
Consumer<br />
deleveraging<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
02
Global Contagion<br />
+ The massive correction in the credit markets and the downturn in the housing market have created severe<br />
dislocations across many asset classes<br />
+ The contagion has spread into the global capital markets, creating a broader scope of opportunities for distressed<br />
investors<br />
RMBS &<br />
other<br />
structured<br />
products<br />
Corporate<br />
leveraged loans<br />
and high yield<br />
Global Opportunity Set<br />
Commercial<br />
real estate debt<br />
market<br />
Consumer debt:<br />
credit cards, auto<br />
and student loans<br />
Commercial<br />
real estate<br />
property<br />
market<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
03
Unprecedented Government Support of the Markets<br />
Selected Key Government Intervention Programs<br />
Program Authorized ($B) Invested ($B)<br />
Federal Reserve<br />
GSE Debt Purchase Program $ 1,450 $ 925<br />
TAF - Term Auction Facility $ 500 $ 110<br />
CPFF - Commercial Paper Funding Facility $ 1,800 $ 14<br />
Term Asset Backed Security Lending Facility $ 1,000 $ 44<br />
U.S. Government Bond purchases $ 300 $ 295<br />
QE2 - Long Term Treasury Purchase Program $ 600 $ 375<br />
Other $ 850 $ -<br />
Federal Reserve Total $ 6,500 $ 1,763<br />
Stimulus<br />
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 $ 168 $ 168<br />
Student loan guarantees $ 195 $ 33<br />
Other $ 36 $ 19<br />
Treasury Total $ 399 $ 220<br />
Treasury<br />
TARP $ 700 $ 356<br />
Conservatorship of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac $ 400 $ 111<br />
Other $ 974 $ 415<br />
Treasury Total $ 2,074 $ 882<br />
FDIC<br />
TLGP (Guarantee Program) $ 1,500 $ 308<br />
Asset Guarantee Program (C, AIG, BS) $ 528 $ 154<br />
Bank Takeovers $ 45 $ 45<br />
FDIC Total $ 2,074 $ 508<br />
HUD<br />
HOPE for Homeowners $ 345 $ 20<br />
HUD Total $ 345 $ 20<br />
TOTAL $11.4 Trillion $3.4 Trillion<br />
Sources: KBW Research, Federal Reserve, U.S. Treasury, FDIC, CBO, White House, Bloomberg, CNN<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
04
Sustained Rally<br />
+ Massive rally in the leveraged loan and high yield universe in 2009, with the weakest credits leading the way<br />
L+3500<br />
L+3000<br />
L+2500<br />
L+2000<br />
L+1500<br />
L+1000<br />
L+500<br />
L+0<br />
Jan-07<br />
Apr-07<br />
Jul-07<br />
Oct-07<br />
Jan-08<br />
Apr-08<br />
Sources: JPMorgan Credit Research, CSFB Leveraged Finance Research<br />
Average Discounted Spread<br />
Jul-08<br />
Oct-08<br />
Jan-09<br />
Apr-09<br />
Jul-09<br />
Oct-09<br />
Jan-10<br />
Apr-10<br />
All Loans ML HY H0A0 ML HY CCC H0A3<br />
Jul-10<br />
Oct-10<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
05
High Yield Market Has Pushed Out the Leveraged Loan Maturity Ladder<br />
+ Since December 2008 the high yield market has grown 32.7%, while the leveraged loan universe shrank 18%<br />
USD Billions<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
Sources: Siguler Guff, JPM Credit Research<br />
0<br />
High Yield and Leverage Loan Maturity Schedule ($ billions)<br />
12/10 Loans 12/10 HY<br />
12/09 Loans 12/09 HY<br />
12/08 Loans 12/08 HY<br />
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018+<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
06
Supply/Demand Imbalances Await the Loan Market<br />
+ In 2012, Siguler Guff believes loan supply will outstrip demand due to declining CLO re-investment<br />
USD billions<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
Sources: Siguler Guff, S&P<br />
CLO Reinvestment<br />
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br />
USD billions<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
The CLO Re-investment Capability<br />
CLO Demand<br />
Loan Supply<br />
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
07
European Leveraged Loan Market<br />
+ In Europe, loan new issuance remained slow while maturities are looming<br />
USD billions<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
-<br />
European Leveraged Loan Market<br />
Loan Market Size New Loan Volume<br />
Source: Credit Suisse “2011 Leveraged Finance Outlook”<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
-<br />
USD billions<br />
USD billions<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
-<br />
European LBO Maturities<br />
Leveraged Loans Maturing<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
08
Structured Credit Markets<br />
Par Value<br />
+ Unprecedented government intervention through TALF, PPIP and MBS purchases by the Fed paved the way for<br />
an RMBS rally<br />
+ However, fundamentals continue to be weak<br />
110<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
Aug-07<br />
Nov-07<br />
Feb-08<br />
May-08<br />
Aug-08<br />
Nov-08<br />
Source: JP Morgan; AAA ratings by S&P and Moody’s<br />
Non-Agency Pricing 60+ Delinquencies<br />
Feb-09<br />
May-09<br />
Prime Alt-A 2006 AAA Subprime 2007 AAA Subprime<br />
Aug-09<br />
Nov-09<br />
Feb-10<br />
May-10<br />
Aug-10<br />
Nov-10<br />
Feb-11<br />
% of Original Balance<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
Prime Fixed Prime Option<br />
ARM<br />
Alt-A Fixed Alt-A ARM Subprime<br />
Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Apr-11<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
09
Stabilization of Collateral is Key<br />
+ Home values are the key driver of collateral performance<br />
+ Stabilization of their decline might not be permanent yet<br />
+ Supply/demand imbalance must equalize<br />
Avg. Price<br />
220<br />
200<br />
180<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
Jan-01<br />
Aug-01<br />
Mar-02<br />
Oct-02<br />
May-03<br />
Dec-03<br />
Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan<br />
Home Prices vs. Supply Underwater Borrowers<br />
Jul-04<br />
Feb-05<br />
Sep-05<br />
Apr-06<br />
Nov-06<br />
Jun-07<br />
Jan-08<br />
Aug-08<br />
Case/Shiller Months Supply<br />
Mar-09<br />
Oct-09<br />
May-10<br />
Dec-10<br />
15<br />
13<br />
11<br />
9<br />
7<br />
5<br />
3<br />
% of borrowers outstanding<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
All Current Del Reperf<br />
Subprime Fixed Subprime ARM Alt A Fixed Alt A ARM<br />
Option ARM Prime Fixed Prime ARM<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
010
Shadow Inventory Overhang<br />
+ Unprecedented supply in housing stock is much larger than demand<br />
+ Distressed inventory estimated at 7 million units, approximately 12% of existing U.S. homes<br />
Total<br />
% of<br />
Inventory<br />
REO Auction Notice of Shadow Total over<br />
City Listings Listings Listings Default Inventory Inventory listings<br />
Las Vegas, NV 16,765 16,835 14,879 21,135 52,849 69,614 415%<br />
San Diego, CA 10,416 5,603 7,727 11,548 24,878 35,294 339%<br />
Los Angeles, CA 43,050 16,706 26,789 37,894 81,389 124,439 289%<br />
San Francisco, CA 4,176 1,856 2,265 3,355 7,476 11,652 279%<br />
Denver, CO 17,730 3,020 10,867 1 13,888 31,618 178%<br />
Chicago, IL 42,698 1,317 7,808 16,787 25,912 68,610 161%<br />
Miami, FL 35,489 2,373 4,499 12,808 19,680 55,169 156%<br />
Washington, DC 13,411 1,754 2,776 0 4,530 17,941 134%<br />
Boston, MA 11,983 1,036 1 0 1,037 13,020 109%<br />
New York, NY 63,022 930 1,642 17 2,589 65,611 104%<br />
*Source: Amherst Mortgage Insight<br />
**Based on 56 million homes in U.S.<br />
Top 10 Metro Areas Inventory*<br />
MBA<br />
Delinquency<br />
Survey %<br />
Probability of<br />
Liquidation<br />
Probability<br />
Weighted<br />
Liquidation<br />
Foreclosure 4.3% 100% 4.3%<br />
90+ days 3.9% 99.2% 3.9%<br />
60+ days 1.7% 95.6% 1.6%<br />
30+ days 3.7% 72.4% 2.7%<br />
Total Distressed<br />
Inventory<br />
U.S. Housing Overhang**<br />
13.5% 12.4%<br />
Affected Units 7.6 million 6.9 million<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
011
The Structured Credit Market is at an Inflection Point<br />
% loss<br />
+ Until home values stabilize, we will continue to:<br />
+ Invest in opportunistic situations<br />
+ View security selection as the key driver of returns<br />
+ Allocate to niche subclasses of the mortgage market and specified pool trades (issuer- and collateral-specific<br />
investments)<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
Loss Severity Cumulative Loss (2007 Mortgages)<br />
Prime Fixed Prime ARM Alt-A Fixed Alt-A ARM Subprime<br />
Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10<br />
Source: JP Morgan; UPB refers to unpaid balance<br />
% of Original Balance<br />
18<br />
16<br />
14<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
Prime Fixed Prime ARM Alt-A Fixed Alt-A ARM Subprime<br />
Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
012
FDIC Troubled Institutions<br />
+ Banks’ losses are rising rapidly<br />
+ The FDIC has closed 246 financial institutions since 2008<br />
+ 775 banks currently sit on the FDIC Problem Institutions list<br />
USD billions<br />
900<br />
800<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
Source: FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile March 31, 2010<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
FDIC Troubled Institutions & Assets<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
2002<br />
2003<br />
2004<br />
2005<br />
2006<br />
2007<br />
2008<br />
2009<br />
Total Troubled Assets Total Troubled Institutions<br />
2010<br />
1,600<br />
1,400<br />
1,200<br />
1,000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
013
Community Bank Net Income<br />
+ Small banks are suffering under the weight of bad loans<br />
+ Small banks defined as having less than $10 billion in assets<br />
USD billions<br />
40<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
-<br />
(5)<br />
(10)<br />
34<br />
32<br />
Community Bank Net Income<br />
Sources: FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile 9/30/2010, Community Banks are defined as all FDIC insured institutions with an assets of $10 billion or less.<br />
27<br />
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br />
(0)<br />
(6)<br />
8<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
014
CRE Distressed Opportunity<br />
+ Commercial Real Estate (“CRE”) Fundamentals<br />
+ Last major down cycle (late 1980’s/early 1990’s):<br />
+ Oversupply<br />
+ Over-leveraging<br />
+ Current environment:<br />
+ Severe demand retrenchment<br />
+ Over-valuation<br />
+ Over-leveraging<br />
+ Wipeout: Siguler Guff estimates CRE values have declined 45% (1) , on average; U.S. industry equity wiped<br />
out on an aggregate basis<br />
+ Opportunity: CRE should experience above average returns for many years (emerging from the late 1980’s/<br />
early 1990’s real estate depression, CRE returns were attractive for 15 years)<br />
(1) Expected price correction based on the Moody’s/REAL Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI) and Siguler Guff estimates.<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
015
Industry Predicament<br />
+ Implication: CRE equity severely impaired<br />
$7,000<br />
$6,000<br />
$5,000<br />
$4,000<br />
$3,000<br />
$2,000<br />
$1,000<br />
$0<br />
CRE Total Value CRE Debt<br />
Equity Value<br />
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br />
Source: Moodys – Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI), Siguler Guff estimates, Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds.<br />
(1) Expected price correction based on midpoint of Siguler Guff estimates.<br />
Assumes 45% (1)<br />
Decline from ‘07<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
016
Industry Predicament<br />
+ Ramping debt maturities catalyze opportunity<br />
Annual Maturities ($ Billions)<br />
Upcoming CRE Debt Maturities (Notional)<br />
CMBS Fixed Rate CMBS Floating Rate Insurance Company Bank/Thrift Construction Other<br />
450<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />
Source: Deutsche Bank, Barclays Capital, Federal Reserve, Siguler Guff estimates.<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
017
Where is the Distress Today?<br />
+ Regional and Community banks are holding precarious amounts of CRE on their balance sheets:<br />
Bank Size Commercial Real Estate Exposure ($Bn) CRE Loans as %<br />
of Total Assets<br />
>$10 billion<br />
$10 billion - $1 billion<br />
$1 billion - $100 million<br />
$100 million - $0<br />
$25.7<br />
Source: FDIC Quarterly Banking Profiles, Q3 2010.<br />
$382.4<br />
$372.9<br />
$861.4<br />
9%<br />
36%<br />
35%<br />
19%<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
018
Certain Disclosures<br />
This Presentation is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer, solicitation, recommendation or a basis for any contract to purchase or sell any<br />
securities or partnership interests of any investment fund managed by or affiliated with Siguler Guff Advisers, LLC (“Siguler Guff”) (each, a “Fund” and, collectively, the<br />
“Funds”). Each Fund is offered or sold only pursuant to a Fund’s Private Placement Memorandum and related documents (such as an Agreement of Limited Partnership)<br />
that set forth detailed information regarding such Fund, including management fees and expenses, investment risks and conflicts of interest. Potential investors are<br />
urged to consult a professional adviser regarding any economic, tax, legal or other consequences of entering into any transactions or investments described herein.<br />
Alternative investment strategies, such as private equity, inherently involve risk and may not be suitable for all investors.<br />
Any reproduction or distribution of this Presentation, or any information contained herein, is prohibited. The Funds are private investment vehicles, and this Presentation<br />
contains highly confidential, proprietary information that is of independent economic value to the Funds and, with respect to information concerning portfolio funds and<br />
companies, such portfolio fund and companies. By accepting this Presentation, the recipient acknowledges that disclosure of any information contained herein could<br />
cause substantial, irreparable harm to the Funds, Siguler Guff, and the funds and portfolio companies, and agrees not to disclose such contents to any person or entity<br />
(except as required by law), and not to use such contents in any way detrimental to the Funds, Siguler Guff, or the portfolio funds or companies.<br />
This Presentation may contain Fund performance information. Past performance does not guarantee future results, and no representation or warranty, express or<br />
implied, is made regarding future performance. Information about the investments in the underlying funds in a Fund’s portfolio contained in this Presentation is<br />
derived from information provided to Siguler Guff by the underlying funds. Siguler Guff is not able to independently verify the accuracy of that information, and makes no<br />
warranty as to its accuracy or completeness, and the general partners of the underlying funds have not reviewed or approved of this Presentation. None of the<br />
information in this Presentation should be used as a basis for investment decisions.<br />
This Presentation contains certain statements, estimates and projections that are “forward-looking statements.” All statements other than statements of historical fact in<br />
this Presentation are forward-looking statements and include statements and assumptions relating to the following: plans and objectives of management for future<br />
operations or economic performance; conclusions and projections about current and future economic and political trends and conditions; and projected financial results<br />
and results of operations. These statements can generally be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology, including “may,” “believe,” “will,” “expect,” “anticipate,”<br />
“estimate,” “continue”, “rankings” or other similar words. Siguler Guff does not make any representations or warranties (express or implied) about the accuracy of such<br />
forward-looking statements. Readers are cautioned that actual results of an investment in a Fund could differ materially from forward-looking statements or the prior or<br />
projected results of the Funds. Readers of this Presentation are cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking statements.<br />
This Presentation may include footnotes or endnotes which, if included, are an integral part of this Presentation and should be read in their entirety.<br />
The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />
May 2011<br />
019