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State Association of County Retirement Systems<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

George W. Siguler<br />

Managing Director<br />

Confidential<br />

Ver. 05.12.11<br />

May 2011


The World Today<br />

Home price<br />

depreciation<br />

Systemic banking<br />

failures Over-leveraged<br />

LBOs<br />

Implosion of the<br />

securitization industry<br />

Sustained high<br />

unemployment<br />

Opaque multi-trillion<br />

dollar credit<br />

derivatives market<br />

Global Distressed<br />

Debt and<br />

Restructuring<br />

Opportunities<br />

Soaring corporate<br />

default rates<br />

Mortgage credit<br />

meltdown<br />

Consumer<br />

deleveraging<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

02


Global Contagion<br />

+ The massive correction in the credit markets and the downturn in the housing market have created severe<br />

dislocations across many asset classes<br />

+ The contagion has spread into the global capital markets, creating a broader scope of opportunities for distressed<br />

investors<br />

RMBS &<br />

other<br />

structured<br />

products<br />

Corporate<br />

leveraged loans<br />

and high yield<br />

Global Opportunity Set<br />

Commercial<br />

real estate debt<br />

market<br />

Consumer debt:<br />

credit cards, auto<br />

and student loans<br />

Commercial<br />

real estate<br />

property<br />

market<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

03


Unprecedented Government Support of the Markets<br />

Selected Key Government Intervention Programs<br />

Program Authorized ($B) Invested ($B)<br />

Federal Reserve<br />

GSE Debt Purchase Program $ 1,450 $ 925<br />

TAF - Term Auction Facility $ 500 $ 110<br />

CPFF - Commercial Paper Funding Facility $ 1,800 $ 14<br />

Term Asset Backed Security Lending Facility $ 1,000 $ 44<br />

U.S. Government Bond purchases $ 300 $ 295<br />

QE2 - Long Term Treasury Purchase Program $ 600 $ 375<br />

Other $ 850 $ -<br />

Federal Reserve Total $ 6,500 $ 1,763<br />

Stimulus<br />

Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 $ 168 $ 168<br />

Student loan guarantees $ 195 $ 33<br />

Other $ 36 $ 19<br />

Treasury Total $ 399 $ 220<br />

Treasury<br />

TARP $ 700 $ 356<br />

Conservatorship of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac $ 400 $ 111<br />

Other $ 974 $ 415<br />

Treasury Total $ 2,074 $ 882<br />

FDIC<br />

TLGP (Guarantee Program) $ 1,500 $ 308<br />

Asset Guarantee Program (C, AIG, BS) $ 528 $ 154<br />

Bank Takeovers $ 45 $ 45<br />

FDIC Total $ 2,074 $ 508<br />

HUD<br />

HOPE for Homeowners $ 345 $ 20<br />

HUD Total $ 345 $ 20<br />

TOTAL $11.4 Trillion $3.4 Trillion<br />

Sources: KBW Research, Federal Reserve, U.S. Treasury, FDIC, CBO, White House, Bloomberg, CNN<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

04


Sustained Rally<br />

+ Massive rally in the leveraged loan and high yield universe in 2009, with the weakest credits leading the way<br />

L+3500<br />

L+3000<br />

L+2500<br />

L+2000<br />

L+1500<br />

L+1000<br />

L+500<br />

L+0<br />

Jan-07<br />

Apr-07<br />

Jul-07<br />

Oct-07<br />

Jan-08<br />

Apr-08<br />

Sources: JPMorgan Credit Research, CSFB Leveraged Finance Research<br />

Average Discounted Spread<br />

Jul-08<br />

Oct-08<br />

Jan-09<br />

Apr-09<br />

Jul-09<br />

Oct-09<br />

Jan-10<br />

Apr-10<br />

All Loans ML HY H0A0 ML HY CCC H0A3<br />

Jul-10<br />

Oct-10<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

05


High Yield Market Has Pushed Out the Leveraged Loan Maturity Ladder<br />

+ Since December 2008 the high yield market has grown 32.7%, while the leveraged loan universe shrank 18%<br />

USD Billions<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

Sources: Siguler Guff, JPM Credit Research<br />

0<br />

High Yield and Leverage Loan Maturity Schedule ($ billions)<br />

12/10 Loans 12/10 HY<br />

12/09 Loans 12/09 HY<br />

12/08 Loans 12/08 HY<br />

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018+<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

06


Supply/Demand Imbalances Await the Loan Market<br />

+ In 2012, Siguler Guff believes loan supply will outstrip demand due to declining CLO re-investment<br />

USD billions<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

60<br />

40<br />

20<br />

0<br />

Sources: Siguler Guff, S&P<br />

CLO Reinvestment<br />

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br />

USD billions<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

The CLO Re-investment Capability<br />

CLO Demand<br />

Loan Supply<br />

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

07


European Leveraged Loan Market<br />

+ In Europe, loan new issuance remained slow while maturities are looming<br />

USD billions<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

-<br />

European Leveraged Loan Market<br />

Loan Market Size New Loan Volume<br />

Source: Credit Suisse “2011 Leveraged Finance Outlook”<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

-<br />

USD billions<br />

USD billions<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

-<br />

European LBO Maturities<br />

Leveraged Loans Maturing<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

08


Structured Credit Markets<br />

Par Value<br />

+ Unprecedented government intervention through TALF, PPIP and MBS purchases by the Fed paved the way for<br />

an RMBS rally<br />

+ However, fundamentals continue to be weak<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

Aug-07<br />

Nov-07<br />

Feb-08<br />

May-08<br />

Aug-08<br />

Nov-08<br />

Source: JP Morgan; AAA ratings by S&P and Moody’s<br />

Non-Agency Pricing 60+ Delinquencies<br />

Feb-09<br />

May-09<br />

Prime Alt-A 2006 AAA Subprime 2007 AAA Subprime<br />

Aug-09<br />

Nov-09<br />

Feb-10<br />

May-10<br />

Aug-10<br />

Nov-10<br />

Feb-11<br />

% of Original Balance<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

Prime Fixed Prime Option<br />

ARM<br />

Alt-A Fixed Alt-A ARM Subprime<br />

Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Apr-11<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

09


Stabilization of Collateral is Key<br />

+ Home values are the key driver of collateral performance<br />

+ Stabilization of their decline might not be permanent yet<br />

+ Supply/demand imbalance must equalize<br />

Avg. Price<br />

220<br />

200<br />

180<br />

160<br />

140<br />

120<br />

100<br />

Jan-01<br />

Aug-01<br />

Mar-02<br />

Oct-02<br />

May-03<br />

Dec-03<br />

Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan<br />

Home Prices vs. Supply Underwater Borrowers<br />

Jul-04<br />

Feb-05<br />

Sep-05<br />

Apr-06<br />

Nov-06<br />

Jun-07<br />

Jan-08<br />

Aug-08<br />

Case/Shiller Months Supply<br />

Mar-09<br />

Oct-09<br />

May-10<br />

Dec-10<br />

15<br />

13<br />

11<br />

9<br />

7<br />

5<br />

3<br />

% of borrowers outstanding<br />

100%<br />

90%<br />

80%<br />

70%<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

All Current Del Reperf<br />

Subprime Fixed Subprime ARM Alt A Fixed Alt A ARM<br />

Option ARM Prime Fixed Prime ARM<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

010


Shadow Inventory Overhang<br />

+ Unprecedented supply in housing stock is much larger than demand<br />

+ Distressed inventory estimated at 7 million units, approximately 12% of existing U.S. homes<br />

Total<br />

% of<br />

Inventory<br />

REO Auction Notice of Shadow Total over<br />

City Listings Listings Listings Default Inventory Inventory listings<br />

Las Vegas, NV 16,765 16,835 14,879 21,135 52,849 69,614 415%<br />

San Diego, CA 10,416 5,603 7,727 11,548 24,878 35,294 339%<br />

Los Angeles, CA 43,050 16,706 26,789 37,894 81,389 124,439 289%<br />

San Francisco, CA 4,176 1,856 2,265 3,355 7,476 11,652 279%<br />

Denver, CO 17,730 3,020 10,867 1 13,888 31,618 178%<br />

Chicago, IL 42,698 1,317 7,808 16,787 25,912 68,610 161%<br />

Miami, FL 35,489 2,373 4,499 12,808 19,680 55,169 156%<br />

Washington, DC 13,411 1,754 2,776 0 4,530 17,941 134%<br />

Boston, MA 11,983 1,036 1 0 1,037 13,020 109%<br />

New York, NY 63,022 930 1,642 17 2,589 65,611 104%<br />

*Source: Amherst Mortgage Insight<br />

**Based on 56 million homes in U.S.<br />

Top 10 Metro Areas Inventory*<br />

MBA<br />

Delinquency<br />

Survey %<br />

Probability of<br />

Liquidation<br />

Probability<br />

Weighted<br />

Liquidation<br />

Foreclosure 4.3% 100% 4.3%<br />

90+ days 3.9% 99.2% 3.9%<br />

60+ days 1.7% 95.6% 1.6%<br />

30+ days 3.7% 72.4% 2.7%<br />

Total Distressed<br />

Inventory<br />

U.S. Housing Overhang**<br />

13.5% 12.4%<br />

Affected Units 7.6 million 6.9 million<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

011


The Structured Credit Market is at an Inflection Point<br />

% loss<br />

+ Until home values stabilize, we will continue to:<br />

+ Invest in opportunistic situations<br />

+ View security selection as the key driver of returns<br />

+ Allocate to niche subclasses of the mortgage market and specified pool trades (issuer- and collateral-specific<br />

investments)<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

Loss Severity Cumulative Loss (2007 Mortgages)<br />

Prime Fixed Prime ARM Alt-A Fixed Alt-A ARM Subprime<br />

Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10<br />

Source: JP Morgan; UPB refers to unpaid balance<br />

% of Original Balance<br />

18<br />

16<br />

14<br />

12<br />

10<br />

8<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

Prime Fixed Prime ARM Alt-A Fixed Alt-A ARM Subprime<br />

Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

012


FDIC Troubled Institutions<br />

+ Banks’ losses are rising rapidly<br />

+ The FDIC has closed 246 financial institutions since 2008<br />

+ 775 banks currently sit on the FDIC Problem Institutions list<br />

USD billions<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

1990<br />

1991<br />

1992<br />

1993<br />

Source: FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile March 31, 2010<br />

1994<br />

1995<br />

FDIC Troubled Institutions & Assets<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

Total Troubled Assets Total Troubled Institutions<br />

2010<br />

1,600<br />

1,400<br />

1,200<br />

1,000<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

0<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

013


Community Bank Net Income<br />

+ Small banks are suffering under the weight of bad loans<br />

+ Small banks defined as having less than $10 billion in assets<br />

USD billions<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

-<br />

(5)<br />

(10)<br />

34<br />

32<br />

Community Bank Net Income<br />

Sources: FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile 9/30/2010, Community Banks are defined as all FDIC insured institutions with an assets of $10 billion or less.<br />

27<br />

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br />

(0)<br />

(6)<br />

8<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

014


CRE Distressed Opportunity<br />

+ Commercial Real Estate (“CRE”) Fundamentals<br />

+ Last major down cycle (late 1980’s/early 1990’s):<br />

+ Oversupply<br />

+ Over-leveraging<br />

+ Current environment:<br />

+ Severe demand retrenchment<br />

+ Over-valuation<br />

+ Over-leveraging<br />

+ Wipeout: Siguler Guff estimates CRE values have declined 45% (1) , on average; U.S. industry equity wiped<br />

out on an aggregate basis<br />

+ Opportunity: CRE should experience above average returns for many years (emerging from the late 1980’s/<br />

early 1990’s real estate depression, CRE returns were attractive for 15 years)<br />

(1) Expected price correction based on the Moody’s/REAL Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI) and Siguler Guff estimates.<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

015


Industry Predicament<br />

+ Implication: CRE equity severely impaired<br />

$7,000<br />

$6,000<br />

$5,000<br />

$4,000<br />

$3,000<br />

$2,000<br />

$1,000<br />

$0<br />

CRE Total Value CRE Debt<br />

Equity Value<br />

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br />

Source: Moodys – Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI), Siguler Guff estimates, Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds.<br />

(1) Expected price correction based on midpoint of Siguler Guff estimates.<br />

Assumes 45% (1)<br />

Decline from ‘07<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

016


Industry Predicament<br />

+ Ramping debt maturities catalyze opportunity<br />

Annual Maturities ($ Billions)<br />

Upcoming CRE Debt Maturities (Notional)<br />

CMBS Fixed Rate CMBS Floating Rate Insurance Company Bank/Thrift Construction Other<br />

450<br />

400<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br />

Source: Deutsche Bank, Barclays Capital, Federal Reserve, Siguler Guff estimates.<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

017


Where is the Distress Today?<br />

+ Regional and Community banks are holding precarious amounts of CRE on their balance sheets:<br />

Bank Size Commercial Real Estate Exposure ($Bn) CRE Loans as %<br />

of Total Assets<br />

>$10 billion<br />

$10 billion - $1 billion<br />

$1 billion - $100 million<br />

$100 million - $0<br />

$25.7<br />

Source: FDIC Quarterly Banking Profiles, Q3 2010.<br />

$382.4<br />

$372.9<br />

$861.4<br />

9%<br />

36%<br />

35%<br />

19%<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

018


Certain Disclosures<br />

This Presentation is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer, solicitation, recommendation or a basis for any contract to purchase or sell any<br />

securities or partnership interests of any investment fund managed by or affiliated with Siguler Guff Advisers, LLC (“Siguler Guff”) (each, a “Fund” and, collectively, the<br />

“Funds”). Each Fund is offered or sold only pursuant to a Fund’s Private Placement Memorandum and related documents (such as an Agreement of Limited Partnership)<br />

that set forth detailed information regarding such Fund, including management fees and expenses, investment risks and conflicts of interest. Potential investors are<br />

urged to consult a professional adviser regarding any economic, tax, legal or other consequences of entering into any transactions or investments described herein.<br />

Alternative investment strategies, such as private equity, inherently involve risk and may not be suitable for all investors.<br />

Any reproduction or distribution of this Presentation, or any information contained herein, is prohibited. The Funds are private investment vehicles, and this Presentation<br />

contains highly confidential, proprietary information that is of independent economic value to the Funds and, with respect to information concerning portfolio funds and<br />

companies, such portfolio fund and companies. By accepting this Presentation, the recipient acknowledges that disclosure of any information contained herein could<br />

cause substantial, irreparable harm to the Funds, Siguler Guff, and the funds and portfolio companies, and agrees not to disclose such contents to any person or entity<br />

(except as required by law), and not to use such contents in any way detrimental to the Funds, Siguler Guff, or the portfolio funds or companies.<br />

This Presentation may contain Fund performance information. Past performance does not guarantee future results, and no representation or warranty, express or<br />

implied, is made regarding future performance. Information about the investments in the underlying funds in a Fund’s portfolio contained in this Presentation is<br />

derived from information provided to Siguler Guff by the underlying funds. Siguler Guff is not able to independently verify the accuracy of that information, and makes no<br />

warranty as to its accuracy or completeness, and the general partners of the underlying funds have not reviewed or approved of this Presentation. None of the<br />

information in this Presentation should be used as a basis for investment decisions.<br />

This Presentation contains certain statements, estimates and projections that are “forward-looking statements.” All statements other than statements of historical fact in<br />

this Presentation are forward-looking statements and include statements and assumptions relating to the following: plans and objectives of management for future<br />

operations or economic performance; conclusions and projections about current and future economic and political trends and conditions; and projected financial results<br />

and results of operations. These statements can generally be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology, including “may,” “believe,” “will,” “expect,” “anticipate,”<br />

“estimate,” “continue”, “rankings” or other similar words. Siguler Guff does not make any representations or warranties (express or implied) about the accuracy of such<br />

forward-looking statements. Readers are cautioned that actual results of an investment in a Fund could differ materially from forward-looking statements or the prior or<br />

projected results of the Funds. Readers of this Presentation are cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking statements.<br />

This Presentation may include footnotes or endnotes which, if included, are an integral part of this Presentation and should be read in their entirety.<br />

The Landscape of Debt Opportunities<br />

May 2011<br />

019

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