NYT-1201: STATE OF THE ART A Thermostat That's Clever, Not ...

ually anchored in Hiroshima Bay, Yamamoto continue
d to warn against joining with the Nazis. He remin
ded his government that Japan imported around four
-fifths of its oil and steel from areas controlled
by the Allies. To risk conflict, he wrote, was fo
olhardy, because “there is no chance of winning a
war with the United States for some time to come.”
But Japan’s confused and divided government drifte
d toward war while refusing to face the strategic
problems it posed. It signed the Tripartite Pact w
ith Germany and Italy in Berlin in September 1940.
As Yamamoto had predicted, the American governmen
t quickly restricted and finally cut off exports o
f oil and other vital materials. The sanctions bro
ught events to a head, because Japan had no domest
ic oil production to speak of, and would exhaust i
ts stockpiles in about a year.
Yamamoto realized he had lost the fight to keep Ja
pan out of war, and he fell in line with the plann
ing process. But he continued to ask critical ques
tions. Two decades of strategic planning for a war
with the United States had envisioned a clash of
battleships in the western Pacific — a decisive ba
ttle like that at Tsushima. But Yamamoto now asked
: What if the American fleet declined to play its
part? What if the Americans instead chose to bide
their time and build up their strength?
IN 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered t
he fleet to Pearl Harbor. He had intended to signa
l that the United States Navy was in striking dist
ance of Japan — but “conversely,” Yamamoto observe
d, “we’re within striking distance, too. In trying
to intimidate us, America has put itself in a vul
nerable position. If you ask me, they’re just that
bit too confident.” Therein lay the germ of his p
lan to launch a sudden carrier air attack on the H
awaiian stronghold.
Adm. Osami Nagano, chief of the Naval General Staf